I thank noble Lords very warmly for their contributions, which were pertinent and challenging as ever. I shall make three introductory points. First, there is perhaps—and I put this as lowly as I can—a tension between those who say that this approach is wrong in principle and, on the other hand, those who say it is already covered by the general law. If it is covered by the general law, it cannot be wrong in principle. There seems to the Government to be an opposition in those two propositions.
Secondly, it is said that these provisions are intended to introduce a high level of impunity for the security services, generally reduce their accountability and effectively put them beyond the law. That is not the case, because in this legislation the decision is for the court—it is for the court to decide what to do. It does not give immunity to officials, the security services or the Government. It is a matter for the court. Essentially, this legislation is spelling out what the position is in relation to persons who have been involved in terrorist wrongdoing. It is saying in explicit terms that, where that situation arises, the court should consider—and I emphasise the word “consider”—whether damages should be reduced to reflect that wrongdoing. It is perfectly true that, at common law, such an argument could already be made, at least in theory; depending on which Latin tag you chose to use or whether you refer to the contributory negligence Act or other general principles, the argument can be made. But the point of these provisions is to spell that out in very clear terms so that the general public and potential claimants know what the position is, and one is not left to argue what can sometimes be obscure and difficult questions of common law in particular cases.
Thirdly, the overriding purpose—we can discuss the exact wording—is to convey a message. The message is that the United Kingdom is not a soft touch for those involved in terrorist wrongdoing when they come to claim civil damages. That is a message particularly directed to those beyond the seas who may be tempted to bring, and have in the past brought, proceedings in the UK courts when these kinds of situations have arisen. It is to make the civil position clear. By the same token, we have provisions relating to freezing and forfeiture which protect any damages that are awarded from subsequently being used for terrorist purposes. That is the overriding framework, as it were.
On behalf of the Government, I entirely reject the suggestion that these provisions are intended to introduce a high level of impunity for the security services or to avoid accountability, because it is ultimately for the court to decide. This is limited to national security proceedings, and the conduct of any public bodies will still be fully subject to scrutiny by the court.
With that general description, I shall try to deal with the various points which have been raised. I come first to Amendment 105A, put forward by the noble
Lord, Lord Marks, which seeks to introduce an exclusion in cases where the evidence or submissions to the court about national security are merely incidental to the civil claim in question. While completely understanding the objective behind the amendment, the Government believe that it is not necessary, for three reasons.
First, national security proceedings are very clearly defined in Clause 82(2), and it is very hard to construe that definition as including a case where national security was for some reason de minimis to the proceedings concerned. Secondly, it is, in the Government’s view, hard to imagine in practical terms a situation in which a person involved in terrorist wrongdoing brings a case against the Crown, and the Crown has presented evidence or made submissions about national security, but national security is merely incidental to the issues in the case. It seems to the Government that it is most unlikely that such a situation would arise. Thirdly—this is a fundamental point that I have already made—