My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. A small point was made about what I said in my opening remarks at Second Reading about the Bill being technical. Maybe I should defend that by saying that every Bill is technical in some way and perhaps that was what I was alluding to. But I thank the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for whom I have great affection, for highlighting that point, and we live and learn through our experiences at the Dispatch Box and in the House.
As I said at Second Reading, this is a Bill that we need to get right—a point that was acknowledged by all noble Lords who have spoken. I stated that right from the outset, as I do again today, at the start of Committee. That is why I will put on record my immense thanks to noble Lords from all sides of the House who have engaged very constructively on this important Bill. I assure noble Lords that that will continue to be the case as the Bill progresses through your
Lordships’ House. I thank all noble Lords—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Lennie—for recognising why we require this legislation.
After we leave the European Union we will need the Bill to ensure that we can continue to impose, amend and lift sanctions, and change our anti-money laundering framework. As noble Lords know, sanctions form part of the range of foreign policy tools that we can use in response to threats such as terrorism to the UK and UK interests. The Government fully recognise that sanctions are not to be used lightly—I assure noble Lords of that fact—and impose significant restrictions on individuals and entities. They should be imposed only after careful consideration of the political context, the desired impact and, of course, the potential risks. The Government also believe strongly that sanctions are a tool for changing unacceptable or threatening behaviour. They should not be used punitively as a substitute for criminal justice measures. A good recent example of the value of sanctions is the way that they encouraged Iran to accept constraints on its nuclear programme.
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I turn to the amendments. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, have so eloquently set out, Amendment 1 proposes changing the circumstances in which a Minister can make sanctions regulations, from where they consider it “appropriate” for the purposes set out in the Bill to where they consider it “necessary” for those purposes. I am thankful to them both for saying that, although they accept that I am currently at the Dispatch Box, they cannot plan for the future. I am not quite sure about the timescales of one year to five years, or the potential for others to lead from a different party. We remain determined on these Benches to ensure that we continue to make things work as we move towards the UK leaving the European Union. However, I also emphasise to all noble Lords that “appropriate” was chosen very carefully. My noble friend Lord Faulks talked of examples of when it might be appropriate but not necessary. For example, if one of our close allies had imposed sanctions and we sought to support them, it might be hard to demonstrate that this was strictly “necessary”; it would be a question of judgment based on UK foreign policy goals.
The UK currently plays a central role in negotiating global sanctions, as noble Lords will be aware, not only at the UN—where the UK is of course a permanent member—but in situations where the UN has chosen not to act but we consider that an international response is still warranted. This has often involved the UK working in close co-operation between the EU and the United States with the support of others, including the likes of Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Norway. An example is where the UK played a key role in negotiating the sanctions in respect of Syria.
It is important that the Government have the necessary discretion to act in the field of foreign and security policy, including in the context of unpredictable, fast-moving events. As we saw in recent years in the western response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, for example, foreign policy is an exercise in managing risks based on the Government’s best assessment of the situation
using the range of tools available—from strong words, yes, to military intervention. There may be differing views on which tools are most appropriate but, in the end, we believe it is for Governments to make these judgments and then be held appropriately accountable by Parliament.
It is also important to note that “appropriate” in Clause 1 does not give Ministers unrestricted discretion to impose whatever sanctions they may wish or like. Sanctions may be not just “appropriate” per se but appropriate for one of the specific purposes set out in the Bill. This includes being appropriate for the purposes of compliance with a UN obligation, which I will address further when we debate Amendment 23, or for one of the other purposes mentioned in Clause 1(2). It places the Minister’s decision firmly in the context of those purposes. This position is also consistent with the current position under the EU treaties. The Lisbon treaty allows the EU to use sanctions if they are made in accordance with the EU’s common security and foreign policy. It sets out the objectives of that policy and requires the EU to pursue its objectives by appropriate means. So, as with other parts of the Bill, we are seeking continuity with current practice in the EU.
It is also important to note that the Bill contains a range of measures designed to ensure that the sanctions are used appropriately. In cases where the UK has chosen to put in place sanctions and the UN has not done so, the made affirmative procedure will apply, ensuring that both Houses of Parliament have a vote. In this way, not only the Government but Parliament will decide whether the sanctions themselves are “appropriate”.
The Bill provides a number of other in-built protections. In particular, it provides for an annual review of each sanctions regime against the purpose it was put in place to achieve, which will involve looking at the current global picture. It also provides for a broader triennial substantive review of all the designations under the regime. Further, the Bill provides safeguards to ensure that the Government do not act unreasonably when imposing sanctions on individuals, including evidentiary thresholds and opportunities for reassessments and challenges.