My Lords, my amendment proposes that those who refer an individual for assessment under the Channel programme are different from those who assess the individuals once they have been referred. For reasons that I will set out, the amendment constitutes a crucial safeguard to protect the integrity of the programme. Amendment 54 addresses the issue concerning Clause 19 that was identified by myself, the noble Lords, Lord Stunell and Lord McInnes of Kilwinning, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, during Second Reading: namely, granting local authorities the additional powers to refer individuals for assessment under the Channel programme, an assessment that they themselves would undertake if Clause 19 were accepted with its current wording.
It is important, moreover, that this concern about Clause 19 is seen in the broader context of the concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in commenting on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill. In relation to Clause 19, the report says that the committee is,
“concerned that any additional responsibility placed on local authorities must be accompanied by adequate training and resources to ensure that the authorities are equipped to identify individuals vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism”.
However, these recommendations cannot address the challenge flowing from the imposition of the extra duty arising from Clause 19, which, for reasons that I will explain, is likely to lead to the creation of perverse incentives.
Clause 19 amends Section 36 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to impose a duty on local authorities to play an additional role to assess individuals vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. This is a function that under the current wording of Section 36(3) of the 2015 Act rests with a chief officer of police. In accordance with Clause 19, apart from assessing—by way of a self-established panel—the extent to which identified individuals are vulnerable to being drawn to terrorism, local authorities will also have an extra power to refer individuals to its panel.
Ultimately, the safeguard that currently arises from splitting the responsibilities between a chief officer of police, responsible for referring individuals, and the panel, responsible for assessment, will no longer obtain.
While the local authorities should be more involved in countering terrorism, the amendment of Section 36 of the 2015 Act through Clause 19 of this Bill introduces a dangerous model that may be abused where the referral and assessment are conducted by the same person.
My concern about Clause 19 in its current form is that if a person refers an individual for assessment and then sits on the panel assessing that individual, there is a risk that the person, even if unintentionally, may steer the assessment panel in a direction that would help to justify their prior decision to refer the person for the assessment. If an individual is wrongly referred and then wrongly assessed, that could significantly jeopardise the process and lead to its abuse.
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In presenting this concern, I highlight questions asked during Second Reading by the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, which, together with the amendment, point to the fact that the Government need to proceed with greater care with Clause 19. He asked:
“what analysis has the department done on which participating agencies are most likely to produce the false positives—the 109 people that week who are referred to a panel but for whom it is not thought to be appropriate that they need Channel support? Who are the people who are getting it wrong, and what can be done for them to get it right? What feedback and learning is there from the cases that do not get Channel support, and where evidently those nominations were inappropriate for one reason or another? What change is Clause 19 expected to produce to those outcomes? Is the clause’s intention that there will be more referrals as a consequence of local authorities having the right to refer, or is it supposed that in some way there will be more priorities for action by Channel panels as a consequence of those referrals?”—[Official Report, 9/10/18; col. 56.]
These questions need to be addressed before local authorities are given the power to refer. One also has to consider the potential effects of these unanswered questions, and the scope for perverse incentives for those referring people under the Channel programme and wanting to validate their referral decision, on the individuals being assessed. Will they believe in the process when the accuser and the judge are the same people? Aware of the flaws in the process will they want to assist or will they refuse to collaborate because of lack of faith in the process? There is a high risk that such an approach, without any reasonable safeguards put in place, will have an adverse effect on communities already significantly affected by the flawed Prevent strategy and divided as a result.
The Bill does not propose any solutions to minimise the risk posed by equipping local authorities with the power to refer and the power to assess. My amendment rises to that challenge by ensuring that those who refer an individual for assessment do not assess the individual. For all the reasons I have set out, this is a very important amendment and I hope that the Government will support it. I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply. I beg to move.