My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, for her amendment to Clause 12(2). The purpose of the current subsection (2) is to outline the criteria required to demonstrate that an offence has been committed. Subsection (3) provides a person accused of an offence with the defence that they took reasonable steps to avoid the commission of that offence. The purpose of subsections (2) and (3) together is to provide a balanced and proportionate framework with regard to prosecutions under the Bill, and to tackle the problem of illegal ivory items being deliberately mislabelled, while also providing a defence that allows a person to prove that they took the reasonable steps needed to ensure that the item was not elephant ivory.
Amendment 42 is explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in the Member’s explanatory statement published alongside the amendment as permitting the “defence of ignorance”. As noble Lords will know, there is no defence of ignorance in UK law. It is not permissible for someone accused of a crime, be it large or small, simply to claim that they did not know that it was illegal to do something. If we were to accept the amendment, we would also be suggesting that an individual would be able to prove a negative—to prove that they did not know something. That would be extremely problematic.
Furthermore, the amendment as drafted does not in fact reflect a “defence of ignorance” as referred to in the Member’s explanatory statement to the amendment. To explain a little, the amendment would remove the criteria in Clause 12(2), which outlines the requirements
that must be satisfied for an offence to occur. Subsection (2) provides legal certainty on what constitutes an offence. It states that an offence is committed in relation to an item only, first, if a person knows or suspects or, secondly, if the person should have known or suspected that the item involved in the commission of an offence is elephant ivory or has elephant ivory in it. Subsection (3) essentially achieves the desired effect of the noble Baroness’s amendment. It states:
“It is a defence for a person … to prove that the person took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence”.
In fact, subsection (3) goes further than the amendment, as it explicitly states what a person must prove to rely on that defence. Furthermore, in this case the individual will be seeking to prove a positive action. It is a far easier prospect to prove that due diligence has been undertaken than to prove a negative—that they simply did not know.
Let us have a quick look at how the Bill would operate if the noble Baroness’s amendment were accepted. Mrs Smith goes to a car-boot sale and sees a lovely box, which is very similar to her grandmother’s. She is not a very well-off lady, she owns absolutely no antiques and she pushes the boat out on that day and pays a tenner for this box as a treat. The box has a tiny, almost imperceptible, amount of ivory in it. Is Mrs Smith a criminal? It is not our intention that she should be. Removing subsection (2) makes the law far less clear because in that subsection is the outline of the requirements that must be met for an offence to occur. In the current draft of subsection (2), the elements of an offence are clear. To remove the subsection, as suggested in the amendment, would upset the firm legal foundation of the Bill. Removing the criteria for the offence in subsection (2) would cause significant uncertainty and risks overwhelming the enforcement system with Mrs Smiths, while the real criminals are left free to continue to break the law by dealing in ivory on much larger scale.
The Bill seeks to be balanced and proportionate. Removing subsection (2) would achieve neither aim. The police, enforcement bodies and the courts can use their professional discretion when considering the approach to use, based on a number of factors—for example, whether that person knew about ivory trading, whether it is a repeat offence or whether there is any evidence of deliberate mislabelling. Discretion is very welcome, but it must be based on a firm foundation of effective law. The amendment of the noble Baroness runs the risk of criminalising those who are not criminals at all.
Clause 12(2) and (3) are very carefully phrased. They protect individuals where there is absolutely no intent to breach the ban, and where the person could not be reasonably expected to know that the item was ivory or even contained ivory. It is not our intention to criminalise these people; that would be disproportionate and counterproductive. I have listened very carefully to the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. It is the Government’s intention in subsections (2) and (3) to be clear and proportionate, and I believe that is the case. Given this explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.