My Lords, I want to add some footnotes to the powerful speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. As your Lordships know, this is the first substantive Bill to be brought forward in this House to address the consequences of Brexit. As the Minister explained at Second Reading, domestic powers are needed to impose sanctions to replace the powers currently enjoyed under EU law. In relation to these amendments, it is important to say—as is repeatedly pointed out—that there is a disturbing irony when a Brexit that is said to be justified by a desire to restore to Parliament powers currently enjoyed in Brussels results in Ministers seeking to confer extensive powers on themselves.
That is a topic to which the House will no doubt return when the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill reaches us, but for today, these amendments seek to identify the unjustifiable breadth of the powers that Ministers seek to confer on themselves in the context of the Bill. I pose this question to the Minister: why should the Committee be satisfied that Ministers should take powers that are unnecessary? That is the question. It is not sufficient that the powers are appropriate; they need to be necessary, because a Minister in this context should not have a power that is unnecessary.
The noble and learned Lord mentioned the report of the Constitution Committee. I also draw attention to the report on the Bill published last Friday by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 18, which I will quote because it is so powerful. It says:
“As drafted, clause 1(1) allows the Minister to make sanctions regulations where the Minister considers that doing so is ‘appropriate’ to achieve one of the purposes listed in that clause. In the light of the width and significance of the powers, we take the view that the Minister should only have power to make sanctions regulations if doing so is considered ‘necessary’ to achieve the purpose for which they are made”.
I hope the Minister will reflect on that advice from that committee, as well as that of the Constitution Committee.
I expect the Minister will respond by seeking to placate the Committee—he is very good at that sort of thing—with reassurances about the Government’s benign intentions in this context. If I may get my retaliation in first, the answer to that contention is given again by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It is in its report published on 28 September this year on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, but it is a general point. At paragraph 10, the report says that the committee judges,
“powers on how they might be used and not just on how the Government indicate that they intend to use them”.
That must be right. That is the approach we should adopt in this Committee.
The noble Lord is, if I may say so, the acceptable face of ministerialism, but who knows the identity of the Minister who will perform this role in a year’s time or five years’ time? I say respectfully to those on the Government Benches that they ought to bear in mind that it may not be a Minister from their party performing this role in a year or five years’ time. It is important to adopt a non-partisan approach to this issue. It is not good enough that the Minister has benign intentions, as I know he has; we have to look at the extent of the powers being given. I strongly support the noble and learned Lord’s amendments.
4.45 pm