My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 12 and 13 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen; Amendment 16 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan; Amendments 24 to 30 inclusive, which are all consequential; and, finally, Amendment 178, which will not detain us for very long.
Amendments 12 and 16 and their consequential amendments are probing amendments. Their effect is to remove the Secretary of State from the various roles in connection with the appointment and holding office of commissioners of the ICRIR, which, with the leave of the House, I will hereafter refer to as “the commission”. The amendments would replace the Secretary of State with the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission —NIJAC.
As it stands, the Bill confers sweeping powers on the Secretary of State, including the power of appointment to the newly established commission and powers over the process of the commission itself. These powers include but are not limited to: control over the commission’s funding; the power to request reviews; the appointment of commissioners; the devising of procedures for dealing with requests around immunity; the power to withhold permission for the disclosure of sensitive information; the power to terminate a review on national security grounds; and, most importantly, the power to wind up the commission itself.
The Government have noted the concerns relating to the commission’s lack of independence and have proposed an amendment to strengthen the commission’s independence by making it clear that the Secretary of State should consult individuals before appointing the chief commissioner. It is clear that independence is a precondition for investigations to satisfy our obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR. The purpose of the probing amendments in my name, and the consequential amendments, is to discern to what extent the extraordinarily wide-ranging powers conferred on the Secretary of State, even after the Government’s amendment, compromise that independence and risk a breach of our ECHR obligations.
One of the functions of independence is securing public confidence in the operation of investigations; to do that, it is necessary for the investigations to be independent—and to be seen to be independent. The role of the Secretary of State in relation to the commission, as currently envisaged, has attracted criticism from all communities in Northern Ireland. The Government have assured us that the commission will have full operational independence; we are assured that that includes the establishment of terms of reference, the appointment of staff and the making of all decisions related to the conduct of investigations. Of course, the commission may appoint its own staff, but that will be done by the commissioners appointed by the Secretary of State. The commission may make decisions related to the conduct of investigations, but with the hand of the Secretary of State ever present and able either to block disclosure or to shut the body down altogether. The commission may make decisions related to immunity applications, but only if the salient question is whether the applicant is telling the truth to the best of their knowledge and belief, and they must take account of any guidance given by the Secretary of State about when that condition is met. It is difficult to consider that a genuine and objective decision at all.
Defending the system, the Government have cited the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and various independent public inquiries as precedents, suggesting that it is common practice for the Secretary of State to appoint commissioners or chairs to organisations which enjoy absolute operational independence. The problem is that that is not comparing like with like; there is no way that an individual inquiry or human rights body with limited powers is comparable with the amount of responsibility being placed on the commission by the Bill. That responsibility is to provide the sole route to justice for anyone who lost a loved one during the Troubles.
Noble Lords will have noticed that my amendment does not seek to address all the powers of the Secretary of State. Because of its probing nature, it concentrates, in this form, on only some of those powers, particularly as there is a genuinely independent alternative to the Secretary of State: the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission. Additionally, the commission’s functions include:
“To select and appoint and recommend for appointment, in respect of all listed judicial offices up to and including High Court Judge … To recommend applicants solely on the basis of merit … To engage in a Programme of Action to secure … that appointments to listed judicial offices are … reflective of the community in Northern Ireland.”
Again, that provides independence, but, crucially, it does so in a way which is transparent and will disarm those who may suggest that the commission is simply an arm of the UK Government in Northern Ireland. Why not forestall those criticisms and remove the Secretary of State from the area of appointments altogether? The NIJAC is accustomed to appointing those who fulfil statutory requirements and who are of good character and have integrity. Furthermore, the link between the commission and the judiciary is embedded in the Bill, as the chief commissioner must be a person who holds, or has held, high judicial office, and almost all those candidates have been appointed to their judicial role by NIJAC.
In addition to the issues with the composition of the commission, many noble Lords will be aware of an uneasiness about how this body will work, from where it will derive its legitimacy, what mechanisms exist for scrutiny, and, where necessary, how we can ensure that it is responsive to concerns in a way that is not simply subject to the fiat of whichever Secretary of State happens to be in post. Those issues speak to a wider systemic problem with the Bill.
The delegated powers memorandum contains a remarkable paragraph which encapsulates my concerns and those of other noble Lords:
“Legacy matters are highly controversial, politically charged and divisive in Northern Ireland. A vast number of issues remain unresolved as a result of political and societal impasse and there is no single accepted or agreed way to address them … There is a very real prospect that providing the Northern Ireland Assembly with the power of veto in relation to delegated powers could frustrate the purpose and application of the provisions in the Bill, which in the Government’s view is necessary to achieve progress and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.”
That is an explicit acknowledgment that the Government have decided to exclude the elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland from important decisions for fear that they will not agree with the direction of travel determined from London. If we were to mould the Bill into a shape which will satisfy everyone in Northern Ireland and be seen as an attempt, in good faith, to further the course of reconciliation, the composition of the commission will need to be seen as independently determined.
Further, it will need to be seen as an avowedly apolitical body aimed at achieving a true incremental reconciliation woven from the skeins of public opinion in Northern Ireland, not a reconciliation based on our perceptions in London. I do not propose to put my
amendments to a vote but urge the Government to engage with their provisions critically and take appropriate steps before Report.
I intend to dispose of Amendment 178 at the earliest possible opportunity. Consequently, with the leave of the Committee, I shall say no more about it. I beg to move.
4.30 pm