I remember well when the detention of children was ended by legislation. I visited Cedars, the property—I do not like the term “facility” in this connection—near Gatwick that was used for two or three days before the removal of families who were going to be removed and were at the end of the argument, if you like. What was particularly notable to me were the facilities for the children, and the support that was given to them, who were accommodated there for a very short time, to help them prepare to go back to a country that they may or may not have remembered—indeed, that they may not have ever lived in. It suffused the whole place and was really admirable. You only had to walk into the place to see
the equipment and toys, and the information that was set out, as well as the work being done by social workers to support the children concerned. There were no families there at that point; the property used to allow visitors only on days when it knew that no families would be in residence.
I have a number of amendments in this group. The first is Amendment 59A, which seeks to probe the “discretion” given to the Secretary of State in making regulations regarding the detention of unaccompanied children. Amendment 64A is a similar amendment. The reason for my tabling this amendment is to understand whether the envisaged discretion can be exercised to extend the circumstances specified in an earlier part of the clause or to narrow those circumstances.
I discovered a possible answer to this when looking at my next amendment, Amendment 61B, which would provide for the affirmative procedure. Amendment 64C is a similar amendment. I tabled this amendment out of pure instinct that there should be an affirmative procedure, not a negative one. I subsequently discovered that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, with considerably more logic than I bring to the matter, recommended the affirmative procedure. I quote its report:
“The Memorandum explains that the negative procedure is considered appropriate because ‘the effect of any regulations is to limit the circumstances in which an unaccompanied child may be detained or the duration of detention for the purposes of removal’. In our view, this explanation is misconceived”.
That is very much committee speak for, “We really disagree”. The report went on:
“The regulation making power can only be viewed as a limiting power from the perspective of the Bill as introduced into the House of Commons which conferred an unfettered power to detain unaccompanied children”.
However, amendments were then made in the Commons, so
“no such unfettered power of detention exists in the Bill as introduced into the House of Lords. It is the regulations alone which will specify the circumstances in which unaccompanied children will be capable of being detained, in the absence of which there is no power to detain such children. Given the importance and sensitivity of the subject matter, we consider that the affirmative resolution procedure should apply”.
As I say, the committee approached this with considerably more logic and power than I was planning to bring to it.
11.15 pm
Amendments 74, 75 and 76 regard matters on which I rather doubt there will be sympathy from the Government Front Bench, given the debate so far. They would provide for a 72-hour time limit on the detention of vulnerable people, or seven days with ministerial authorisation. I remember some years ago a meeting chaired by a very senior MP who had been a Minister. She argued how important it was to have ministerial authorisation in sensitive and arguably unusual cases because it ensures that Ministers apply their minds to the individual’s real situation.
Pretty much everyone has been through what led to flight and the experience of that flight—people must be vulnerable. There is a definition of vulnerability in Amendment 76, and I think it would be hard to argue that anyone in the list is not vulnerable and therefore in need of appropriate treatment.
Amendment 75 would require the Secretary of State to provide to the tribunal all relevant—which I realise now has become quite a topical term—information they have on an individual when there is an application for immigration bail or a bail hearing.
Amendments 76B and 78A would restrict the detention of potential victims of slavery and trafficking. We have already in this Committee spent some time on reasonable and conclusive grounds, and that a victim or potential victim can be referred only by a first responder; there is no self-referral. We have also spent time on the very particular needs of potential victims, including those who have reached the first stage of a “reasonable grounds” decision.
The detention of this already vulnerable group increases the risk of retraumatisation and there is a risk to their long-term physical and mental health. On Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, talked about the fact that victims must be identified because that enables them to be supported. In turn, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has referred to several times, that affects the willingness and ability— ability is important too—to engage in investigations and prosecutions. This group of people is very much at risk of retrafficking and further exploitation, and needs the protection that these amendments put forward.