My Lords, it is worth the wait. We need to be clear that these amendments—which return to the Bill its original flexibility over exit day—are not about overturning the decision to leave. They are about removing the straitjacket the Government inserted at the behest of some ardent Brexiteers more anxious to earn their
spurs than help the Government in their delicate negotiations. Importantly, the amendments enable the Bill to fulfil the task set for it: to provide a functioning statute book and legal certainty as we withdraw from the EU.
A fixed, immutable date undermines this, which even the Government acknowledge as the Bill contains a get-out in Clause 14(4)(a). The two drawbacks of the fixed date are: first, it undermines the transition period, which is rather vital for our departure; and secondly, it undermines the Government’s negotiating strength. Indeed, it appears to make it illegal, without the use of Clause 14(4) for the UK to extend the Article 50 negotiations period by even a single minute—even if the EU 27 unanimously agreed to do so, and even if it were in our country’s best interests.
With regard to the transition, assuming it will be on current terms, the ECJ would continue to have some hold under those. Therefore, triggering Clause 6(1) to end its jurisdiction on 28 March next year is a nonsense. This needs to be delayed until the end, not the beginning of the transition phase, or, in the case of EU citizens, whom we have promised can access it for eight years, a later date, as may also be needed for our continued participation in Euratom or other agencies.
Turning to the negotiations, as our EU Committee says:
“The rigidity of the Article deadline of 29 March 2019 makes a no deal outcome more likely. For the Government to compound the rigidity of Article 50 by enshrining the same deadline in domestic law would not be in the national interest”.