I see the point that the noble Baroness is making. I see no reason why not. If it has security connotations then perhaps it cannot be made public. However, our idea is that the independent reviewer should not be denied information that they consider important to perform their statutory duties as required by our amendment.
The noble Baroness asked about an example of where an individual would be deprived of citizenship on grounds of economic well-being. I replied to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on 26 March and a copy would have been sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. In my letter I agreed that any situation which threatens vital economic assets is likely to be covered by terrorism considerations, but for that very reason we cannot rule out the possibility that it may be properly considered under this power.
The noble Baroness asked whether this goes against the UK’s international obligations to those countries that allow entry to British citizens who are subsequently deprived of that nationality. In the vast majority of cases, it does not. However, the Government note that the 1930 special protocol concerning statelessness created limited obligations in this respect. These obligations are limited to the 11 states that have ratified the protocol and apply only if certain conditions are met.
A number of noble Lords mentioned Professor Goodwin-Gill’s paper and his illustration that it was contrary to international law. Professor Goodwin-Gill has some expertise on this topic since he was part of the legal team representing Al-Jedda, but on this topic we believe that he is wrong. He based his analysis in large part on the opinion of Judge Read in the 1955 International Court of Justice case of Nottebohm, but Judge Read’s judgment was a dissenting judgment. We cannot accept the conclusions which Professor Goodwin-Gill derived from it. There is a very limited basis for an obligation to readmit people deprived of citizenship in very limited circumstances, as set out in Article 1 of the 1930 special protocol concerning statelessness. The limited number of state parties that have ratified this convention, together with the lack of state practice conforming to its provisions by states that are not party to the convention, shows that it does not constitute customary international law.