I rise to move Amendment 7 and to perhaps add some mascara to this porcine proposal for the satisfaction of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I tried to give a preview of the excitement of later groups to retain the attention of the Committee. Alas, we might be on to more of a core group with Clause 4. In many respects, it is the core of the Bill. We have been told by the noble Lord, Lord Frost—who is no longer in his place—that it contains the proposals which will resolve the issues. However, in many respects, the Bill should be called the Northern Ireland delegated powers Bill, because 19 of the 26 clauses are delegated powers clauses and not proposals that we are able to scrutinise properly.
On why imminent peril and the invocation of necessity is so important, it is because it is at the heart of the reasoning why Clause 4 exists. I shall not recap the discussion on the previous group or the first day in Committee, but there is still a lack of clarity about the Government saying that the protocol is the issue but then that it is not the issue, it is its implementation. They have said in their legal paper that the situation of necessity needs to be addressed urgently but also that they have not yet made up their mind on solutions and addressing them will take time. They have said that there is imminent peril, but the Advocate-General told me on the first day in Committee that imminent is as long as the Government might consider it to be, so it is important to try to pin down when the imminent peril started.
I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Frost, is not able to stay for other groups in Committee because I wanted to respond to what he said. If this Bill is a negotiating tactic, he has completely undermined the Government’s argument for invoking the doctrine of necessity for this Bill, because it cannot be both. It cannot be a way of addressing grave and imminent peril and also be a negotiating tactic with the EU. I heard said from a sedentary position, I think by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, “Why not?” If the whole reason of grave and imminent peril for the invocation of international law is to set aside treaty commitments but there are negotiations under way to resolve them, you cannot invoke the doctrine of necessity because the doctrine of necessity under Article 25 of the International Law Commission can be invoked only if there are no other means of resolving the issues, so it simply cannot be both.
I am trying to pin down when this peril actually started and how we are to consider what the baselines are. The noble Lord, Lord True, told the Chamber in January 2021 that concerns about the implementation of the protocol must not be overstated. He said:
“I acknowledge that there have been issues—that was never denied—but, overall, goods are continuing to flow effectively. Supermarkets are able to move their lorries into Northern Ireland. There are some specific issues, as we have seen with individual suppliers, but it is holding up well overall.”—[Official Report, 14/1/21; col. 884.]
A week later, his then Secretary of State Brandon Lewis told BBC “Question Time” viewers—I quote from the transcript of the programme: “The protocol means that as part of the United Kingdom Northern Ireland is going to have this unique competitive advantage in the world, in the sense that Northern Ireland has the ability to trade in and as part of the United Kingdom as well as through the single market with the EU. That is going to mean if you are a business that deals with the UK and a business that deals with the EU, the place to invest and grow your business is in Northern Ireland. You have got that ability to trade both ways and I think that gives Northern Ireland a competitive advantage and a huge opportunity.”
Therefore, the Government rest their case on grave and imminent peril somewhere between January 2021 and the publication of the White Paper. During that period, I asked repeatedly for information on UK-EU trade, and we were also asking questions about east-west trade between GB and Northern Ireland. Ministers stated to me in response that it was impossible to disaggregate factors such as Covid and then the global supply chain. They have found ways to do for this for GB-NI trade, but it is hard to discern from official government statistics produced by the Northern Ireland statistics body, and the Department for Transport’s data for UK major ports have not shown major shifts. So I would be grateful if the Government would publish this information directly. They have indicated that trade diversion exists, but they have not published statistics showing their case. I am very willing to look at them if they have published them, but they have not yet done so. Therefore, we need to have more information as they are seeking powers to put forward a dual regulatory system of both UK and EU procedures.
I appreciate the comments that were made on the first day in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and others that the protocol has not been implemented in full yet, and I understand that, but neither has the TCA for any UK port of exit and entry for goods into the UK. We are on our third delay for Dover and all other ports, and they are not fully operational. For trade between the UK and the EU, there is not a single fully operational port under the measures of the TCA in any of the four nations.
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Clause 4 is an admitted breach of the protocol agreement. It represents withdrawing from the Government’s agreement on customs legislation—the unique competitive advantage described by Brandon Lewis. The powers under this section are affirmative but unamendable if they are changing the law, or making retrospective law, negative elsewhere, but also automatic in the “made affirmative” procedure. As the DPRRC said, the Government’s justification for the Clause 4(3) powers is the need for flexibility and that they are technical in nature and the technical should not be in statute. However, the regulations themselves can amend statute, so if it is justified for primary legislation in the first place, it obviously justifies it for its amendment. Let us not forget that this is international law. On the other point on flexibility, the DPRRC stated that this is
“at the expense of meaningful constraints and scrutiny, precisely because the power is so open-ended.”
The Clause 4(5) powers are also an admitted breach. They replace an agreed joint mechanism with a unilateral mechanism to decide how to categorise goods which may or may not be at risk of entering the single market. This would be a unique proposition for the UK now, contrary to all UK FTAs and the WTO. As the DPRRC states:
“It cannot reasonably be described as technical, administrative or operational detail.”
It is not just that committee. The Constitution Committee has said that
“it undermines the rule of law for the UK Government to invite Parliament to pass legislation in breach of the UK’s international obligations. Enabling ministers to do this through secondary legislation, particularly via the negative resolution procedure, is even less constitutionally acceptable.”
On the basis that this clause is an admitted breach of international law and the Government’s defence for the breach has fallen apart, and, further, that the Government have not presented a replacement for the provisions of the protocol they seek to exclude, and the powers are so broad and have been condemned by the committees of this House, I beg to move.