My Lords, this group contains three amendments in my name, and a Clause 103 stand part debate in the names of my noble friend Lady Massey and the noble and right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby, neither of whom appears to be here at the moment. The amendments fall into two categories, but I make no complaint about them being grouped together. Amendments 195, 196 and 197 are based on the deep concern on this side of the Committee that the Government have not done enough in the Bill to mark their animosity to violence against women and girls.
Amendment 195 proposes a minimum sentence for an offence of rape under Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. That minimum term—of seven years—applies unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or the offender which justify it not doing so. I propose that minimum term for rape without one iota of apology.
The framework for sentencing by the courts has to be set by Parliament. The way Parliament does this—as the two former Lord Chief Justices made clear—is by setting a maximum sentence, and the courts then reflect on what they conceive to be the justice of the case, as determined by the maximum. In exceptional cases—I use that word advisedly—it is appropriate for there to be minimum sentences as well. If there is a minimum sentence, the judge’s discretion is removed, but that is because Parliament is saying that particular offence merits a minimum sentence except in exceptional cases.
I strongly agree with the proposition that one should keep those sentences to the minimum. I also strongly agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that, where Parliament says “exceptional circumstances”, for all the impressive sophistry of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, it is definitely saying, “We want the norm to be whatever the minimum is, and as few cases as possible should not be in the norm”. There is nothing wrong with Parliament doing that. Rape, in our view, is one of those cases.
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I have the greatest respect for the judges—indeed, I should say as a declaration of interest, I am married to a judge—but I disagree strongly with the proposition that the effect of the amendment is to force judges to pass “unjust” sentences. Was the position after the 2003 Act was passed, which in effect increased the starting point for murder and the minimum term, that judges begin to pass unjust sentences? Of course not; what the judges were then doing was reflecting what Parliament had determined the framework was in relation to those sentences.
Without apology, I therefore say that there should be a minimum sentence for rape. That sentence should be departed from only in exceptional circumstances. It is important that Parliament sends out that message.
The second amendment, Amendment 196, says that where the name of a complainant in serious sexual cases is revealed by somebody, instead of it only being a fine that can be the sentence, they should be susceptible to a maximum of two years in prison. For very many people, it being made public that they have been the victim of a sexual assault is something of enormous anxiety. Parliament should send out the signal that where people reveal names, they could have a sentence of as high as two years—I am not saying in every case or as a minimum, but I am saying that Parliament should mark the seriousness of this and the fact that people can be put under enormous pressure by the threat of publicity.
The third amendment that we propose would require, in relation to a murder case which involves the abduction and sexual assault of a person, and then their murder, that the starting point for a crime as heinous as that should be a whole life term. Of course, applying the 2003 Act, the judge would need to take into account other factors, but a whole life term should be the starting point. There should not have been, as there was in a recent case, a debate about whether a whole life term could be imposed. We think it important that this Bill addresses the fact that violence against women and girls is not adequately dealt with by the criminal
justice system at the moment. We are concerned that it does not do that. I put forward those three amendments without an iota of an apology.
The fourth thing in the group is whether Clause 103 should stand part. Clause 103 would make it possible for judges to impose a whole life order on offenders aged 18 to 20. We have touched on this in previous groups. We think a whole life term should be imposed only on somebody who is 21 or over—somebody unequivocally an adult—for all the reasons that have been debated before. We have very considerable doubts about that clause. I was going to say that I would wait for the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby to talk about it, but I will be waiting for a very long time, so I have made clear my position in relation to it.