My Lords, I support the amendment, although there should of course be amendments to the drafting. I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about anonymity acting to the detriment of the accused without his consent. I suggest that consideration be given to redrafting the amendment to permit the accused to waive the right to anonymity. On reconsideration, I should add that I consider my earlier intervention on the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, to be ill advised: the amendment does not in fact cover communication privately by police officers and I accept that it should.
There has been widespread discussion in the press of the independent review by Sir Richard Henriques into the failure of Operation Midland, the reliance placed on accounts given by, in particular, one unreliable witness and baseless allegations that had been made. Those allegations were, as has been said, permitted
to do untold harm to the reputations of a number of prominent men who had given their lives to public service.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us that Sir Richard makes the case for increased anonymity, but his recommendation is that there should be anonymity only pre-arrest. He draws back from recommending anonymity at all stages prior to charge. His reasoning, in paragraph 1.67 of his report, is as follows:
“I consider it most unlikely that a Government will protect the anonymity of suspects pre-charge. To do so would enrage the popular press whose circulation would suffer”.
If that is the reasoning behind his conclusion, I disagree. He goes on to say:
“Present arrangements, however, have caused the most dreadful unhappiness and distress to numerous suspects, their families, friends and supporters”.
In that, Sir Richard is plainly right.
The question of when anonymity should be lost is one of balance. For my part, I do not believe that protection ought to be lost at the date of arrest, when the arrest can be made—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, points out—on reasonable suspicion only. I accept that the consideration that comes into play is whether, as he suggests, anonymity should apply only to sexual offences, rather than more widely. In my view, the particular position relating to sexual offences justifies the difference when we weigh the balance. He is of course right to say that what needs to come into the balance is the risk of injustice flowing from anonymity, just as there may be—indeed, we know there is—a risk of injustice flowing from the exposure that comes from the lack of anonymity.
As we all know, suspicion—even reasonable suspicion sufficient to ground an arrest—can turn out to be entirely misplaced. There may be a reasonable and truthful explanation for the circumstances that give rise to the suspicion justifying an arrest. While those circumstances may demand that explanation, an arrest can legitimately take place before the suspect has had a chance to give the full explanation required. When a suspect is charged, however, it is on the basis of a different test and different circumstances. First, the police must have the evidence that they believe will sustain a prosecution and conviction, if not refuted. Secondly, the suspect will generally have had a full opportunity to give a considered explanation of the circumstances, if there is one. Public exposure damages a suspect’s family life, his privacy and his reputation—for we are talking about men predominantly. The damage is largely irreversible, even where allegations are later withdrawn or found to be baseless. Death has sometimes made the damage and injustice total.
When striking a balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from that damage and the right of the public to know, the balance tips, in my view, in favour of the public’s right to know at the point of charge, not at the point of arrest. I am not persuaded by the argument that pre-charge anonymity will prevent other victims coming forward altogether. It may be that there will be a delay in such victims coming forward and they will do so after charge, rather than after arrest. That gives some opportunity for witnesses to come forward—as in the case of the murder client
of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, which of course could happen in the case of a sexual offence client as well. There is delay to the stage at which anonymity is lost, but it is not lost for ever and there is no reason to suppose that others will not come forward at that stage. My noble friend Lady Brinton’s point, that there should be protection also for the victims from early disclosure until it is established by charge that there is going to be a case, is an important one. I agree with my noble friend Lord Beith that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on gossip and speculation, applies wherever there is going to be anonymity at any stage. The argument that we have to address is at what stage anonymity should be lost.
The only reasonable point that can be made against this amendment is that there may be cases where further witnesses might come forward with legitimate and admissible similar fact evidence which might justify the charge where otherwise no charge would be brought. However, for my part, I have concluded that such cases will be rare and that most can be met by the proviso included—though perhaps to be redrafted—in the amendment. It is a question of balance but, in my view, the possibility of similar fact evidence being lost and justice thereby being thwarted is of lesser weight than the inevitable damage caused by premature exposure of an innocent suspect’s identity.