My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for setting out the rationale for his Amendment 18. However—without, I hope, disappointing him too much—I am not convinced it is necessary to set out in the Armed Forces Bill a statutory requirement for the Defence Council to issue guidance on when a member of the Reserve Forces is on or off duty.
We ask a great deal of our reservists, who, in many cases, attend training and fulfil military duties alongside their full-time civilian employment, as well as committing to deploy on operations when they are required to do so. It is self-evident that in return for this dedication, the MoD needs to make it clear how members of the Reserve Forces will be treated and supported when they are on mobilised service or training, or travelling to and from their reserve centre. Principally, we set this out because reserve service is not risk-free and we need to be able to give reassurance that we will support people properly if they suffer an injury or illness during service.
When is a service man or woman subject to service law? Section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 sets this out:
“Every member of the regular forces is subject to service law at all times”.
The position for reservists is different. Reservists are subject to service law in the following circumstances only: when they are mobilised—called out; when they are in full-time reserve service; when they are undertaking any training or duty; and when they are serving on the permanent staff of a reserve force.
Single service regulations, which are made under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 for each of the reserve forces, already define the circumstances in which a reservist is to be regarded as on duty. As might be expected, this includes during Armed Forces training but it also includes time while they are on MoD premises for the purpose of training, or time spent travelling to and from training or duty for which they are entitled to claim payment. Travel to a mobilisation centre in answer to a call-out order is also regarded as duty. The regulations are principally intended to define the MoD’s liabilities in the event that a reservist sustains an injury at any of these times.
Of course, the actions of a reservist at a time when they are not on duty may none the less be relevant to their service; for example, reserves regulations stipulate that officers may at any time have their commission terminated, be called upon to retire, or be called upon to resign their commission because of misconduct, whether or not that misconduct took place during training or other duties. It is also fully understood by reservists who are present on service premises at times when they are not on duty—for example, those making use of unit gymnasium facilities in their own spare time—that they are to conduct themselves at such times in the same manner as they would were they are on duty.
It is worth clarifying that the practice of payment of members of the Reserve Forces for training or other duties in increments of a day’s pay, half a day’s pay or a quarter of a day’s pay is not directly linked to the issue of when during that day the reservist is on duty. Thus a reservist who works an eight-hour day will receive a full day’s pay for it—the same payment as he or she would receive for working for all 24 of the hours in that day. However, that does not mean that the reservist who works an eight-hour day is on duty for all 24 of the hours in that day. It might be considered odd to suggest that they would be. It would be surprising to suggest that a reservist who left their reserve unit at 1600 on a Saturday after completing an eight-hour day and returned to their civilian life—and perhaps their civilian employment—would still be on duty until midnight.
For the reasons I have set out, and given that existing regulations already contain provision for when members of the Reserve Forces are on duty, I hope my noble friend will be reassured and will agree to withdraw his amendment.
I turn now to the amendments which would make provision with respect to members of the Armed Forces who encounter civil emergencies or terrorist attacks. Amendment 19 makes provision with respect to members of the Armed Forces who take it upon themselves as individuals to intervene to help in civil emergencies where they have received no orders to do so. I am sure this is intended to encourage them to intervene in such circumstances. In the case of members of the Reserve Forces, this would include interventions when they were not otherwise on duty. However, it would apply only to reservists who were in uniform and were either on duty, were intending to be on duty that day or had been on duty that day.
I read subsection (3) as intending to allow provision to be made to place service personnel under an obligation to intervene in certain circumstances. Subsection (4) would offer those who intervene indemnities from legal action. Amendment 20 makes similar provision with respect to intervention of members of the Armed Forces during terrorist attacks. This new clause would apply to reservists and members of the regular forces whether or not they were in uniform at the time.
The first point to make is that the criminal law provides protections for members of the public who use force for the purposes of self-defence, defence of another, defence of property, prevention of crime and lawful arrest, although the force used must be reasonable in the circumstances. Thus a member of the Armed Forces, whether in uniform or on duty or not, who intervenes during a civil emergency or a terrorist attack and uses reasonable force for any of the purposes to which I have just referred has a defence to charges under the criminal law.
However, Amendments 19 and 20 suggest that my noble friend is concerned that a person who intervenes in an emergency situation to prevent loss of life, serious injury or serious damage to property may be at risk of being sued in the civil courts. We think it highly unlikely that a person who did what they honestly believed was reasonable and necessary in the
circumstances, during a civil emergency or a terrorist attack, to prevent loss of life, serious injury or serious damage to property could be successfully sued in respect of injury or damage caused by them in doing so.
It is not immediately apparent why an off-duty member of the Armed Forces who decides to intervene to help in a civil emergency or a terrorist attack should be in any different position in law from any member of the public who does so. No doubt contrary to my noble friend’s intention, the amendment might in fact make a claim in respect of the actions of a member of the Armed Forces more likely, because those actions would not simply be those of a member of the public in their private capacity but would instead be those of the Armed Forces.
Another concern that I have with these new clauses is whether, if a member of the Armed Forces intervened in a situation and was then deemed to be on duty and perhaps somehow under orders, there could be a risk that they could find themselves not supported but actually challenged by the chain of command as to the usefulness or otherwise of their intervention. While we would not want to deter off-duty members of the Armed Forces from intervening in a personal capacity in an emergency situation, we do not think that it would be appropriate for them to be duty-bound to intervene or to think that they were. Would we want an unarmed, off-duty member of the Armed Forces to think that they were duty-bound to tackle heavily armed terrorists and that they might face disciplinary action should they fail to do so?
We should also not rule out the possibility that their efforts, however well-intentioned, may not necessarily be welcomed by the police or other emergency services. It is long-established that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that members of the Armed Forces should deploy in an official capacity on the streets of the United Kingdom. The civilian emergency services rightly have primacy in such matters.
The notion that individual service personnel may deploy as members of the Armed Forces on official duty not under orders but instead, in effect, on their own say-so would also represent a very significant departure from very long-established practice, under which the use of service personnel is authorised and regulated under orders through a chain of command. I am afraid that it is a departure that the Government cannot support.
I also note that Amendment 20 would purport to allow members of the Armed Forces to use,
“all necessary steps to neutralise”,
an attack. The criminal law allows only the use of such force as is reasonable in the circumstances. This is the standard that applies not only to members of the public generally but also to the police and members of the Armed Forces who are under official orders to tackle armed terrorists. We do not see any basis for departing from this long-established standard.
In short, we do not consider that the proposed amendments are necessary to allow members of the Armed Forces to intervene in the circumstances discussed and we are not convinced that it would be appropriate
to put in place the proposed legal rules regarding such intervention. I therefore ask my noble friend not to press his amendments.