My Lords, these amendments seek to remove the ability of the Government to create sectoral financial sanctions measures by removing the power to apply certain sanction measures to, as we have heard,
“persons connected with a prescribed country”.
Amendments 10 to 14, 16 and 17 would make this change in Clause 2 while Amendment 19 speaks to Clause 5, Amendment 22 to Clause 6 and Amendment 81 to Clause 50. Amendment 30 to Clause 10 would make a slightly different change in that it would restrict the Government from being able to designate a person on the basis of their involvement with other designated persons. However, the amendments all have a common
theme as they deal with the application of sanctions to persons other than those directly designated.
The Government are clear that sectoral financial sanctions remain a vital foreign policy and national security tool to enable us to meet our UN obligations. It is worth emphasising that we already implement these sanctions under both the United Nations and the European Union regimes. For example, sanctions against North Korea restrict that country’s access to certain financial markets in order to restrict its ability to generate funds for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. To do this and to make it work, we have had to impose sanctions on groups of persons—or in extreme cases, on all people—connected in a specified way with the prescribed country. This ensures that the sanctions measures are robust and effective.
We accept that this creates the potential for far-reaching sanctions that bite upon people who themselves have done no wrong, but it remains the case that it is a necessary part of some sanctions regimes. The more broadly sanctions can be drawn, the greater the impact they will have. I accept that it is a sad but necessary side-effect that at times this can affect persons who may not be directly involved with the activities of the target regime. For example, the current restrictions on the transfer of funds to and from North Korea—noble Lords will be aware that there have previously been restrictions on the transfer of funds to and from Iran—will affect people who do not directly support Kim Jong-un’s regime.
The UK, EU and Strasbourg courts have all considered and accepted that the harsh effects on individuals are justified due to the importance of sanctions and the need for them to have broad and deep effects. It was summarised by the European Court of Justice, which stated that,
“any measure imposing sanctions has, by definition, consequences which affect the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions. Moreover, the importance of the aims pursued by the regulation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators”.
This was the Bosphorus case decided in 1996 in relation to sanctions that were placed on the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has been a settled principle of law for more than 20 years.
If the amendments were accepted, we would be unable to impose these measures. In some cases, they are mandated by resolutions of the UN Security Council, such as the obligations imposed in 2013 to cease business with North Korean banks and financial institutions. We would then be in breach of international law. Another example of a sanctions regime that we would be unable to maintain is the Ukraine sovereignty regime, which aims to restrict Russia from accessing certain financial services. Similar to the North Korea examples I have already given, we would be unable to maintain those financial sanctions if we were unable to impose sanctions on persons connected with Russia, or with persons of a certain description connected with Russia, such as state-owned banks. The clauses must remain if we are to be able to meet our international obligations and work with allies to use sanctions as an effective foreign policy and national security tool.
Clause 10 currently permits us to determine that a person is an “involved person” on the basis of their relationships with other “involved persons”. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised this issue; I hope I can briefly explain the significance of it. A person can be designated only when the appropriate Minister has sufficient evidence to have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are involved in the activities targeted by sanctions. For example, if a senior member of a regime is controlling a public body that is developing weapons of mass destruction, they are involved in that activity and can be classified as an “involved person”. Assuming that the appropriate Minister deems it appropriate—and proportionate—to designate them, they can do so.
Clause 10 also enables a person to be an “involved person” if they are owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf of, an “involved person”—for example, as an agent. It goes further and enables a person to be an “involved person” on the basis of their association with other involved people. The key point is that this is often required of us by our international obligations. It is common for a UNSCR to require states to designate not just those involved in a particular activity, but those acting on their behalf or at their direction. Accordingly, we must be able to do that to meet our UN obligations, but it also has three other advantages. First, it enables us to apply sanctions more widely to affect the people around those directly involved, which would further restrict the regime’s ability to act and place further pressure on the regime to change its ways. Secondly, it allows us to designate those people who enable these activities by providing funds and financial services to the regime without direct involvement in the targeted activities. Thirdly, it enables us to apply sanctions across a whole group who share the same aims but are using different methods to achieve them. For example, it would enable us to designate all members of a terrorist group: not only those who are engaging directly in terrorist activity, but those providing funds and logistical support.
A current example of that would be the EU designation of Bashar al-Assad under the EU’s Syria sanctions regime, which has frozen the assets of Assad in the EU —including the UK—and banned him from entering the EU. However, people associated with him are also designated: leading businesspersons operating in Syria; members of the Syrian armed forces of the rank of colonel, or the equivalent or higher, in post after May 2011; members of the Syrian security and intelligence services in post after May 2011; and members of the regime-affiliated militias. Removing the ability to designate these as “associated persons”, as proposed in Amendment 30, would remove the ability to designate those who have a significant role in threats to peace and security.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, gave a personal example of being connected and made the pertinent point of the definition being very wide: it encompasses many people, even those whose connections are arguably tenuous. As I have already explained, it is necessary to ensure that sanctions are broad and effective. To say that somebody is connected because of a remote family relationship is tenuous. I doubt it would be lawful or stand up to scrutiny in a court, nor would it advance the purpose of the sanctions. However, it is
almost impossible to foresee what type of connections will be required in future sanctions regimes, but I do not believe that this one, in terms of the detailed nature of what the noble and learned Lord expressed, would apply.
I have heard and listened very carefully to the concerns, but at the same time I have stated that there are good reasons for casting these powers in the way we have. There will be real difficulties in applying sanctions if they are too restricted. We believe that we have the balance right. With the practical examples I have given, and my interpretation of the Bosphorus case—especially when we bear in mind that power can be exercised only when proportionate and compliant with human rights; any other use would be forbidden by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998—I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw the amendment.