My Lords, the last thing I am prepared to do, with great respect, is to have a lecture from the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, as to the functions of this House or the way in which we ought to behave. This whole Bill is a prominent and clear example of how this House should not behave. This is clearly a
major constitutional issue; for it to be brought forward by a private Member in a rush, and to be told by Members on the other side of this House that we are not entitled to consider it properly, is not only arrogant, but positively impudent. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, will reflect on this at some stage.
The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said that the Bill was improved by the two amendments that we passed last week. That is true: it might be further improved by two amendments that we pass today, without destroying—as he put it—the purpose of the Bill. The amendments that have gone down were tabled with thought. They were not tabled in order to filibuster; they were tabled to deal with a situation into which this House—and indeed the country—should never have been put by this Government. If the Government had shown an ounce of steel in their relationship with their own right wing, we would not be in this position today. They have not and we are in this mess, which is what it is, and we must now try to deal with it, but to be lectured by a sermon from the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is, frankly, almost too much.
I will try, perhaps, to calm down slightly. I have an amendment in this group—Amendment 73—which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, will think is helpful and constructive. It is a serious attempt to deal with the difficulties raised by this Bill in terms of legislating now for what might happen in the next Parliament. The next Parliament after the next election will be a different Parliament from the one that is now sitting. In those circumstances, that Parliament should have a say—and a direct say—given by this Bill, and not by some general constitutional doctrine that no Parliament can bind its successors. It should be given by this Bill in the sense that, before the Bill actually comes into force—it can be passed in this Parliament if that is what Parliament wishes to do—a resolution is passed by both Houses in the next Parliament saying that the Bill should now come into force. That is an attempt to deal with the dilemma in which we are placed, that we have a Bill in this Parliament designed to take effect in the next Parliament. Let me wrap it up: that is the effect of the Bill. It is not designed to take effect in this Parliament; it is designed to take effect in the next Parliament.
Therefore, it seems to me that in those circumstances, it is only just, reasonable and fair—and, indeed, constitutional—that that successor Parliament will have some say in whether and how the Bill comes into force. My amendment is not, I hope, a foolish one or a filibustering one. I said in my speech that it was not a filibustering one: it is not going to go on for very long, anyway. It is an attempt to square this very difficult circle in which we have been placed by the shenanigans of the party opposite, and particularly by the Government. The amendment aims to square that circle, by providing that, although the Bill is legislating for something designed to take effect in the next Parliament, the next Parliament will nevertheless have a direct say as to whether or not that should take place.