My Lords, Amendment 131, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Best, would prohibit contracting authorities applying relative assessment methodologies for price, costs or value-for-money award criteria, with the aim of preventing “race to the bottom” behaviour by suppliers and helping contracting authorities achieve safe, quality and value-for-money outcomes.
The objective of the Bill is to make public procurement more flexible for contracting authorities and suppliers, not less. In deciding how to assess tenders, contracting authorities must be able to determine what is important to them and the best means of assessing this. In some cases, price may be more important than others and, in particular, price assessment methodologies may be more appropriate in certain circumstances. I must also stress that contracting authorities will be very aware of the need for safe outcomes and that those cannot be compromised. To reiterate, we will publish guidance on assessment to help contracting authorities decide how best to assess tenders.
Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would require a Minister, within three years of the Bill being enacted, to undertake a review of the impact of the rules on how contracts subject to a competitive procedure must be awarded. In particular, the review must assess the impact of the change from “most economically advantageous tender”, commonly referred to as MEAT, to “most advantageous tender”, commonly referred to as MAT. On the delivery of social value, and whether the needs of service recipients have been met under contracts, the change from MEAT to MAT sends a much clearer message to contract authorities that the contracts do not have to be awarded on the basis of the lowest price. I can assure the noble Lord that the matters he refers to are within the scope of MAT, where they are relevant to the contract being procured.
Amendment 149, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, would make explicit that contracting authorities may exclude a supplier where it has failed to explain satisfactorily why the price or cost proposed in its tender appear to be abnormally low. We discussed this point during a recent SI debate, and I welcome his
contribution. I appreciate that tenders may appear abnormally low for a variety of reasons, some of which ought to concern contracting authorities. The Bill’s silence on this point is not intended to discourage authorities seeking to understand the proposed price and cost or interrogating suppliers where they appear to be abnormally low. Authorities are already under an overarching duty to award contracts to the most advantageous tender. This should be sufficient to allow for questions to be asked of suppliers about proposed price and costs, and authorities can structure their evaluation to ensure that tenders can be rejected where the authority has reason to believe a tender is abnormally low.
In summary, this Bill aims to deliver a simpler regulatory framework. It therefore does not include every possible action a contracting authority might wish to take in assessing the validity of tenders or awarding contracts. This approach is better than the
existing EU approach, as it offers increased flexibility to design efficient, commercial and market-focused competitions, while reducing burdens for smaller firms. Therefore, I respectfully request that these amendments are not moved.