My Lords, I thank noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their contribution to this part of the debate. Since the commencement of this Committee, the matter of whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill has in a sense been the elephant in the virtual Chamber—or perhaps the virtual elephant in the Chamber. I therefore do not intend to rehearse or repeat the arguments that have been made repeatedly in Committee. However, I want to make it clear that the Government regard the powers in Clause 2 as essential to achieving their objective to build up the United Kingdom’s position in private international law, not only in the immediate future but in years to come.
Of course, there is one particularly pertinent example of our ambition; namely, our ambition to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the desire—indeed, the need—to do that before the end of the transition period. It would be gravely unfortunate if a gap was to emerge between the end of the transition period, when we continue to look to the Brussels I and IIa regime, and the application of the 2007 Lugano Convention. We are concerned that that should be avoided.
Briefly, first, we consider that the proposal in Clause 2 is not only essential but proportionate. International law agreements are generally uncontroversial and technical in nature, and the detailed content of the private international law agreements to which the Bill will apply will already be determined at the international level; they are by their very nature clear and precise in their terms.
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Secondly, I do not accept that the terms of Clause 2 are novel or unprecedented. As I sought to point out earlier, there are a number of precedents for the use of delegated powers to implement international agreements on private international law.
Thirdly, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—the CRaG process—can be used to ensure scrutiny at the level of treaty-making law or international law. There is then the affirmative statutory procedure,
where steps are taken to draw down that international law obligation into domestic law, with, I venture, sufficient scrutiny for a treaty which is not in itself amenable to amendment at the level of domestic law.
Although repeated reference was made to the employment of primary legislation to carry out this process, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, made the telling point that successive Governments can take years to identify the time for primary legislation to bring into domestic law a treaty obligation that has been entered into. Sometimes, quite exceptionally, it can take more than 50 years. I accept that that is an exception, but it nevertheless illustrates why we seek to bring forward Clause 2 in its present form.
Listening to noble Lords, I detect an element of concern about the terms of Clause 2. It is something that I will consider before we reach Report, where a number of noble Lords have made it perfectly clear that they will want to revisit this issue and may want the opportunity to divide the House. However, at this stage, I invite noble Lords to allow Clause 2 to stand part of the Bill.