My Lords, I shall also speak to our other amendments in this group. A strong and adequately resourced scrutiny process is an
essential ingredient in the process of devolving substantial powers to combined authorities—and, it might be thought, especially to mayoral combined authorities. The sheer quantity of amendments in this group reflects the importance that all noble Lords, including the Government, have given this issue.
Our Amendments 35 and 37 ensure that the scrutiny committees can enquire into and challenge not only actual decisions—for example, by call-in procedures—but matters under consideration prospectively, rather than just retrospectively.
Amendment 43 requires that guidance by the Secretary of State on the functions of overview and scrutiny committees should be affirmed by the affirmative procedure, in the light of the crucial role that such committees should play.
The Bill lacks an adequate procedure comparable to that of the audit committees found in local government. Amendment 36 seeks to remedy this deficiency, but we felt on reflection that it does not quite meet the case, since it delegates to the overview and scrutiny committee the task of appointing another committee, independently chaired, to carry out that audit function. Our Amendment 34A seeks to remedy the position by explicitly requiring the appointment of a separate audit committee, again independently chaired, with the responsibility for reviewing and scrutinising the authority’s financial management and affairs in the same terms as Amendment 36. Given the potentially large expenditure of the combined authorities if the promise of devolution is to be realised, this is an important role and one that is distinct from the general overview and scrutiny process.
Although they have yet to be moved, we support the Lib Dem amendments concerning political balance and the chairing of the scrutiny committee, but have some concerns about possible delays of call-in powers, which could necessitate another round of consultation.
We will listen with interest to the government amendments, particularly to Amendment 41, which requires the approach to reconsideration powers to need the consent of the combined authority. This would appear unduly restrictive. We are not quite sure why it is proposed to have an alternative to an independent chair of scrutiny, but in any event can live with what is proposed. I understand that we are not able to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, today on his very substantial amendment about governance, which we felt was very important. As proposed, however, some of the voting thresholds may be problematic, especially the requirement for unanimity at the first meeting of the overview and scrutiny committee.
Overall, however, these amendments highlight the importance that we should place on getting oversight right in circumstances where considerable power is rightly being placed with a combined authority and possibly a mayor. This should also address in part—although, doubtless, not comprehensively enough—those who have expressed fears about a single-party state. I beg to move.