My Lords, if these amendments were adopted by the Government, it is possible that there would be a successful negotiation. Let us look at the possibilities of a successful negotiation, which it is generally assumed there will be.
First, the Government have to make up their mind what their aims are. Having renounced the idea of staying in the single market or the customs union, it seems that they are aiming for a new kind of customs union and for access to the single market under a special kind of bespoke single market. The idea of having a new kind of frictionless customs union without being a member of the single market is wholly unrealistic. Nobody outside Britain regards the arrangements suggested by the Government as in any way credible, and the idea of a bespoke single market arrangement has been rejected by one European leader after another. Therefore, why is it assumed that when the Government come forward with their offer, it will be a serious basis for negotiation? At that stage, the negotiations may well break down.
Next, it is assumed that there will be a transition agreement. The Government envisage a period in which there will be an agreement on the framework and we will work out the details. During this period, which they say will last for two years and will include an implementation period, we will continue with the status quo. Maintaining the status quo, with acceptance of membership of the customs union and the single market, of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and of a continuation of our making contributions, has been described—fairly accurately, I think—by both the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg as meaning that this country will become a “vassal state”. I do not think it can be assumed that there will be automatic agreement by the EU 27—the Commissioners’ negotiators—to this kind of transition agreement. There must surely also be a question as to whether the Conservative Party itself will accept it. And if there is no transition agreement, there will be no deal.
Most importantly, the trade negotiations were allowed to continue because there was an agreement in December about the Northern Ireland border, and alignment of regulations between the UK and Ireland. It was a fudge, which had a completely different meaning to Dublin and to the British Government. To Dublin it meant that Britain would stay within the customs union, and to the British Government it was a way of getting the trade negotiations going and preventing a breakdown at that stage. It is clear that the Government’s
frictionless border is not going to be a working proposition—and it seems to me that the negotiation over the Irish border will itself be a breaking point. If there is a breaking point then, of course that means no deal.
My noble friend Lord Newby was wrong when he said that on the whole people had been too optimistic. I think he was being too optimistic, because he assumed that there would be an agreement. All the signs are that we have very good reason to suppose that there will be no deal. If there is no deal the whole economic position will look entirely different—and unless some of these amendments are passed, the odds are that there will be no deal.