My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to restate the Government’s position on the further changes to the service justice system that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, proposes. His intention with Amendment 11 is to extend the jurisdiction of civilian criminal courts in England and Wales by giving them jurisdiction to try members of the Armed Forces and civilians subject to service discipline for overseas acts that, were they committed here, would constitute sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, because I confess I am not clear what advantage the amendments would confer on the system as a whole. Noble Lords may be aware that service courts are already able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts committed overseas. Section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that a member of the Armed Forces is guilty of an offence under service law if they commit an act outside the UK that would constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales were it done here. If it is necessary to have a further conversation with the noble Lord after Report to clarify any misunderstanding that I have, I will be happy to do that.
Amendment 12 would give members of the Armed Forces accused of committing certain crimes overseas the right to elect to be tried by a civilian criminal court in the UK instead of a court martial. The crimes in question are those that the civilian criminal courts may try even if the event in question took place overseas. Those offences include murder, and would also include sexual offences if Amendment 11 were accepted as well. I note that Amendment 12 does not appear to propose that a member of the Armed Forces should have a right to elect civilian criminal trial in a case concerning conduct in the UK, where both the civilian courts and a court martial would have jurisdiction to try the case. I confess it is not immediately apparent to me why such cases should be treated differently.
Taken together, the effect of Amendments 11 and 12 would appear to be that while a service person who committed a sexual offence overseas could choose to be tried at a Crown Court rather than a court martial, a service person who committed the same offence in the UK would have no such choice. It is not clear why the amendment makes provision for electing civilian court trial only for conduct outside the UK, not in the UK.
The noble Lord may again not be too surprised to hear that we do not support these amendments. I said in Grand Committee in response to two very similar amendments tabled by the noble Lord that making the changes proposed would appear to imply that there may be reason to doubt the ability of the court martial to deal with sexual offences. I would make the same point about Amendments 11 and 12. Yet, as I said in Grand Committee, the service justice system has been scrutinised by the UK courts and by Strasbourg and it is now well recognised that the court martial system in the UK ensures a trial that is fair and compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, both for
investigations and prosecutions in respect of acts in the UK and for investigations and prosecutions in respect of overseas acts where the civilian police may not have jurisdiction. The Government believe that the service justice system, including the service police, the Service Prosecuting Authority and service courts, is capable of dealing with the most serious of offences and should be able to continue to do so.
The amendments would significantly undermine existing arrangements designed to ensure that cases are dealt with in the most appropriate court jurisdiction. In the case of offences which both the civilian criminal courts and service courts have jurisdiction to try, it is recognised that it is necessary to consider in each case whether the offence is more appropriately tried in the civilian criminal courts or in a service court. This applies not only to those offences committed overseas in respect of which the civilian criminal courts have jurisdiction, but also to offences committed in the United Kingdom which both the civilian criminal courts and service courts have jurisdiction to try. However, a decision on appropriate jurisdiction is rightly a matter for service and civilian prosecutors rather than the accused person.
There is a protocol between service and civilian prosecutors which recognises that some cases are more appropriately dealt with in the service system and others are more appropriately dealt with in the civilian system, particularly those with civilian victims. The principles of this protocol have the approval of the Attorney-General for England and Wales, and the Ministry of Justice. The protocol recognises that any criminal offence can be dealt with by the service authorities. The main factor in decisions on whether an offence is more appropriately dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system or the service justice system is whether the offence has any civilian context, especially a civilian victim. The protocol therefore provides for cases with a civilian context to be dealt with by the civilian criminal justice system. Where a case has a service context, it is important that the service justice system, which is specifically constructed to deal with that unique service dimension, is able to deal with the case.
Creating a right to elect of the kind contained in this amendment would override the existing protocol and could seriously undermine the service justice system. Many offences which involve conduct outside the UK will have a service context such that both service and civilian prosecutors would consider that they would be more appropriately dealt with in the service system. However, the proposed right of election could mean that a person accused of such an offence could make an election that led to their case being dealt with instead by the civilian criminal courts. We do not think this would be right. This is significant because the court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline, and the existing statutory provisions in the Armed Forces Act 2006 governing sentencing in the court martial reflect this. They are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include in addition, as I mentioned earlier, the “maintenance of discipline” and the “reduction of service offences”, which reflect
special aspects related to the service justice system. In my response to Amendment 2, I touched on a number of these special aspects.
Allowing a case with a purely service context to be dealt with in the civilian system on the election of an accused therefore risks undermining the system of justice and discipline in the Armed Forces which the Armed Forces Act 2006 was carefully constructed to underpin. And where the prosecutor’s protocol indicated that a case should be dealt with in the civilian system—for example, a case in which the victim is a civilian—would the accused service person be able to override that and instead elect trial by court martial? We do not think that would be right. Furthermore, a right to choose which court should hear the case would open up the possibility of any co-accused making different elections, resulting in split trials in different systems with obvious implications for the efficient administration of justice.
There is another aspect to this, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, identified in Grand Committee and which it may be helpful for me to repeat here. The amendments are concerned with conduct overseas which is likely to be criminal under the local law as well as under service law. However, the authorities in states visited by our Armed Forces are commonly prepared to allow service courts to exercise jurisdiction rather than assert their right to try a case before their own civilian courts. A good example is Germany, where there is a very active and much-respected criminal justice system, but under the arrangements we have in place the German authorities are prepared to allow our service courts to exercise jurisdiction over cases with a service context.
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There is a risk that jurisdictions around the world which are prepared to do that may be concerned about allowing our civilian courts to exercise jurisdiction. We would need to be absolutely sure that those jurisdictions were prepared to allow this when they could perfectly well assert their right to try a case before their own civilian courts.
In conclusion, I strongly contend that the service justice system is capable of dealing effectively with the most serious of offences and should be able to continue to do so. It is therefore not appropriate to limit the jurisdiction of the court martial; nor is it necessary or appropriate to make changes which may have that effect—changes which would appear to imply reason to doubt the ability of the court martial to deal with sexual offences. Although I know that the noble Lord will find my reply disappointing, I hope he will agree to withdraw his amendment in the light of what I have said.