My Lords, this group responds to the amendments tabled in relation to the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and separate amendments tabled regarding guidance on the scheme, impacts of the enhanced tier on the higher education sector and the exemption for legal activities. In addition, it introduces a number of minor government amendments to the scheme, which I will cover shortly.
Before I address the amendments and clauses specifically, let me say that we are not yet able to publish a policy statement relating to the power taken in Clause 77(1), which we committed to do in the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum. The Government are in the process of carefully considering feedback from industry and the important scrutiny in this House. As such, we believe that publishing a policy statement now would only muddy the waters when the Government’s focus is rightly on listening to Peers’ concerns.
It is the first duty of government to protect its people, the country they live in and the integrity of their democratic institutions. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme will play an important role in delivering on this agenda. Dialogue between policymakers and the rest of society is an essential feature of our democratic system. It provides parliamentarians and Ministers with important information and expert analysis, helping us to become more informed. It allows decision-makers and the public to be exposed to diverse opinions and voices, including from the international business sector. It can be a positive contribution to healthy and robust public debate, and will continue to be welcome in the UK.
However, when communications or disbursements are not transparent, it can lead to corruption or give certain groups an unfair advantage. It can be seen as a way for powerful interests to exert excessive influence on political and governmental processes, potentially at the expense of the British public. It is particularly
important to be able to identify foreign influence. The UK Government and the British people are entitled to know when foreign interests seek to influence public policy and public opinion. We should be able to identify foreign influence and evaluate those contributions properly, including the aggregate impact over time. Some foreign lobbying presents risks to national security. Members of the Committee will have heard Ken McCallum, in his annual threat speech in November, discussing the challenge from state threats. He said:
“The West is in a contest in which our security, values and democratic institutions are at stake.”
The Intelligence and Security Committee discussed political influence and state threats in its 2020 Russia report, calling for a scheme like the one delivered through the political influence tier of FIRS, which we are debating here today. The political influence tier of FIRS will play a role in strengthening openness and transparency in those processes, with the additional aim of deterring foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly through agents and proxies. Noble Lords will be aware that some foreign states increasingly seek to influence how we think, vote and feel. Such states view themselves as being in a long-term contest with the West and take a much broader view of what they are interested in than simply national security matters. Covert political influence from state actors can damage our democratic processes, institutions and wider societal cohesion.
The foreign influence registration scheme will require those acting covertly with malign intent to make a conscious choice between registering their activity and publicly declaring their provenance, or not registering and risking prosecution. This raises the cost of conducting such activity and will be a significant deterrent to those who seek to harm our democracy.
Before we move on to the main debate, I will very briefly explain the government amendments in this group. Amendments 82, 89, 99, 100, 101 and 102 make minor technical changes to ensure consistency in the use of “arrangement” and “agreement” across the foreign influence registration scheme provisions. These amendments will assist with the clarity and understanding of the scheme.
Government Amendment 92 amends the existing provisions regarding public communications in the political influence tier of FIRS. This amendment provides that where a public communication is reasonably clear that it is being made by a foreign principal on its own behalf, it will not need to be registered. The Bill already provides an existing exclusion from registration requirements where it is reasonably clear that the public communication is made at the direction of a foreign principal. This is in keeping with our commitment to ensure that the scheme is proportionate and does not impose any unnecessary burdens.
During the last day in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, raised a number of questions regarding the foreign power condition, which we dealt with at some length last week, and the foreign influence registration scheme. I thank her for her letter and will deal with the core of her questions now, to ensure that this is on the record. On the question of whether a member of this House will need to register when entering arrangements, the responsibility to register
under the political influence tier of FIRS will lie with the foreign principal carrying out the activity in the United Kingdom, or with the person in an arrangement with the foreign principal to carry out activities in the United Kingdom. There will be no requirement on the person whom the foreign principal is seeking to influence to register activities. As such, Members of this House would be required to register only if they entered into arrangements with foreign principals to carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom. This applies equally for arrangements with any foreign entity, including political parties in government or in opposition.
There was also a question in relation to the foreign power condition of why “a governing political party” has been included in the meaning of “a foreign power”. It addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. The noble Baroness posed the question of what constitutes a governing political party. It is right that this will vary in different countries. Clearly we cannot legislate for every different administrative structure. Rather, in criminal proceedings where this was an issue, the prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a political party was the governing political party based on the facts of the case. Therefore, any political party with no members holding posts in the Government would not be in scope. The definition in Clause 30(2) means that a political party is a governing party only if individuals within that party hold posts in the Government or part of the Government. For example, the Democratic Party runs the US Administration and sets the direction of government policy. It is therefore the governing political party in the US.
To omit Clause 30(1)(e) as the noble Baroness suggested and to rely entirely on the other aspects of the definition of “a foreign power” risks creating a loophole whereby sophisticated state actors could claim to act on behalf of the ruling party but not the Government. To be clear, foreign powers, including governing political parties of a foreign Government or their members acting in their capacity as a member, do not have to register their own activities. However, those in arrangements with foreign entities—including governing political parties—to carry out political influence activities in the UK will need to register those arrangements.
I will be listening very carefully to the remarks made on this group and will respond to the amendments directly in my closing comments. I look forward to this important debate.