My Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments relates to the provision of support to potential victims of modern slavery. We have, of course, recently had an extensive debate about the application of the public order disqualification to those who meet the conditions in Clause 2 of the Bill. I will not go over the same ground again, save to say that it is a necessary consequence of the provisions in Clause 4 that the duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for removal of persons who meet Clause 2 conditions should apply regardless of whether the person claims to be a victim of modern slavery.
It follows that, for the provisions of this Bill to work as intended, individuals who arrive illegally in the UK and receive a positive reasonable grounds decision must be disqualified from the protections of the national referral mechanism. Clause 22 gives effect to this principle for England and Wales by disapplying the duties on the Secretary of State, under Section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, to provide necessary assistance and support to potential victims during the recovery period. Clauses 23 and 24 have the same effect in relation to corresponding legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. Clause 27 then makes the necessary consequential changes to the relevant legislation that applies in each part of the United Kingdom.
If an individual arrives in the UK illegally and a first responder suspects that they may be a victim of modern slavery, they will still refer that individual into the NRM and that person will receive a reasonable grounds decision. That process will not change under the Bill. However, as I set out before in relation to Clause 21, Article 13 of ECAT envisages that the obligation on signatory states to provide assistance and support to potential victims may be withheld on grounds of public order. This is precisely what Clauses 22 to 24 give effect to as a result of the public order threat arising from the current scale of illegal entry into the United Kingdom by people undertaking dangerous and unnecessary channel crossings in small boats. That means that they will not benefit from the protections otherwise afforded to potential victims of modern slavery, subject to the exception set out in Clause 21, which we have debated at some length.
It is right that the Government take meaningful steps to ensure that these illegal and dangerous channel crossings are stopped and that any incentives to enter the UK by such means are closed off. That is what these clauses seek to do. Clauses 22 to 24 operate subject to the same exception as Clause 21 in relation to those potential victims who are co-operating with a public authority in connection with an investigation or criminal proceedings in relation to their alleged exploitation, and it is necessary for them to remain in the UK to provide such co-operation.
The effect of Amendments 93, 94, 95 and 96 is no different in practice from proposition by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to strike out these clauses as a whole. The amendments effectively gut Clauses 22 to 24, such that the existing requirements relating to the provision of support would continue to apply. It will therefore come as no surprise to noble Lords that I cannot commend these amendments to the Committee.
In response to the devolution points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Morrow, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, I remind the Committee that immigration and nationality are reserved matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and therefore matters for the UK Government. It is also our view that the modern slavery clauses also deal specifically with the reserved matter of immigration, and they are for a reserved purpose. As for the Bill as a whole, they would not therefore engage the legislative consent process.
I assure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham that anyone who has arrived illegally in the UK on or after 7 March and before commencement would in this period receive support as now.