This is a probing amendment. The question is: how can the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, and the House involve devolved Administrations in the conduct of the referendum? There are two issues. This, in a sense, follows on from the previous debate. First, there is the potential for a disaster if we do not get this right. Secondly, there is the question of how devolved Administrations can indicate to their constituents what their considered view is.
Let me take the first issue. I give your Lordships a rather irreverent description of the United Kingdom. Not long ago, the former First Minister of Wales, Rhodri Morgan, had a meeting with Alex Salmond. “The United Kingdom”, Rhodri said, “consisted of one large mammal: an elephant and three fleas”. The elephant was England and the three fleas were Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. As it happened, Mr Salmond
was not entirely pleased with this analogy, nor would many of my colleagues in Wales or Northern Ireland be. Nevertheless, let us consider the truth of the matter. England, in population terms—hence, in terms of votes—outweighs the combined total of the three devolved Administrations by a factor of roughly five. In other words, the elephant can easily vote on any issue to squash the fleas. To be more precise, England might vote in any UK-wide referendum by such a wide margin that the matter would be settled, regardless of how the votes fell in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Therein lies the problem.
Let me consider the “in or out” referendum as proposed in the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs. By the way, in the light of what my noble friend Lord Giddens said about referendums, I should note that, in my experience, they always start off with one question and end up with another, usually on whether the electorate want to give the Government of the day a kicking. That happened in France, for instance, in the referendum there. I hope that that will not translate into the referendum that the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, proposes. If all constituent parts of the United Kingdom, the elephant and the fleas, voted in the same way, there would be no problem. All would be harmony. As for the specific referendum proposals that we have in front of us, if Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland showed the same appetite as England for staying in or leaving the European Union and all were as one, there would be no problem. Alas, on the current evidence on this issue, that may not be case.
Let me take the situation as I understand it to be in the four regions that make up the UK and try to gauge their attitudes to UK membership of the European Union. I cannot speak for Northern Ireland as I have no great knowledge of the feeling there on this issue. I have had to consult colleagues. All that I can say is that it would look odd, to say the least, to see Northern Ireland out of the European Union and the Republic staying in. This matter, I am told, worries the Republic a lot. That might please some people but it would surely disconcert others. After consulting noble colleagues on the spread of opinion, I am led to believe that a vote in Northern Ireland would go, on a best guess, 60:40 in favour of remaining in the European Union. As is normal, some noble colleagues think that it might go the other way, but I am not there to judge that.
As for Wales, the position is equally unclear. A distinguished academic wrote only a few days ago that as far as he knew,
“nobody in the mainstream of Welsh politics, business and academia wants to leave the European Union”.
In fact, he argued that Wales has benefited greatly from UK membership. The protections afforded by the EU treaties and consequent directives and regulations, as well as the flow of funds from the EU, have been much welcomed. Economic development, environmental policy and the protection of social and employment rights are just a few examples. In short, it is hard to see the Welsh electorate voting to reject all that has been of benefit to them from UK membership of the European Union. Nevertheless, some polling evidence in Wales suggests that there might be a substantial “out” vote.
As for Scotland, again the picture is not entirely clear. After all, the Scottish National Party has spent a good deal of energy, and quite a lot of money on legal fees, arguing for continued Scottish membership of the European Union in the event of Scotland leaving the United Kingdom. It would be almost absurdly idiosyncratic for it to advocate the UK leaving the EU if Scotland itself voted to remain part of the UK. That being so, and given the relative weakness of the Conservatives and UKIP in Scotland, I think that it would be safe to assume that the Scottish vote would fall in favour of the UK staying in the European Union.
As for England—well, who knows? It seems clear that a large section of the Conservative vote and, I imagine, the totality of the UKIP vote would be in favour of the UK leaving the European Union. Of course, I very much hope that I am wrong but I very much fear that the English vote may go quite powerfully in what I personally regard as the wrong direction. Worse still—and here is the major point—I fear that it would go in the wrong direction to the point where an English majority might overwhelm the totality of the vote in the Celtic fringe.
So what happens then? It could easily be that my worst-case scenario comes about: England votes for exit in sufficient numbers to overcome the Celtic fringe voting to stay in. With an overall majority in its pocket, the Conservative Government of the day would then presumably proceed to dismantle all the arrangements between the UK and the European Union which have been put in place since we first joined all those years ago. So far, so relatively simple—or disastrous, according to your opinion.
At that point, what is at present a theoretical problem becomes a constitutional nightmare. The new Conservative Government set about legislating for the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union. However, how would that play with the Celtic fringe countries if the result of the “in or out” referendum had been a thumping “out” in England and an equally thumping “in” in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the overall vote in the UK—including, of course, Gibraltar—when totted up amounted to “out”?
As for Northern Ireland, noble Lords with better knowledge than mine will no doubt have their own opinion. All I can say is that there would probably be, as usual, political fireworks, and possibly real fireworks as well. As for Wales, I am afraid that I imagine there would be the customary sullen acceptance of the historical domination of the English—expressed yet again—over their Celtic neighbour, but it would be sullen anger to be fed into resentment in the future. As for Scotland, I cannot even begin to imagine the reaction of Scots when they hear that the English have kicked them out of Europe. It just does not bear thinking about.
So what can be done? I have to be honest and say that I doubt whether it will be possible, within the present legislative framework, to solve this problem in its entirety. The Committee will no doubt be aware that foreign affairs are a reserved issue under the devolution Acts and are thus the preserve of the UK Government. In the normal course of events, this is a
perfectly reasonable arrangement, but this Bill does not fall within the normal course of events, and I do not see how anybody could claim that it does. Therefore, we have a special situation that calls for special measures.
What I propose in the amendment is that devolved Administrations should have the right to request of the Secretary of State what amounts to an opt-out from the referendum proposed in the Bill. In deciding whether to make such a request, each devolved Assembly or Parliament shall debate the grounds for such a request and explain them to the Secretary of State in a memorandum after consulting, in one form or another, their electorate. It goes, I think, without saying that each one would take into account the advantages and disadvantages for their electorate in taking part in the “in or out” referendum—in other words, the debate would be a responsible one and not just a petulant gesture. The best we can do is to allow a formal mechanism which would enable the devolved Administrations to have their voices heard. At present, under the devolution Act, they have no right to do so.
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That leads me to my second issue. Let us suppose that Wales, for instance, was to make such a request. The Secretary of State, under my proposal, would have the right to refuse it. The Welsh memorandum would be the property of the Welsh Assembly, which might and almost certainly would wish to publish it. If the Secretary of State were to accede to the request to make an order removing Wales from the United Kingdom for the purposes, and only for the purposes, of the referendum, he would be obliged to publish the memorandum to support his decision. In either event, the formal view of the Welsh Assembly, whose Members are elected by the citizens of Wales, would be in the public domain.
Let us now suppose that Scotland were to make such a request. Judging from what I have heard in previous debates in this House, I think it goes without saying that if the Scots voted for independence next September, the Secretary of State would be pretty well bound to accede to its request since Scotland was removing itself from the United Kingdom however defined. In fact, even if my amendment is not accepted, the Scottish vote for independence would bring with it legislation in some form to exempt Scotland in the UK referendum. However, if the Scots were to remain in the United Kingdom and the Secretary of State rejected the Scottish Parliament’s request for an opt-out, the view of Parliament could and would be published, as in the Welsh case.
What would happen if the overall UK was to leave the European Union thanks to an English majority? I have absolutely no doubt that there would be the mother and father of a row. No doubt there would be new demands for Scottish independence. In all probability it would ignite a similar debate in Wales and even in Northern Ireland. No one can foresee the consequences of all that. The least one can say is that it would put in doubt the whole future of a viable United Kingdom.
There will of course be objections to my proposal. No doubt there will be arguments that opt-outs are impractical, although they have proved to be a practical
and useful device in arguments between the UK and the rest of Europe. If granted, they would form a platform for negotiation between an England which might have wished to leave the European Union and an opted-out country about the future relationship. If refused, at the least it would give the devolved Governments the right to have their opinions heard. It may also be argued that foreign affairs are no business of the devolved Administrations, as the devolution Acts make clear, and should be handled by Members of the UK Parliament on their behalf. It is precisely those policy areas which are the responsibility of the devolved Administrations—environment, education, culture and so on—where UK membership of the EU has been most beneficial. They have a right, and I would argue a duty, to defend that. Otherwise, there is no point in them being there.
Finally, it may be argued that my proposal would put at risk the stability of the United Kingdom. However, the risk involved if my worst-case scenario comes about is infinitely greater. Of course I, like others around me, hope that it does not come about. If an “in or out” referendum is ever launched, I hope that all four countries of the United Kingdom will vote decisively to remain in the European Union and work constructively at all levels of government to reform the EU in a sensible and rational way. I hope for all that. But along with hoping for the best, one must also fear the worst and do whatever is possible to provide a way of mitigating its effects. It is in that spirit that I beg to move my amendment.