I am very pleased to follow the noble and learned Lord, who ended by saying that he wanted to ensure that the solution was practicable and workable. I strongly agree. This is the first time that I have had a chance to speak on the Bill. I straightaway echo very strongly the comments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which recognised that, in an increasingly dangerous and unstable world, covert intelligence has a vital role to play in protecting our country from terrorism, organised crime and the growing threats to our national well-being. I was very impressed by the information that James Brokenshire, the Minister for Security, gave on Second Reading in another place. In the year to November 2019, in London alone, covert intelligence led to 3,500 arrests and the recovery of 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, half a ton of drugs and £2.5 million in cash. I note also the evidence given that, in 2017, covert intelligence foiled an attack on No. 10 Downing Street. Having myself been a victim of the mortar attack 30 years ago on No. 10, I am sorry that we did not have better covert intelligence then.
I also recognise that this vital tool must be put on a proper statutory basis. I have to say again that it is not before time, because it was 26 years ago that the Secret Intelligence Service and the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I had the privilege to lead in its early years, was put on a statutory basis.
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My concern is that in giving this vital aid to law enforcement and putting it on a statutory basis, we so surround it with a host of additional conditions that seriously limit its effectiveness. The Minister was challenged earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the number of covert agents and whether there were more than in earlier years or fewer. If we do not produce a good, workable and safe basis for such sources to operate, there will certainly be fewer, and the country will be much more exposed to the risks that covert intelligences sometimes prevent us from.
This is why I do not support Amendments 11, 12, 14 and 15, which propose prior approval by a judge or even—my goodness—a Secretary of State. In many of these cases, the covert intelligence source risks his own life to pass vital information to his handler. His willingness to do this has depended on his confidence that his identity will be totally protected and that he would be able to behave as a normal member of a gang or terrorist unit in which he is involved. He must have total confidence in his handler and be able to turn to him if sudden changes arise and nobody can get a quick response from him. If he and others find that they cannot get that support, then the willingness of people to come forward will be seriously undermined, and there will be fewer and fewer covert sources. If when he calls for help, his handler has to turn to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who in turn has to apply to a judge or the Secretary of State, how many more people will become privy to his existence, and how much greater will the risk that he faces be?
It has been suggested that judges are always available at short notice, and that if the one who gave the original authority is not available, there are plenty others able to step in who are good at mastering a brief quickly. However, that ignores the point that someone who had no previous knowledge of the matter would now have some knowledge of the agent’s existence and activity. How many others would too? That is why I support Amendments 46 and 73, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Butler, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, a quartet exceptionally qualified to advise your Lordships on this issue. They do not propose prior authorisation by a judge or by the Secretary of State, but that when a properly authorised handler issues a criminal conduct authorisation, he should be required to pass it at the earliest possible moment to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—incidentally, a distinguished judge—who, together with the handler, operates under the code of practice, which will be approved by Parliament.
Obviously, this puts a very heavy responsibility on handlers, and their selection and training is a crucial ingredient, but provided that it is successfully achieved, it is much the safest and best way to ensure that the vital source of intelligence that has protected our country in so many different ways over the years is not lost.