The noble Lord, as so often, has hit the nail right on the head. What he said encapsulates much of what I have been saying, and I am grateful to him.
Amendment 1 would enable court martial rules to provide that members must be drawn from each and every branch of the armed services. The current law allows for the appointment of members of any of the three services to a court martial panel. Before the 2006 Act, when each of the three services had its own separate system of service discipline, the panel almost always consisted of members of the same service as the accused. The current practice is to appoint lay members, the majority of whom come from the same service as the accused, but this is not set down in law. There is therefore nothing in law to prevent lay members in any particular case being drawn from any branch of the armed services, so I suggest it would not be necessary to amend legislation to achieve the effect required.
The composition of the panel was considered by the House of Commons Select Committee during the passage of the Bill that became the 2006 Act. General Sir Mike Jackson said to the committee at the time:
“For me the default setting would be that the soldier … on the face of it will be more comfortable being tried by members of his own Service”.
The committee considered that where a mixed panel of lay members was appointed, the senior lay member and the majority of members should come from the same service as the accused.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 3, on court martial findings and sentence, would change the law governing decisions of the court martial on findings of guilt or innocence, and sentence. The court martial system allows conviction or acquittal by a simple majority of
the lay members of the court martial, with no need for a retrial in the event of a lack of unanimity or a qualified majority.
The judge advocate does not vote on findings of guilt or innocence. In the case of an equality of votes on the finding, the court must acquit the defendant. The lay members are directed, if at all possible, to reach a unanimous verdict, and to decide by a majority only if they cannot all agree. That provides a considerable safeguard against the lay members moving too easily to a majority decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, indicated, this is a long-established process: the service discipline Acts of the 1950s, which preceded the Armed Forces Act 2006, also provided for majority decisions at court martial. The great advantage of reaching a decision by majority is that it avoids a “hung jury”: there is no need for a retrial in the event of a lack of unanimity or a qualified majority.
The Crown Court process is that unanimity or—with the judge’s permission—a qualified majority is required for any verdict: guilty or not guilty. If unanimity—or a qualified majority—is not achieved, there is a “hung jury”, and this produces a retrial, not an acquittal. Importantly, under the existing court martial process, the accused may be convicted by a simple majority, but he or she may also be acquitted by a simple majority. In the Crown Court, most of a jury may wish to acquit an accused but cannot achieve the necessary unanimity or qualified majority, yet the accused may be retried by a new jury, who may convict.
The court martial process also has the advantage that it allows a decision to be made without it being apparent whether the verdict is unanimous or by majority. As the panel must keep its voting secret and is not required to seek the court’s permission for a majority decision, there are no lingering doubts outside the court about whether an acquittal was correct. It is for these reasons that proposals for unanimous or qualified majority verdicts in the court martial have up to now been rejected.
My noble friend Lord Attlee suggested that we could not show that the current system is satisfactory. The Government have been successful in establishing both in the European Court of Human Rights and in the civilian courts that the court martial system is in principle safe, independent and impartial. The current system for majority verdicts has been considered twice by the Court Martial Appeal Court in the last five years and was on both occasions held to be fair and safe. The Court Martial Appeal Court, which is made up of the same judges as sit in the civilian Court of Appeal, has held that there is no ground for deciding that a verdict by a simple majority of the lay members of a court martial is inherently unfair or unsafe. They noted, among other points, that the overwhelming majority of criminal trials in England and Wales are decided in magistrates’ courts and the process of simple majority verdicts is long established in those courts.
The issue of majority verdicts was raised by Sergeant Blackman—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas—in his appeal against conviction in 2014. He argued that it was discriminatory to apply trial by the court martial rather than trial by jury in the Crown Court because the court martial offered
less protection to the accused than jury trial. The Court Martial Appeal Court again held that trial by the court martial on the basis of a simple majority was not unsafe or unfair; moreover it was not discriminatory.
I should add that Amendment 3 would make very different provision in the service system from that in the criminal justice system if it is the noble Lord’s intention that there must be a panel of at least five lay members in all cases in the court martial, even in cases equivalent to those which may be tried in the civilian system by a single magistrate or three lay magistrates, who may make decisions by simple majority. That difference in provision would in one respect be magnified yet further by the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Attlee to increase the size of the panel of lay members on court martial cases to 12.
Amendment 3 would also expose the deliberations of the lay members of the court martial. Proposed new subsection (3) would require the president of the lay members to state in open court the number of panel members dissenting where the majority finding is that the defendant is guilty. One important safeguard of the independence of the lay members of a court martial is the confidentiality of their deliberations. The question whether court martial verdicts are unanimous or by majority is not asked or investigated at all. This safeguard is in place to produce a fair trial process. For this reason, the Armed Forces Act 2006 makes provision about offences relating to members of the court martial and their deliberations. It contains provisions which mirror those in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which apply to jurors in the Crown Court. Under these provisions, it is an offence for a person intentionally to disclose information about statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of the court martial for proceedings in the course of their deliberations. It is also an offence to solicit or obtain such information. This is subject to exceptions but these are very limited. For example, the offence is not committed where information is disclosed for the purposes of an investigation into whether an offence of contempt of court has been committed by, or in relation to, a lay member.
In the Government’s view, the confidentiality of the deliberations of lay members should not be compromised unless there is a compelling case for doing so, such as for the purposes of an investigation into whether an offence of contempt of court has been committed. We are not convinced that there is a compelling case for requiring voting figures to be disclosed.
The effect of the proposed new subsection (4) would appear to be to expose whether conviction or acquittal was unanimous or by majority. In our view, it should never be known that a defendant has been acquitted by a majority decision. Consistent with the position which applies with jury verdicts in the Crown Court, we think that it would be wrong in principle for any request to be made of the lay members which identifies an acquittal by a majority where the defendant is acquitted. The acquitted defendant should not be exposed to public ignominy consequent on the recording of the fact that one or more lay members was convinced of his or her guilt. The same arguments may be made
in response to my noble friend Lord Attlee’s Amendment 11, which would make provision for academic research into the workings of the board of lay members in court martial cases. We are not, therefore, convinced that there is a compelling case for compromising the confidentiality of the deliberations of lay members by allowing research of the kind proposed by this amendment.
Returning to Amendment 3, another effect of this amendment would be to change the role of the lay members in court martial trials. In response to Amendments 1 and 2, I explained how the role of a lay member in the court martial differs from that of a juror in a Crown Court trial. In the Crown Court, the jury’s role is limited to findings of fact and sentencing is a matter solely for the judge; in the court martial, the lay members and the judge advocate vote on the sentence. In the case of an equality of votes on the sentence, the judge advocate has a casting vote. The judge advocate advises the lay members on the appropriate sentencing guidelines for the offence.
Proposed new subsection (5) in Amendment 3 would change this by making the determination of sentence a matter for the judge advocate alone, although he or she would be required to consult the lay members. We would see that change as an erosion of an important difference between the civilian criminal justice system and the service justice system. The military context and service experience should be considered during sentencing as well as in findings of guilt or innocence. I submit that the input from the board members on sentencing is thus very important.
As I explained earlier, the existing provisions governing sentencing reflect the fact that the court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline. I spoke of how all service courts must apply statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These include “the maintenance of discipline” and “the reduction of service offences”. These principles reflect special aspects relating to the service justice system, which explains why there is direct involvement of the panel in sentencing, and I remind noble Lords of those factors that I listed earlier.
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At the same time, the judge advocate has a power to give directions and rulings on the law. This ensures that the law on sentences—for example, where a sentence is mandatory and what the maximum sentence is—is laid down by the judge advocate. Moreover, the judge advocate has not only a vote on sentence but also a casting vote. He will also, from his knowledge of the civilian courts and law and practice, be able to influence the views of the lay members more generally.
There is no evidence that sentencing in the court martial is wayward. During the passage of the Bill that became the Armed Forces Act 2006, Sir Jock Stirrup, as he then was, stated:
“If, in considering sentencing, one is having regard to the maintenance of discipline, one has to understand what that means, what things affect discipline and what things do not. So it seems to me the military involvement in sentencing is absolutely fundamental to the effectiveness of a military justice system”.
The House of Commons Select Committee on that Bill concluded that it considered it,
“essential that the lay members of the court martial panel are involved in sentencing in order to provide Service context to those deliberations”.
The Government continue to believe that the involvement of the lay members when it comes to sentencing should go beyond mere consultation with the judge advocate: they should continue to vote on sentence.
In conclusion, I am sorry that my answer has been rather lengthy, but I hope that what I have said has been helpful. The Government have not been persuaded that the existing court martial system needs to be changed or that an alternative system would represent an improvement on what currently exists. On that basis, I express the hope that the noble Lord will, perhaps at least for now, agree not to press his amendments.