My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 71, 72, 73 and 74 in my name, which are amendments to Amendment 70, tabled by the Minister, who has continued diligently to engage with all shades of opinion in your Lordships’ House. Like other noble Lords, I thank him for that.
For the reasons given, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friends Lord Hain and Lord Murphy of Torfaen. At this stage, I feel no need to go over those reasons again. In proposing these amendments, I am conscious that, when juxtaposed with the larger issue of immunity itself, they are confessedly procedural and administrative in their scope. But they
do seek to do something in the province of responsible legislation: they anticipate that which can be anticipated, minimise the effect of contingency and, in this particular case, ensure that, if the chief commissioner is unable to consider requests for immunity—whether for reasons of misadventure or owing to a potential or perceived conflict of interest, or for any number of reasons—there is a person empowered to do so. To some extent, this has been anticipated by Amendment 70 in the name of the Minister.
While the government amendment is welcome, the amendments I have tabled seek to do three specific things. Amendments 71, 72 and 73 mandate the appointment of a deputy for the chief commissioner. This deputy would be appointed by the Chief Commissioner immediately upon their own appointment and would be empowered to exercise some or all of the immunity functions if the chief commissioner were absent or otherwise unable to do so. I believe that the mandatory appointment of such a deputy would better ensure a consistency of approach, strengthen institutional memory in respect of such decisions and place a further brick in the wall dividing the Secretary of State—mindful as I am of new subsection (7B) in Amendment 70—from the fraught question of immunity.
Where Amendment 70 seeks to engage that eventuality by recourse first to a rapid nomination by the chief commissioner and, if that is not possible, through an ad hoc appointment by the Secretary of State, my amendments would see such a person already in place. This person would be fully briefed on these issues and placed in their position by the chief commissioner at the start of their term.
Given that new subsection (7C) in Amendment 70 quite rightly mandates that a stand-in for the chief commissioner must have held high judicial office, it is evident that one of the qualities such a person must possess is impartiality. Surely, being appointed by the Commissioner rather than by an active politician in the shape of the Secretary of State would strengthen claims to judicial objectivity rather than the reverse. Moreover, having a named deputy in place from the beginning of the chief commissioner’s term will provide confidence that, where decisions must be made in his absence, they will conform with the standards set by the chief commissioner and follow the tramlines of decision-making in a manner that is consistent across all cases. I beg to move.