My Lords, I sense that the horse is heading for the stable, and at an increasing rate, so I will be as brief as I can. I apologise to the Committee for not having taken part in proceedings before, but I have a particular interest in this area. The Committee should be aware of my involvement with the All-Party Group on Extraordinary Rendition and the All-Party Group on Drones.
In that connection, I ask my noble friend to thank his colleagues in the Ministry of Defence for arranging for us to go to RAF Waddington to see the operation of the drones there. It was exceptionally impressive. I took away three important things. One was the care being taken, with the forces on the ground calling in the strikes being balanced by people in the cooler atmosphere of RAF Waddington, who were able to provide the right balance.
Another was the stress on personnel, in the sense that personnel left their homes on the base, where the children were not doing their homework and the dog had to go to the vet, and went to the place they operated the drone from. They might, over the course of the next six or eight hours, have had to do some exceptionally unpleasant things that might result in the death of a fellow human being, then drive home again and, 10 minutes later, be back with the dog still needing to go to the vet and the kids’ homework still not being done. It is a very stressful situation, and the care that the ministry was taking to make sure that everyone’s mental health and well-being were being properly looked after was impressive. Last of all was the international nature of the operation in the sense that the operations at RAF Waddington are then
passed to the Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. As the RAF officer explained to us, if you are being asked to get up at 2.30 am to sit in a hut and make these sorts of decisions, it is quite destructive for your mental health: it is much better if it can be passed to somebody in another part of the world. It means that there is this rotating situation which has its own issues, stresses and strains.
With that background, I turn to my amendment and the reasons for it. It is, of course, a probing amendment. Casualties are an inevitable and ghastly by-product of war. Every casualty is a tragedy, but civilian, non-combatant casualties are probably doubly so. I say that for two reasons. First, the long-term damage to the fabric of society if women and children are traumatised takes generations to recover from. Therefore, we need to be particularly careful of the damage that we might be doing to those groups. Secondly, and no less importantly, mistakes—casualties among civilians—are one of the best, possibly the best, recruiting sergeants for the extremists. People who have seen their village wrecked, their families or communities blown apart, are unlikely to be sympathetic to the cause that has resulted in this unfortunate episode.
We have now reached the three-month anniversary of the commencement of Parliament’s authorisation of military activity in Syria. We were promised a quarterly progress report to update both Houses, as a way of providing some form of parliamentary oversight of the mission against Daesh. I am not sure that that has yet been provided, but no doubt my noble friend could tell me when he comes to wind up.
Accountability and transparency are important aspects of this country’s military activities in the Middle East. They play a critical role in ensuring continuing public support at home for a policy that is bound to have its controversial aspects, particularly in the maintenance of popular support in our minority communities. However, accountability and transparency are also important for the maintenance of this country’s reputation abroad. We should be giving an example by setting standards that our allies will emulate, that will shame our enemies and that will give third parties caught up in the crossfire some confidence that these terrible events—which have, in many cases, shattered their lives—have not been undertaken capriciously or without due thought.
This amendment seeks to build on the commitment made by Penny Mordaunt in the other place on when she said that Airwars, the NGO that provides surveillance or information about civilian casualties,
“has been proactive in submitting written reports of civilian casualties and we are grateful for its efforts and for the value that they add. Each case has been individually reviewed and it has been demonstrated that the civilian casualties were not caused by UK activity. Our targeting processes are extremely robust in this respect and in others, but I would welcome any further ideas about how value may be added. I have committed to review any reports of civilian casualties and I have oversight of the whole process, including compensation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/2/15; col. 672.]
She gave further reassurance in reply to a Written Question on 2 February this year when she said:
“Any credible concerns or evidence relating to the possibility of civilian casualties caused by air strikes may be submitted to the Ministry of Defence Ministerial Correspondence Unit”,
and gave an address and email address.
This need to clarify and commit to a UK standard is particularly important as it appears that yet another remote engagement—in Libya—is getting under way. Further, there are also indications of new collaborative working with partners, in particular the United States, which have emerged in recent weeks. Most recently, as has been reported in the press, the Secretary of State has authorised the use of RAF Lakenheath for US air strikes in Libya on the—I have to say uncertain—legal basis that “it makes us all safer”.
The UK can and should lead here in forging a model civilian casualty review procedure and a model procedure for dealing with compensation claims as well as in standards of transparency to show how this is working in practice. This might act as a model for Russia or, more likely, for other EU states and the United States in and outside the traditional battlefield.
The UK has carried out 600 air strikes in Syria and Iraq and flown more than 2,100 combat missions against Daesh. The Defence Secretary has stated that the UK is probably the second most important part of coalition air activity in strikes as well as in surveillance and intelligence activity. According to the NGO Airwars, there are credible reports that up to 952 civilian casualties have been caused by coalition air strikes, excluding Russia. The NGO puts that figure at between 3,200 and 3,800. Eleven out of 12 coalition members, including the United Kingdom, deny any civilian casualties. This is unprecedented in a major military engagement and naturally invites questions about how civilians are being classified, what the onus of proof is, how battle damage assessments are being undertaken in the absence of ground troops, what sort of procedures are in place to make sure that credible allegations of civilian casualties are reviewed rigorously with sufficient independence, what discussions and agreements there have been about these matters with coalition partners, whether there is a realistic chance of a co-ordinated or collective response, what are the implications of joint operations and whether the UK has a non-combatant casualty cut-off value like the US.
As far as the UK is concerned, we have a good record on civilian casualties and the disclosure of relevant information. The UK has second place in Airwars’ transparency table, which is a matter on which the MoD deserves congratulation. However, I am not sure that it is enough to announce that there have been no civilian casualties caused by 600 air strikes for which we have been directly responsible—and there will be many more which we have supported—without additional information and disclosure of relevant policies and procedures.
Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause would impose a new quarterly reporting obligation on the responsible commander to report to the Minister in order that she can report to Parliament. The report need not be long—it can be quite short—but it must include the basic statistics outlined in the amendment.
Proposed new subsection (2) goes a little further. So that we can make sense of the report in proposed new subsection (1) and to promote the principles of transparency and accountability to which, no doubt, the MoD is committed, the report must include three key sets of documents: a copy of the relevant civilian casualty review procedure; working definitions of the
terms “casualty” and “combatant” and the standard operating procedures in place to enable the review of reports of civilian casualties. Most of these terms are drawn from the ISAF model used in Afghanistan and do not come from the MoD commitment in relation to the mission against Daesh.
Several parliamentary Questions have been tabled in the House of Commons which suggest that a policy or procedure is under way, or at least is at an advanced stage of development. For example, the Minister for the Armed Forces has said that the Ministry will “analyse the risks” in any potential air strike in advance and,
“every strike is subject to careful post-mission scrutiny”.
However, it seems likely that the information I am seeking already exists, although possibly under a different or updated name. I would welcome my noble friend’s clarification on this point.
5.30 pm
Proposed new subsection (3) makes it clear that the air strikes carried out by UK personnel in the UK Reaper Squadrons 13 and 3, those at RAF Waddington and at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada are caught by the term “UK deployment”. This should reflect an up-to-date interpretation of the parliamentary convention requiring a debate in circumstances when we become involved in a conflict or potential conflict situation. The term “deployment” should not overlook RAF drone operators in Lincolnshire or elsewhere.
To conclude, the evolving nature of modern remote warfare puts new temptations and demands on us. Remote warfare makes our obligations to civilian casualties harder and, perhaps, more important to honour. The UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson has said that,
“in any case in which civilians have been, or appear to have been, killed, there is an obligation on the State responsible to conduct a prompt, independent and impartial fact-finding inquiry and to provide a detailed public explanation”.
General McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, told a conference on 25 November last year that the advanced capabilities inherent in drones operated remotely could cause decision-makers to lower the threshold for intervention and make it less likely that the second or third order effects are considered properly. A clear and transparent casualty review procedure reflecting the highest standards of British practice and international law may be one way to understand and counter the second and third order dangers referred to by General McChrystal. I suggest that these issues deserve careful consideration about how we implement this obligation in current and future remote wars and how we might best encourage our partner states to do the same. I look forward to my noble friend’s response and I beg to move Amendment 22A.