My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate and I thank the Minister for his reply. He will perhaps not be surprised to learn that I was not wholly satisfied with his reply—although in fairness there was some common ground. He, like me, referred to the White Paper of March 2017 and the commitments that the Government made. Indeed, I accepted and acknowledged that in many cases the rights that have been established in relation to equality in this country have sometimes exceeded those in the European Union. However, that somewhat misses the point, because what I sought to do with this amendment was to ensure that, as we go forward and leave the European Union, these rights will still be there and that no future Government will be able to row back on them without having to give a proper explanation to Parliament.
The Minister made a couple of other points and I will reflect on what he said. I wonder about making the same offer as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, made
in the previous debate: if he thinks that some of these go too far, if he and I were to meet and he were to excise the ones he thinks take it beyond what is already there, would he then be prepared to accept an amendment on Report without these? That might be something he would wish to consider.
I also note that while he made the point in relation to subsection (2):
“All individuals are equal before the law”,
as I did in my remarks, that that is part and parcel of our common law, he did not have anything to say about the second part, which refers to having,
“the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, very graphically described the recent case which shows that treating everyone equally before the law does not take account of the fact that some laws might impact disproportionately on some categories of people and end up in discrimination.
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I was glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, repeated the question to the noble Lord, Lord Low, as I was not sure that I quite understood it the first time. I apologise if I have not quite got this right, but I think he asked how, if retained EU law has the status of primary legislation, the proposed new clause would relate to it. For example, if the statement of compatibility was, as it were, assumed as primary legislation, that could not possibly apply. Trying to apply what is here to a piece of primary legislation, I would have thought that if at some future date an individual thought there was an incompatibility with what was then seen as primary legislation, that case could be argued before the courts and it would be up to them to determine whether indeed it was incompatible, having regard to what is in the proposed clause. Having said that, I think that that is highly unlikely, given that the whole point of this amendment is to reflect the fact that the retained European Union law has been the basis of many of these equality rights—and I cannot immediately think of an example where one would feel that it was lacking. But—I say tentatively, having been given a few minutes to think about it—if you were to apply this to someone seeking a declaration of incompatibility, that could be possible. But, as I said, I think that it is unlikely because we are trying to build on what is already there rather than diminish it.
I have heard what the Minister said. I will obviously want to reflect on it, but for the meantime I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.