My Lords, the noble Lord made a strong case on this before. He has repeated it in a shorter version. I have told the Committee that the review has been conducted, as he—and the Prime Minister—asked. That is now complete, so let us see what happens. I cannot give any more detail because I simply do not know it as I stand here. The new debarment list will allow Ministers to debar suppliers in the most serious cases and therefore there is no need to make the additional provision.
Amendments 310, 318 and 322 tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Young, seek to add conviction of any environmental offence as a ground for mandatory exclusion. The mandatory grounds for exclusion are by nature a blunt instrument. They require the supplier to face exclusion from every public contract for five years, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe pointed out, unless and until the risk of the issues reoccurring has been addressed. For this reason, they are reserved for the most serious forms of misconduct.
The inclusion of environmental offences in the discretionary ground reflects the fact that, for offences where a range of misconduct may be involved, it may be appropriate to take into account factors such as the nature of the contract being tendered or the level of environmental harm caused, before deciding to exclude a supplier. There is guidance from the Environment Agency on what constitutes environmental harm.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, proposed Amendment 329, which seeks to introduce a discretionary exclusion ground where a supplier’s tender violates applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law. I have already explained why we elected to narrow the exclusion ground relating to breaches of such law.
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Amendment 330 tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes—a narrow amendment and a welcome one in that respect—probes why there is a discretionary ground for exclusion on acting improperly in procurement when a similar provision appears to be made in Clause 30. These two provisions are different: the discretionary ground for exclusion at paragraph 14 of Schedule 7
applies to behaviour which occurred in a past procurement; the provision at Clause 30 applies only where the behaviour occurred in the procurement in question. It is important that both situations are provided for, but different considerations apply in respect of self-cleaning and unfair advantage, and this is why the provisions appear separately.
Amendment 331, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, introduces a new discretionary exclusion ground in relation to human rights abuses. I assure noble Lords that the United Kingdom has a strong history of protecting human rights and promoting our values globally—of which this Government are no less jealous than their predecessors. However, the protection of rights in this country is also underpinned by due process of law. The exclusions regime is not a substitute for a judicial process, despite the remedies system I described earlier. It cannot function like a court in delivering a full and fair trial.
The ground for “professional misconduct” is clear that this can include
“a serious breach of ethical or professional standards applicable to the supplier.”
This ground may well be met where a supplier has committed many of the acts referred to by noble Lords, but many contracting authorities will not be prepared or equipped to consider human rights violations more broadly, and we should not force them to do so. We must avoid imposing unreasonable burdens on contracting authorities which already struggle to apply exclusion grounds. This is why most of the exclusion grounds require a criminal conviction or regulatory decision, and why they focus on the risks which are most relevant to a procurement context.
Amendment 332, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, addresses the time periods that apply when considering the discretionary exclusion grounds. This is a transitional regime; it allows for consideration of past events only in respect of grounds which exist under the current regime, but not for new or substantially changed grounds. This maximises the immediate impact of the new regime while avoiding unfair outcomes for suppliers. My noble friend questions why labour market misconduct, environmental misconduct and poor performance which occurred prior to the Bill coming into force are not considered. These grounds are, in certain respects, broader in scope than the existing regime. It would be unfair to impose exclusion on suppliers for events which occurred before this was set in law.
Amendment 340 requires publication of statutory guidance on the application of the exclusion grounds. As I said in response to an earlier group, I accept the need for more detailed guidance on self-cleaning; I addressed the matter in the previous debate on the exclusions process.
Finally, I turn to the very important Amendment 353 on supply chain resilience against economic coercion and modern slavery put forward by my noble friend Lady Stroud. I listened most carefully to the impassioned and heartfelt speeches made by many noble Lords on all sides. I appreciate my noble friend’s dedication and
commitment to these issues. On both issues in question, the Bill already provides for much of what she seeks to achieve. On resilience, the Bill requires contracts to be awarded to the most advantageous tender. This allows for a holistic assessment of value for money which could, if relevant, take into account long-term supply chain resilience against geopolitical instability. Of course, there is no place for modern slavery in any supply chains. There is already comprehensive guidance for contracting authorities on assessing and addressing modern slavery risks in supply chains.
As my noble friend knows, we are not only strengthening the grounds for exclusion in relation to modern slavery, but introducing, for the first time in the UK, a debarment list of suppliers. For the first time, we are making explicit provision to disregard bids from suppliers known to use forced labour or perpetuate modern slavery themselves or in their supply chain. I concede that the current rules are too weak in this regard: they require the supplier to have been convicted, or for there to have been a breach of international treaties banning forced labour, or they require evidence of grave professional misconduct.
We recognise that modern slavery often occurs in countries which are not party to international treaties on forced labour and which are unlikely to prosecute the perpetrators, and where there may be no relevant national laws. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 allows authorities to exclude suppliers and disregard their bids where there is sufficient evidence of modern slavery—