My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. Clauses 39 and 64 give the widest possible powers of intervention to the Secretary
of State and even the power to delegate that power to someone else. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and other noble Lords clearly believe that the Government are going too far, hence the large number of amendments in this and the next group.
I believe that the Clause 39 powers could justifiably be used only in the case of some cataclysmic failure of the NHS. There are four questions to ask. Is it possible that the Secretary of State would ever need these powers of intervention at an operational level, given that he already has the mandate? Does the Secretary of State have any other powers which could be used prior to this atomic bomb of a power? Has the NHS survived well enough over the last 10 years without the Secretary of State having such powers? Does Clause 39 upset the balance between the Secretary of State and the autonomy of NHS England? I think the answers are no, yes, yes and yes—your Lordships can work it out.
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 removed the Secretary of State from this sort of meddling. I thought at the time that it might also avoid him or her taking the blame for failure, but that was just me being cynical and there has actually been no failure of political accountability over the last 10 years. The ninth report of the House of Lords Constitution Committee refers to this issue. It notes that, in 2011, it
“raised concerns that that Bill could erode ministerial responsibility due to the proposed duty on the Secretary of State to promote autonomy for persons exercising functions in relation to the health service. What is now section 5 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was amended, such that the Secretary of State instead must have regard to the desirability of securing autonomy. This helps ensure a balance between enabling those providing health care services to deliver services in a manner that they consider appropriate, whilst ensuring ministerial responsibility.”
The Constitution Committee believes that, in combination with Clause 64, the powers taken for the Secretary of State by Clause 39 would undermine that autonomy and upset the balance. They also risk
“undermining accountability by making it more difficult to understand which body is responsible for a particular function of the NHS.”
The fact is that the Secretary of State already has the power to change the mandate of NHS England—as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, pointed out—to adjust its funding or to bring political pressure upon it to behave in certain ways, without the need for the powers in this clause. Indeed, I think it would be very unwise to use these powers, and he or she will certainly get the blame if it all goes pear-shaped. The Bill, as has already been pointed out in some detail by noble Lords, the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee, gives the Government considerable regulatory and guidance powers, about half of which allow no parliamentary scrutiny at all. Does that not give the Secretary of State enough ability to ensure things are done in the way the Government wish? The Secretary of State already wants to be Henry VIII; does he also want to be King Herod?
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The Bill lays out in some considerable detail the powers and duties of the new integrated care systems, and the Government tell us they do not want to be prescriptive as to how these duties should be carried out—yet here, we are expected to rubber-stamp an enormous set of powers which could do absolutely the
opposite. Clause 39 is not needed. In addition to all the regulatory and guidance powers in the Bill, the Government still hold the overall purse strings and can always provide additional resources after the initial budgets have been set if particular needs arise. The Secretary of State should then leave it to those who have been so carefully chosen and so rigorously regulated to get on with the job. I support removing Clause 39.