My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for introducing the amendment; much that she said is extremely pertinent.
It is useful at this point to remind the Committee of quite why we are in this predicament over veterinary matters. From one point of view, you can acknowledge it as a simple function of our departure from the European Union. However, the protocol, in both the May and Johnson versions, contains a way of handling
veterinary matters, which is essentially to say, “We will not accept UK veterinary testing. Pirbright is gone and you are out of the system. The only form of veterinary testing we will be able to accept is that within the European Union itself”—presumably, in the case of Ireland, in Dublin. In the EU documents of the time, there are rather interesting green pictures with little arrows showing power departing from the island of Ireland to the EU, which has now taken control of this area.
There is an obvious basic problem with that. The Good Friday agreement, whose importance has been increasingly acknowledged and accepted, was not accepted as the prior agreement when we began this debate, but I notice with pleasure that it is increasingly accepted as the key agreement; that has some significance, as it was not when we opened these discussions. The Good Friday agreement established food safety and animal health boards. For the life of me, I have never known why, in the negotiation, it was quite so necessary to have the approach of extraction of powers from the island of Ireland to the EU that the protocol, lodged by the May Government and signed by the Johnson Government, contains.
That is another example of why what the Good Friday agreement suggests, and obvious pathways that follow from everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, should be followed, rather than a strict obsessive acceptance of the fact that, “We signed it in this protocol and therefore it can’t be changed”. A negotiation is going on and it is bound to touch on these matters. In this case, as in so many others—including, I dare say, the issue we have been discussing for the last half hour—the canopy for the settlement is acceptance of the Good Friday agreement and the way in which it approached this problem. Then you get into the possibility of consensus and agreement.
It is not all the UK Government’s fault that they find themselves, to put it mildly, on the back foot. It is arguable that they have not behaved particularly effectively in sorting this problem out, but it is not all their fault. The root of the matter is the failure of the EU to understand—and how could it?—the north-south dimension of the Good Friday agreement. That failure is radically revealed in Michel Barnier’s memoir in these documents. The explanation has been given in various books and articles by the officials involved on the Irish side in Dublin in the negotiation on the 2017 agreement, which then set the template for the two later agreements. The explanation is that the Irish Government appropriated a particular version of the Good Friday agreement—their version—and sold it to the EU, and it was accepted in Europe and by us. We cannot revisit any of these issues in any simple sense but it remains an intellectual reality that is the clue to understanding how we can redress these processes.
All these problems that seem so insoluble—I absolutely respect the spirit in which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, moved the amendment—are much more easily resolved if we follow what the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said, accept the prior importance of the Good Friday agreement and realise that the institutions and the concepts to be found there are the institutions
and concepts that provide the basis for a benign compromise that both the UK and the EU can live with.