I take the noble Lord’s point and that of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, who spoke from a position of great knowledge on the subject because of his past work as a Minister, referred to the importance of capping and summed up the dilemma well. This is an important issue which has been raised with me constantly both by noble Lords and those who are interested in carrying out spaceflight activities. I hope noble Lords will bear with me as I explain the provisions in great detail and go through what we propose. I somewhat doubt that I will satisfy everyone at the end but I will do my best.
The liability provisions of the Bill are vital but necessarily complex and I will take a little time to explain the Government’s position and why these amendments would not be appropriate. Clause 11 concerns the terms which may or must be included in a licence issued under the Bill authorising spaceflight activities, the operation of a spaceport or the provision of range control services. Subsection (2) provides a power to specify in an operator’s licence a limit on a licensee’s liability to indemnify the Government and other listed bodies under Clause 35 against claims brought against them for damage or loss caused by spaceflight activities. Amendment 15 relates to this subsection and seeks to remove it altogether. Amendment 36 is linked to Amendment 15, as it removes reference to the subsection from Clause 35. These amendments would therefore remove the regulator’s power to cap this liability to indemnify under Clause 35.
I should be clear that the position under the Bill is exactly the same as that in the aviation industry—that operators have an unlimited liability to indemnify government. However, satellite operators have previously raised concerns that such a liability is a barrier to operating in the space industry. Operators have found that the unlimited liability has made it difficult to raise finance or insure against the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. This is not the case in the more mature aviation market. The Government have responded to these concerns.
The Outer Space Act 1986 was amended by the deregulation Act in 2012 and since then, licences issued under that Act for the procurement of an overseas launch and the in-orbit operation of a satellite benefit from a cap, which is set out in the licence conditions. The UK Space Agency publishes the usual level of cap in its guidance, which currently sets it at €60 million for standard missions. Since the level is not set by statute, the cap can be increased for riskier missions. It should be noted that some activities currently regulated under the Outer Space Act, notably procuring the launch of a space object and the operation of a satellite in orbit taking place from the UK, will in the future be regulated under this Bill. Therefore, following Royal Assent, the amendment would reverse the current policy under the Outer Space Act—that the indemnity to government for these activities is capped. However, the current cap under the Outer Space Act would remain in place for such overseas activities regulated under that Act. As a result, there is a very real risk that UK operators may decide to procure overseas launches and conduct their satellite operations overseas under the Outer Space Act or a different regime altogether, to avoid an unlimited liability to
indemnify government. This would go against the Bill’s aim, which I hope all noble Lords support, to grow the UK space industry.
The cap on the indemnity to government under the Outer Space Act was based on many years of licensing those activities and it was well received. The costs and benefits of capping liabilities for those activities have already been considered and were subject to a full consultation with industry at the time. There was an amendment to primary legislation that was also subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Evidence provided by industry during the Science and Technology Committee inquiry into the Bill reiterated that an unlimited indemnity to government was a barrier to entry into the industry. The discretionary power in Clause 11 therefore allows the Government to remain committed to their current policy position under the Outer Space Act. However, it also allows the Government a discretion on whether to cap the indemnity to government for other activities licensed under the Bill, such as a UK launch.
I shall move on to Amendment 35 which would remove subsections (5) and (6) from Clause 33. The power in these subsections to make regulations provides for the capping of an operator’s liability to prescribed persons or in prescribed circumstances in an operator licence. The Bill therefore goes further than the Outer Space Act and provides a power to cap all of an operator’s liability to prescribed persons. This is intended to cover third parties or the uninvolved general public who suffer injury or damage caused by regulated space flight activity. Removing these subsections would mean that a regulator would be unable to cap this liability. As a consequence, the operator would bear unlimited liability, and as previously highlighted, operators have already raised concerns about managing unlimited liabilities. Most of the main space launch nations, including France and the United States, do cap an operator’s liability in some form. Having this power enables the UK to compete on a level playing field by allowing the Government the power to share the burden of liabilities with operators. There is a real concern that we risk being uncompetitive internationally if we do not have the powers to cap operator liabilities both to the Government and to third parties. Without the powers to cap, we may be unable to attract operators in the UK. The reason for conferring a power to cap rather than simply providing for a cap in the Bill is to ensure that careful consideration can be given to whether and when it is appropriate to exercise the power, as there may be missions where capping is not appropriate.
While we have assessed the cap on the operator’s indemnity to government for activities currently licensed under the Outer Space Act, a more general liability cap for space flight activities taking place from the UK has not been fully analysed. Launches are a new activity for the UK and we believe that we should cap the operator’s liabilities for this activity only if there is clear evidence that it is necessary to do so. That is why we have taken powers to cap liabilities for spaceflight activities on a discretionary basis under the Bill. We are already undertaking work on assessing the availability and cost of insurance to cover the liabilities. That work
will inform any policy on limiting the level of any cap on the liability both to indemnify government and to prescribed persons.
The flexibility provided by the powers in the Bill means that the right balance can be created for each mission, based on the risks involved. The Bill is designed to ensure that spaceflight activity is as safe as possible in the first place, which will minimise any liability arising. Under Clause 33, an operator is strictly liable where injury or damage is caused, meaning claimants can bring a claim without having to prove fault. Regulations requiring operators to be insured can be made under Clause 37; that would provide a resource to meet any of those claims. Furthermore, it should be noted that Clause 33(5)(b) provides a power to constrain the circumstances in which a liability cap applies. For instance, we envisage that a cap would be disapplied in cases of operator wilful misconduct.
On Clause 34—the power of the Secretary of State to indemnify—we have previously considered clauses that allow for an operator’s liability to third parties to be capped. Clause 34 provides a power for the Secretary of State to indemnify a claimant or an operator for injury or damage arising because of spaceflight activities; that includes situations where an operator’s third-party liabilities have been capped under Clause 33. In order for the Government to provide such an indemnity, the injury or damage must be sustained as a result of spaceflight activities. To qualify for an indemnity, the person suffering the injury or damage must not have taken part in, or be connected to, the activities. Those people will be identified in regulations; however, it is likely that they will be the same people to whom the informed consent provisions apply, under Clause 16, and who are excluded from the right to bring a strict liability claim against an operator under Clause 33. That is because they will have engaged in spaceflight activities in full knowledge of the risks involved. As part of the informed consent process, such people will be made aware that this indemnity does not apply to them. The Government may only indemnify an operator where a claim for injury or damage exceeds any insurance held by it. The Government may only indemnify a claimant where the amount of liability has been limited by regulations under Clause 33(5) and the claimant would otherwise have been entitled to more money.
In most cases, we envisage that an operator’s liability, if capped, will equal the amount of third-party liability insurance that they are expected to hold. Therefore, an operator’s insurance should cover their liability. However, there may be situations where an operator has taken out more insurance; Clause 34 ensures that the insurance is exhausted before the Government step in. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that the uninvolved general public can be compensated in the event of injury or damage, particularly where an operator’s liability to third parties has been capped. However, the intention is that the provisions in the Bill and subsequent regulations will work together to reduce the likelihood of injury or damage occurring in the first place. That will be achieved by implementing a robust safety regime and ensuring operations take place with appropriate provisions for range control and safety to minimise damage in the event of failure.