My Lords, I strongly support my noble and learned friend and his noble and gallant supporters. I have deployed on two military operations, in addition to aid operations. One was peacekeeping and one was
war-fighting but for our purposes there was no difference because a peacekeeping operation can deteriorate into a war-fighting or combat operation.
On both operations I willingly put my life, limb and security at the disposal of Her Majesty. “Her Majesty” might sound an old-fashioned term but to me it is all-encompassing. It means the nation, its citizens, the Government, the CDS—who at the time was the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce—and the chain of command.
In return, the nation regards such service as highly commendable. If I did not come back or I was badly injured, it would be jolly hard luck. Statistically, it was actually unlikely. Whenever you deploy on military operations, it is a sad fact that it is not likely that everyone is going to come back intact, and you have to accept that if you are prepared to authorise military action. Obviously, my family would mourn my demise, but what I would not have wanted is the chain of command and the staff wasting their time on inquiries or litigation about my bad luck when they are trying to prosecute a campaign and to secure the absolute minimum number of casualties overall. I suspect that all of the cause célèbre cases that I have read about have been either misreported or misleadingly reported in order to make a good story. In some cases, I know this to be the case because at the relevant time I was in the headquarters handling the issue. If noble Lords want to be briefed privately on that, I am quite willing to do so.
It seems to me that there are several difficulties with involving the legal system when there appears to be a failure in an operation, the planning of it, the resourcing of it or the training for it. The first issue I am certain about because I have seen it myself. Sadly, in a few cases the deceased or those around him or her are the authors of their own misfortune. Sometimes, there is a failure to adhere to the training. I have read news reports where I have had to conclude that for one reason or another the training was not adhered to. Obviously, the MoD is not going to use any of these defences against a claim or misleading news report. We would be shocked if it did so, and I think that some Members of the Committee are a little bit shocked that I am taking this line.
The second issue is that there may be a very good technical reason why some equipment is not used. There could be intelligence to suggest that it is not a good idea. For instance, the capability could have been compromised in some way or using that equipment might be of benefit to opponents. There might be a military judgment to be made about which technology or capability is the highest priority to deploy to theatre. The Committee needs to recognise that in an operation logistic capacity is neither infinite nor perfect.
In about May or June 2003, I was running around in Basra province in southern Iraq in a soft-skin Land Rover. I was heavily armed with a Browning 9 millimetre pistol. My body armour was somewhere in the back of the Land Rover and I am reasonably confident that my driver had his SA80 rifle. It was a benign environment and I did not need protected mobility. But then the situation changed for reasons that the useless Chilcot inquiry may eventually tell us. Following tours had to adopt a much higher state of readiness and needed better equipment, and this was not anticipatable.
The final difficulty is morale. It does not improve morale anywhere in defence to have to endure all this completely unfair and inaccurate criticism. For instance, imagine that you are an expert in the DSTL and read a report suggesting that the very clever equipment you are developing and deploying is in some way inadequate. I have made this point before and I will make it again. I think that trying to pin responsibility for an individual fatality arising from Operation TELIC 1 against the then Labour defence Ministers is outrageous. There may well be questions about the legality, necessity, grand strategy and post-conflict planning of TELIC 1. However, the operation was militarily brilliant. We are one of the few nations in the world that could have undertaken it at all. Most nations cannot even get close to what we can do. We deployed a division out of theatre. We helped to get a regime to collapse at the cost of a mercifully low number of casualties, tragic though they were. The reality of military operations is that one never has all the training or equipment that one would desire or that could be made available in time. What you need is far better training and equipment than your opponent has, and that is exactly what happened on Operation TELIC 1. Noble Lords should make no mistake: in a deployed headquarters every fatality hurts like hell. I know; I have been there.
My final point is that there is a perverse inverse law that the level of scrutiny attached to each fatality on an operation is inversely proportionate to the number of fatalities taken. Proof of this is that if we had taken 1,000 fatalities on Operation TELIC 1, would anyone be worried about the ones who are currently a cause célèbre? I think that the Committee knows the answer.