My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 13, which is also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and which simply requires the removal of the word “reasonably” from Clause 5. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is unable to be with us today, but he associates himself with my remarks.
The Government told us that one of the purposes of the Bill is to provide families with information that was not previously available to them, and another is to gather all investigative and review functions within the ICRIR. This was always the proposal under the Stormont House agreement, and I have no difficulty with it, except for the way in which it is done and the immunity clause. But the powers accorded under the Bill do not provide to the ICRIR the access to information that will be necessary to obtain the information that families need,
without lengthy judicial reviews and threats of judicial reviews, which have bedevilled inquiries such as the Saville inquiry and, indeed, the Kenova investigation.
In normal criminal investigations, there is a proviso that an investigator will not do anything which would prejudice national security or put someone’s life at risk. There is law that deals with this. The law also provides mechanisms which include a power to recover information, such as the search process when a warrant has been obtained. For example, police will seize all the computers in a house to determine whether the contents of any of them may be relevant to the matter under investigation. Those are general statutory investigation powers. Those charged with criminal investigation also have powers to require the provision of information from agencies and individuals. For example, under Section 17 of the Police Reform Act 2002 there is a simple duty on every chief constable and local policing body to provide information to the IOPC. Similarly, Section 66 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 says:
“The Chief Constable and the Board shall supply the Ombudsman with such information and documents as the Ombudsman may require for the purposes of, or in connection with, the exercise of any of his functions”.
There is no qualification, simply a duty to provide information. However, this Bill as drafted states that a relevant authority
“must make available to the ICRIR such … information … documents, and … other material as the Commissioner for Investigations may reasonably require”.
This provision applies only to information which the ICRIR reasonably requests. Of course, an investigator must always act reasonably and in compliance with the law. However, there is no process for which a chief constable may, for example, say, “No, it’s not reasonable for you to make that request for information”. I had those conversations in the early days of my tenure as Police Ombudsman. I was told, for example, that it was not reasonable for me to ask for sensitive information, such as information held by Special Branch—now the Intelligence Branch. I was able to point to the law, which said that the chief constable
“shall supply the Ombudsman with such information … as the Ombudsman may require”.
That is how it is in criminal investigations. It is not required that the investigator demonstrates the reasonableness of any request for information.
The Minister has said that a requirement that information shall be reasonably required is to be found in other statutes. He cited one, the Finance Act 2008, so I looked it up. Section 113 of and Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008 provides that an officer of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs can require a taxpayer to provide information reasonably requested by the officer for the purposes of collecting a tax debt owed by a taxpayer. There is a big difference in the powers required to collect an unpaid tax debt and those required to investigate a murder, as is evidenced by the current state of the law, which provides necessary protections for privacy in appropriate circumstances under the GDPR and the Data Protection Act, for example, but also empowers criminal investigators to access information. This is the proper working out of UK compliance with its obligations under the Good Friday agreement and the European convention.
If an agency could respond to a request for information by the ICRIR by challenging the reasonableness of that request, there would be inevitable and very lengthy disputes, possibly—indeed probably—involving judicial review, about why what the ICRIR was asking for was reasonable. The reality is that the investigator—the ICRIR in this case—may be in possession of material justifying the reasonableness of the request for information, but that material cannot be disclosed at this particular point in time without compromising the integrity of the investigation. The result is that an agency may be unaware of the material which the investigator holds, but it may be very aware that information which is held by that agency is highly compromising of the agency and may indicate how it came about that, despite an agency, for example, being aware of a proposal to murder someone, it did not intervene to stop that murder. It has happened.
The necessary unqualified powers to compel the production of documentation, especially documentation held by the other agencies, security intelligence services and police intelligence units, will not be available to the ICRIR because of how the Bill is drafted and the definition of sensitive information. The proposed powers to identify and gather information will also be subject to veto by the Secretary of State under the extensive provisions of Clauses 29 and 30. Access to information could be severely curtailed through the exercise of powers conferred on the Secretary of State in this Bill, because it gives the Secretary of State powers to give guidance about how the ICRIR is to identify sensitive information such as that held by police intelligence units and how that information is held and handled, et cetera, and even to create new criminal offences in relation to such matters.
Last year, the European Committee of Ministers exposed serious concerns about the Bill, and the Commissioner for Human Rights has now said that the amendments proposed by the Government do not sufficiently allay those concerns. This emphasised again that it is crucial that the legislation, if progressed and ultimately adopted, is in full compliance with our convention obligations and will enable effective investigation into outstanding cases.
The Committee of Ministers has called on the Government, first, to ensure that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland’s role in the establishment and oversight of the ICRIR is more clearly circumscribed in law, in a manner that ensures that the ICRIR is independent and seen to be independent. Secondly, it has called on them to ensure that the disclosure provisions unambiguously require full disclosure to be given to the ICRIR. Thirdly, it has asked that they ensure that the Bill adequately provides for the participations of victims and their families for transparency and public scrutiny, which is fundamental to Article 2. It has again stressed the importance for the success of any investigative body of gaining the confidence of victims, families of victims and potential witnesses.
I also put my name to Amendment 31 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, supported also by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, who has spoken at length about it, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Murphy. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, is unable
to be with us today. I shall support that amendment if a Division is called. I do not think that I need to describe the reasons for it, but I shall say that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that the Kenova model could effectively be scaled up for the purposes of the ICRIR.
I regret that I cannot support Amendment 28 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lords, Lord Bew and Lord Godson, because it requires that, when a family is seeking a review or investigation, they will have to be able to show that, if there is to be a review, and there has previously been an investigation or an inquest, for example, the ICRIR should not decide to grant a review unless there is compelling new evidence. To require a family to provide compelling new evidence would be to deprive them of their Article 2 rights to investigation, in particular in older cases where investigations and inquests were not as thorough or impartial as they are now. It is not the role of a traumatised and bereaved family to gather compelling new evidence. They have neither the powers nor the access to do so. That is the job of the investigator—in this case, the ICRIR.