My Lords, I sat out the Second Reading debate in favour of a meeting of the Constitution Committee, in which we discussed our draft report on the Bill. That report is no substitute for the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights—which I, for one, await with impatience—although I hope that it does deserve study. It discusses, in particular, the remarkable variety in the Bill of what might be called ouster clauses. Among them is Clause 4(2), which is the subject of Amendment 21, in the name of
my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead, who cannot be here today, and to which I have added my name.
Some ouster clauses are aimed at restricting appeals or reviews from the decisions of a legally qualified tribunal. Examples include Clauses 49 and 51, which appear to be modelled on Section 2 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Privacy International case concerned an ouster of that nature.
More fundamental in their scope are the ousters in Clauses 4, 12 and 55. They bite not on claims that have already been adjudicated by tribunals but on claims that have never been adjudicated by any court or tribunal—and, in the case of Clause 4, any claim to the effect that removal from this country would be contrary not only to our laws against slavery and human trafficking, as we have just heard, but to the refugee convention, the Human Rights Act and the principles applied by the courts on judicial review. Such claims can be pursued, if at all—I am mindful of the jurisdictional limitations on the Human Rights Act—only after removal from the United Kingdom.
Through the kind offices of the Bar Council, I spoke this morning to a number of immigration law practitioners. They told me that so-called bring-backs, historically, have been vanishingly rare. Indeed, they are measurable in single figures. These are people who win their cases from abroad and then see those judgments implemented in the sense that they are brought back. Pursuing such a claim from out of country seems, for most people, to be a remedy which, in the time-honoured phrase, is not practical and effective but theoretical and illusory.
Clause 4 is supported by two buttresses: Clause 52, which prevents our courts issuing interim measures to prevent or delay removal; and Clause 53, which, if passed into law, will give parliamentary authority to Ministers to disregard interim measures issued by the European Court of Human Rights. A final nail is hammered into the coffin of judicial review by government Amendment 25A, which was debated in the previous group.
The Minister will no doubt say that the effect of the Clause 4 ouster is mitigated by the new suspensive claims provided for by Clauses 37 to 51 to deal with cases of serious harm and factual error. That is right, but only up to a point. The problem with those clauses is not only the punishing time limits and evidential requirements proposed in the Bill but their limited scope of application. For example, they afford no scope to challenge removal on slavery and human trafficking grounds, on private and family life grounds, or for the breach of elementary legal principles, such as prejudging and procedural error.
As my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood referred to at Second Reading, the difficulty we face as a revising Chamber is that this degradation of existing judicial powers to keep the Executive in check is a feature of this legislation and not a bug. The Government’s theory of deterrence is based, in significant part, on the neutering of the courts. No doubt we will have to decide on Report whether we think that the objectives of the Bill, and the likelihood of achieving them, are enough to justify
such a significant rebalancing of powers. If we think that they are not, we will have to decide whether to try to reverse the ousters in Clause 4 or to work with the grain of the Bill, however unpalatable we may find it, and seek to increase the range and feasibility of the new suspensive claims. In any event, it may not be controversial, but, in the words of a unanimous Constitution Committee:
“The cumulative impact of the ouster and partial ouster provisions in the Bill gives rise to very considerable constitutional implications”.
I wonder whether the Minister agrees.
6.45 pm
Finally, I have a question for the Minister of a probing and, I am afraid, slightly technical nature. Clause 4 does not itself render protection claims or human rights claims inadmissible, when brought by a person who meets the four removal conditions in Clause 2. Rather, Clause 4(2) requires the Secretary of State to declare such claims inadmissible, and Clause 4(4) exempts such declarations from any right of appeal. The Constitution Committee described that provision as having
“significant rule of law implications”,
and as relating
“to decisions hitherto reserved to the courts”.
That is indeed so, but my question is of a more prosaic nature: what happens when a declaration of inadmissibility is made under Clause 4, and a court subsequently determines, after hearing a factual suspensive claim under Clause 42, that a mistake of fact was made in determining that the person in question met the removal conditions? Justice surely requires that the declaration of inadmissibility, having been made on a false premise, should be rescinded and the protection claim or human rights claim allowed to proceed. I hope that the Minister will agree, but I do not see any mechanism to that effect in the Bill. Can the Minister, either orally or in writing, show me where that is? If there is nothing there, will he undertake to look at whether this point could usefully be clarified in the Bill?