My Lords, my noble friend Lord O’Neill referred to the Bill as an unfortunate necessity, but it is only necessary because of choices the Government have already made. We could have remained in Euratom while leaving the other institutions of the EU. Euratom was originally in a separate treaty and remained a discrete part of the consolidated treaty. It would not have been cherry-picking for us to remain. The EU would not have objected. There is admittedly a role for the ECJ in Euratom’s institutional structure, but that has never been used. It would have been a sensible and safe thing to do to say at the beginning of the post-referendum process or at the point of triggering Article 50 that we were withdrawing from the other institutions but wished to remain within Euratom. It would have been the logical thing to do, and it would also have been by far the safest thing to do.
In the Bill, we are dealing with the rules that govern the use and proliferation of what is probably the most dangerous material handled by mankind, and their enforcement. Frankly, the boundaries between civil and potential military use need always to be absolutely clear and shared within and between nations. That has not always been the case in the history of the nuclear industry, nuclear power and military hardware.
The global system under the auspices of the IAEA is vital but is not watertight. Over the years there have been a number of reports about fissile materials going missing in the sense that they have been unaccounted for. Usually, the authorities have reassured us that it was an administrative glitch and not a real diversion of these vital materials to North Korea, to terrorist organisations or to other countries wishing to join the nuclear powers. But that has not always been certain. The role of the Euratom operation in preventing proliferation has been vital and is one of the tightest parts of the global system. Under Euratom, the tightness of the safeguards has been maintained. It has monitored nuclear sites and trade to ensure security of operations and transfers within and beyond Europe, and as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it has also been responsible for the third party treaties. We will have to replicate those treaties post our leaving the EU.
It is true that the Minister has distinguished between safety and safeguards, but as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just implied, it is not always a clear distinction and not a clear one in the minds of the public. It would certainly not be a clear distinction if an incident actually happened. By and large the HSE and latterly the ONR, along with the organisations in this country to which they have delegated powers, have enforced that safety. However, we also need international and particularly cross-European co-ordination. Hitherto, Euratom has helped to ensure that co-ordination and indeed the UK’s own compliance with the various international conventions governing nuclear materials, nuclear safety and non-proliferation.
Under the Bill it is true that the UK through the ONR will continue to meet IAEA standards, but the reporting and monitoring standards of the IAEA are different and on the face of it less rigorous than those of Euratom. I was grateful to hear what the Minister said about maintaining Euratom rather than IAEA standards and I hope that somehow appears in the final version of the Bill. However, all of this will place severe pressures on the ONR, an organisation that has performed well but, frankly, has had its resources cut by more than two thirds in the current spending round up to 2020 for its existing responsibilities.
I would be grateful if the Minister set out clearly, before the Bill completes its passage through this House, the resources, staffing and level of qualifications of staff for the ONR that will be needed for it to carry out its new obligations. I understand that currently, 40 Euratom safeguarding staff are based in the UK and focused on UK nuclear institutions while at the moment only eight ONR staff have professional safeguarding qualifications. How many extra staff will the ONR need, or will it sub-contract the work back to Euratom? I hope that any new migration package will not stop those staff coming in. These questions are vital if we are to establish that the ONR will be in a position to carry out these new duties. There are also duties relating to what is currently Euratom equipment. Are the Government going to acquire that equipment for the ONR, and will it be a cost to the ONR and the Exchequer? What will be the future cost of its decommissioning and replacement? How will all
this be taken into account on the basis of a significantly reduced ONR budget and a shrinking expertise base, which is what we are inheriting?
The phrase “Euratom equivalence” requires some further explanation in the context of the regulations, as does the ONR’s independence. The UK Government, via the ONR, will be inspecting their own provisions regarding the civil and military interface, for example. I think I can say without severely breaching the Official Secrets Act that when I worked for the Atomic Energy Authority, well before Euratom, those interfaces were not always clear. I shall say no more. ONR independence from government is absolutely essential; otherwise, the Government will effectively be marking their own homework in this vital area.
The Bill does not cover all the other functions of Euratom, but even the safeguarding provisions stray into other areas. For example, another key Euratom function has been the facilitation of cross-border supply chains. Since much of the UK nuclear industry is owned overseas and certainly has overseas suppliers, primarily French, these international supply chains are key. I, and I expect other noble Lords, have received evidence from EDF that spells out how important this seamless supply chain was in dealing with a very dangerous emergency situation at Sizewell B a few years ago, and now in fulfilling the effective delivery of the new Hinkley Point station. If we are absent from not only Euratom itself but its agencies—the observatory referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and its supply agency—the monitoring and support for these supply chains will inevitably diminish.
The Minister might say that this is irrelevant to the direct subject of the Bill, but others have already mentioned the R&D provisions under Euratom, which spill over into safeguarding. I recognise that much R&D is international. I have probably related this in the House previously, but in my early youth in the 1960s—prior to Euratom even being invented, or certainly the UK being a member of it—I worked at Harwell and Culham. Noble Lords might find it difficult to believe, but I received security clearance to the highest level. It took about three passes to get to my office. But one morning I was in early and I heard this babble outside in the corridor, which was all in Russian. Harwell had invited a whole crowd of Russian experts and scientists, because science is international. This was at the height of the Cold War.
Some international collaboration is open, but Euratom has channelled expertise and money into projects that have already been referred to, which include the important work on fusion technology. The Minister may try to downplay the importance of Euratom in this, but it is all part of the picture of European co-operation. Before we finish with the Bill, we need to get a clear indication of the Minister’s understanding of and position on the JET and Torus fusion projects, and other R&D programmes, when we leave the EU and Euratom.
The noble Lord referred to progress being made on Euratom in the Brexit negotiations. I would be grateful if he could expand on this and how, in agreement with our European ex-partners, we will liaise in future. Are the Government at least seeking associate membership
of Euratom and its agencies? I assume from what the Minister said that the answer to that is no, but it is possible. Norway is party to some of these.
The recent EU document suggests that we will be absent from the agencies as well as the institutions of the EU, not only after the end of the transition period but from the beginning of it. That means that by March 2019, we must beef up the operation of the ONR, reach an understanding with the EU and ensure that an adequate alternative UK regime is recognised internationally and co-ordinated in new bilateral treaties replacing those currently covered by the EU. That stretches credibility. While there are aspects of the Bill that I welcome, the Government need to stop pretending that all of this can be done. We need to ensure that the endpoint of this process, if we are leaving Euratom, is at least the endpoint of the transition period. There is no chance of us meeting it by what is effectively October, or even by March 2019.
I recognise that, in the circumstances, the Government have created the need for the Bill, but there are many queries still to be faced. In particular, I would like a justification for what appears to be an impossible timetable.
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