My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for setting the scene and others who contributed to the previous debate on this part of the Bill. I welcome my noble
and learned friend Lord Stewart to his place on the Front Bench. He is a much more distinguished member of the Faculty of Advocates. I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for raising its concerns with me, which has led to my tabling the amendment. I very much look forward to hearing from others on this group, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Coaker. We will hear their views on their amendments in due course.
This amendment seeks to delete Clause 59(4), which states:
“Guidance issued under subsection (1) must, in particular, provide that the determination mentioned in paragraph (d) is to be made on the balance of probabilities.”
The amendment is to raise my concerns and dismay but also to provide the opportunity for my noble and learned friend in summing up the debate to explain the Government’s thinking on raising the bar for evidence.
Clause 59 makes specific reference, as we heard earlier, to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and seeks to amend Sections 49, 50, 51 and 56 of it. The clause raises the standard of proof for determining a reasonable grounds decision for a victim of trafficking from “suspect but cannot prove” to “balance of probabilities”. Indicators that a person is a victim of trafficking can be missed by first responders, meaning that a referral to the national referral mechanism is not made. If a referral is made, reasonable grounds represents a sift to determine whether someone may be a victim of trafficking and whether further investigation is needed.
Home Office statistics reveal that 92% of reasonable-grounds decisions and 89% of conclusive-grounds decisions on the balance of probabilities are positive. The evidence basis for so-called overidentification is not made. The lower standard of proof at the reasonable-grounds decision stage helps ensure that potential victims do not miss out on being properly investigated and progressed to the conclusive-grounds stage of the national referral mechanism.
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Raising the standard of proof at reasonable-grounds stage where minimal information is collected by the competent authority could foreseeably result in fewer referrals being made and will increase the prospect of potential victims not being identified by the national referral mechanism, thereby with an investigation not even taking place. In my view, it would be regrettable if, by raising the standard of proof at reasonable grounds stage, fewer referrals would made but the prospect of potential victims not being identified by the NRM without an investigation taking place would increase. So, I raise my concerns and those of the Law Society of Scotland about raising the evidence bar in the guidelines and give my noble friend the opportunity to explain. I beg to move.