My Lords, perhaps I might intervene in this debate and save the Committee some time. First, they say that sorry seems to be the hardest word but it is not for me. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, since after Second Reading, as he said, I wrote to him and said that the Government intended to bring forward a draft instrument and would put on record during Committee the Government’s intended policy in regard to this clause. I regret to say that we have not fulfilled the first part of that intention—I will come to it in a moment—but I hope that, through what I say, I can fulfil the second part of it now.
Let me assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the Committee more generally that much work has been, and continues to be, done between officials in various departments on refining this important policy area. As the noble Lord acknowledged, the issue is complex and involves not only the specialist tribunal but how this relates to other aspects of the Bill. This has meant that, despite best efforts by officials, the draft statutory instrument was not ready to be published. It was my view and that of the Government that, rather than publish a statutory instrument that is not yet fully ready, Parliament would be better assisted by seeing a more mature version of that instrument. To that end, my officials and others across Whitehall will continue this work apace. We will endeavour to publish a version of the statutory instrument ahead of Report. I would be happy to meet the noble Lord in the interim to discuss this specific issue. I would also like to put on record for the Committee the intention behind this clause and address some of the points that he made.
Clause 40 concerns how appeals against the immigration consequences of UK autonomous sanctions are handled. I would like to give the Committee some background as to the current arrangements before I go on to speak about the clause. Under the current arrangements, UN or EU travel bans are, in the vast majority of cases, imposed on individuals who are outside the UK and have no connection to the UK. The Immigration Act 1971 already makes provision for persons subject to UN travel bans. Clause 40 allows us to ensure that the persons subject to UK autonomous travel bans can benefit from a similar provision.
In the unlikely event that a UK autonomous travel ban were to be imposed on a person in the UK, this would, as a matter of domestic law, have consequences for their immigration status in the UK—a point I know concerned the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Whereas a person who is outside the UK will be refused entry, those who are in the UK will lose the right to remain here and may be subject to removal. A person affected in this way might argue that any removal from the UK would interfere with their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, or be contrary to our obligations under the refugee convention. As a result, they may wish to make a human rights or humanitarian protection claim to prevent their removal. These immigration claims are usually decided by the Home Secretary, and a very developed machinery has grown up around the decision-making process to ensure that it is fair and effective and, importantly, complies with our international obligations. Such decisions, once made, can also give rise to a right of appeal before the immigration and asylum chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, a specialist tribunal with expertise in deciding such claims.
I turn to the Bill. Such immigration claims may also be made against the immigration consequences of a UK autonomous travel ban imposed under the Bill. Again, immigration claims are most likely to arise where an individual in the UK would lose their right to remain here. Noble Lords might ask why we need Clause 40, given that this situation can already arise in the context of a UN or EU travel ban. I wish to explain the point here. The Bill establishes a new administrative reassessment process for designations and a court review process in the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session. No such equivalent administrative and court mechanisms are currently applied in domestic law for UN or EU travel bans. The mechanisms in place are different, so we will need to adapt the existing decision-making and appellate structures that I described earlier in order to accommodate the Bill. That is why we need Clause 40.
I turn back to the practicalities. Cases of this kind are likely to be limited in number, but it is vital that we get this right—a point made by the noble Lord himself. The Government consider it important to ensure that such claims are handled appropriately. We want to ensure that domestic sanctions do not unjustifiably interfere with fundamental rights or run contrary to our obligations under the refugee convention. It is also important that the effectiveness of our domestic sanctions regime is not compromised because our domestic legislation no longer enables us to manage effectively such immigration claims as may be made. The Government have therefore considered how these immigration claims should be treated in the context of the new administrative reassessment and court review processes.
Our conclusion is that, as a starting point, we should seek to maintain the status quo. The Home Secretary and the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal should remain the appropriate decision-makers, as they are now. Both the Home Office and the tribunal are vastly experienced in this area, having dealt with 38,681 human rights and asylum claims and appeals
in 2016 alone. However, some changes will be necessary in order to ensure that domestic legislation enables us to manage situations where, for example, there would otherwise be the possibility of both the High Court and the tribunal considering the same issues, or the High Court being required to determine a protection claim that the Home Office had not had the opportunity to consider.
To illustrate the point, whereas the tribunal would be best placed to determine an appeal against an immigration decision, determining the lawfulness of a decision to freeze an individual’s assets is a decision that would be better suited to the High Court. The clause provides the powers necessary to make these changes, which will ensure that we continue to comply with our international obligations and that the effectiveness of our domestic sanctions regime is not compromised. To provide appropriate scrutiny, regulations made under this power will use the draft affirmative procedure.
I give this very detailed explanation along with, once again, an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I believe that at Second Reading when he raised this issue I had momentarily left the Chamber or I was near the Box to clarify something, so I did not fully hear his contribution and read it only later in Hansard. As I said, I put on record that we would look to return to this in Committee, which clearly we have not been able to do. I am much minded that the instrument put forward is one that we have looked at extensively and reflects the detail of what I have just submitted to your Lordships’ House. I therefore hope that with that somewhat detailed explanation, which I briefly mentioned to the respective Front Benches out of courtesy in your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment, with the assurance that I look forward to working with him specifically on that SI before Report.