My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for being late on parade this morning due to my travel arrangements.
It is tempting from these Benches to have a bit of a dig at manifesto commitments, bearing in mind that I made my maiden speech in this House in my previous incarnation here on what became known as the poll tax, so I know that political expediency often overrules practical reality.
Your Lordships will know that I come to this matter with a certain area of technical expertise in relation to development matters. It seems to me that there is more than a hint of evidence that a sale by a housing association of a property at a 20% discount is not a self-sustaining model without the cross-subsidy, notwithstanding the fact that many housing associations are involved at the commercial end of residential property development and are in competition with other private sector operators in the market for the same sites—therefore, one can reasonably suppose that they are making some developer-type profit out of that.
Given that most local authorities now no longer operate on that basis—your Lordships’ Select Committee on National Policy for the Built Environment had evidence brought before it that indicated the sharp fall-off in local authority construction of new homes; the evidence from the graphs that we were shown was incontestable—it follows that the sale of a local authority house on whatever level of value is also unlikely to be self-sustaining. More to the point, it does not have the cross-subsidy from the allied sector—or any sector really. There will either be an attrition in the numbers replaced—not one for one—or an attrition in quality, AKA size; whatever way you want to do it. It might be both. That might result in a cheapening of the housing stock to the potential detriment of the built environment
and the long-term value and therefore sustainability in terms of people’s willingness to maintain and look after these places.
The noble Lord, Lord Tope, referred to something that I know as market drag, which is when something is sold and there is a period when one tries to organise where to reinvest the money and things happen. The market may move forwards or backwards, as the case may be, financing arrangements may change, opportunities that may have been counted on may disappear or new ones may arise. One therefore cannot easily say that £20 today will give £20-worth the day after tomorrow. It does not work like that because of the very high number of price-sensitive factors involved in the development world. In any event, we do not know how many high-value council house sales will take place, and we have heard that we do not know what high value is intended to mean. Is it in absolute terms—the largest four-, five- or six-bedroom house in a council’s stock? Or, more disturbingly, could it be a relative test by reference to a series of sub-categories of housing? We do not know.
When the Minister held a series of meetings before Second Reading of the Bill—and I give great credit to her for organising those—it became clear that there was a great deal of unfinished business in terms of getting the information back from local authorities about how this would work in practice. We do not have a worked model and I wonder what that means in practice. I remain to be convinced that reinvesting in social housing is more than a short-term fix. I mentioned at Second Reading that the precedents are not that great. I referred to the proceeds of council house sales. First of all, councils were able only to spend the interest that arose on the capital sum. Then they were not even able to use that and finally the Government of the day in 2000, as far as I could see and this may be an oversimplification, popped the lot into the Consolidated Fund. Thereafter, we had the business of developers somehow funding this social element because the entire stock of billions had disappeared. I do not know what it was spent on because of course the Consolidated Fund does not tell us that. The Treasury does not like hypothecated figures in its Consolidated Fund: it wants a big bank account on which it has great flexibility. I can understand that.
I feel that smoke and mirrors are involved here. What I am really getting at is that if there is a 20% discount at every turn—so that a house is sold at a discount and the money is reinvested in something else that is then discounted at another 20%—I do not see that that is viable. I would really like the Minister to ask her officials whether we could see a worked model of how that would function in practice because I strongly suspect that what is involved is forward guessing on increases in property and land prices.
As a registered valuer and thus being subject to all sorts of things that registered valuers are subject to, I absolutely proscribe forward guessing future rises in value: the value is what it is today. If I am reviewing a value the day after tomorrow, it is the value for the day after tomorrow, but on day one and on any accounting basis, to forward guess an increase in value is an extremely risky and perilous operation. But I sense
that that is what lies behind this, because the numbers do not seem to add up. I fear that that is what is implicit in this. I ask the Minister again: I would really like to see a worked example of how it will be done.
I am not against the principle of the Government’s manifesto commitment, but I sure do not want to be here trying to sort out the debacle that might arise if we get into a situation of relatively static house price increases and land values, which we might. Then the year-on-year increase that might implicitly be built into this model evaporates and it fails. While I do not wish to say whether I am necessarily for or against this series of amendments, they raise a very important point about the underlying financial principles that are involved.
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