My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 36 in my name. I also support Amendment 36A in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I declare an interest as a member of the council of JUSTICE, the all-party law reform organisation, and a British agent of the International Council of Jurists, along with many other Members of the Committee and your Lordships’ House.
Notwithstanding the praise that we all rightly heaped on my noble friend and his fellow magistrates in the earlier group, I am a passionate believer in the right to jury trial. I suspect I am not alone in that in this Committee. Juries are not perfect; however, I have defended jury trial, sometimes against Governments of both stripes, for at least 20 years. I hope I do not need to rehearse for too long why it is such an important right. It is not just because people believe in it. People want to be tried for serious matters that will send them to prison for a long time and destroy their reputations, and lives in many cases, not just because they want to be convicted by their peers; it is also important for trust and confidence in the justice system that it is not always seen as primarily about more-deprived and working people in the dock being adjudicated over by middle-class professionals like this Committee. As a third point, my experience of people who have served on juries is that it is a really important part of public service and engagement that people from a broad range of communities can ideally participate in. It is a very important glue for our country and the rule of law. I hope that did not need rehearsing, and I will stop on it there.
I note that in more controversial debates, for example around the Human Rights Act and its survival or not, some of the Minister’s colleagues—and indeed the current Justice Secretary—have said that one of the ways in which the Human Rights Act might be improved on would be with greater entrenchment of the right to jury trial. That is said on the one hand yet, on the other hand, provisions are taken to extend the sentencing powers of magistrates, which is ultimately a significantly broad back door to undermining jury trial.
I understand that the Government are concerned about the backlog. I certainly understand that the backlog in the system has been exacerbated by the pandemic. But if the Government did not share some of my concerns, they would not have added the so-called off switch in the other place that is now to be found in Clause 13. I am concerned not just in principle because of my belief in jury trial, but in practice as to whether the measures in the Bill will actually do what the Government are hoping. First, will these measures really save 1,700 sitting days in Crown Courts by enabling 500 jury trials to be switched to magistrates?
Is that really a credible figure? Even if it is, we think that it would represent a saving of only 1.6% according to recent courts service estimates. Secondly, there is a presumption that defendants will not exercise their right to opt for a jury trial, which they are more likely to do if the benefit of a lesser sentence is not a temptation to take the magistrates’ court option. Thirdly, I am really concerned about whether there will be sufficient and appropriate training for magistrates if we are to double their sentencing powers. That is the rationale behind Amendment 36 and, quite possibly—I will not speak for my noble friend Lord Ponsonby—part of the rationale for Amendment 36A as well.