My Lords, perhaps I may reiterate for continuity that the areas for concern with PFM can be grouped into three: confidence in the basis for the Government’s decision, differing views on what benefits the saver and the need to protect dormant pots already accrued.
When it comes to the basis for the Government’s decision, where are the significant barriers to be overcome before the Government can be confident about the superiority of the PFM model? The consequences of getting this wrong are huge. Yet the transfer model is in the Bill when there are so many conditionalities still to work through, and confidence in securing lower charges, which is the main benefit claimed for the PFM model, are by no means assured.
PFM requires effective pan-industry collaboration, but what if that is not forthcoming? Are the Government confident that they can overcome industry inefficiencies and conflicts of interest, so well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Turner? The DWP is working with the industry to find an IT solution to match pots to members. There are significant technical challenges to overcome, standardisation to be achieved and the industry as a whole has to reach a consensus that prioritises the savers’ interests. If and when that is achievable are unknowns, but the Bill locks us into pot follows members.
Some providers will have an interest in getting rid of small, less profitable pots but will also have an interest in setting a pot size cap to defend their more profitable pots. They will have a natural antipathy to an aggregator with a pot cap that increases to a certain level. However, the pot limit chosen for automatic transfer will affect the number of separate pots that a saver builds up over their working life. It is one of the issues that goes to the heart of the efficiency of the aggregator model or the consolidation model chosen. Depending on the assumptions about the aggregator or how many active member and dormant-member pots that it has, the administrative savings can be greater than those that have been estimated in the impact assessment.
The department comments in its impact assessment that, overall, the results of its modelling suggest the aggregator scheme will achieve slightly less consolidation than PFM, but that needs to be set against the greater control that an aggregator scheme could provide in mitigating other risks that come with an automatic transfer mechanism. It would also be interesting to see the results of modelling that includes today’s dormant pots. I would like to come back to this. Equally, pot follows member cannot be implemented without raising quality standards, or the Government risk transferring the savings of millions of ordinary people into myriad schemes over which they currently have little quality control.
Even if the Government succeed in getting all schemes to a minimum quality standard, there will be a wide range between minimum standard and best practice.
For example, consider a modestly paid worker who leaves a good scheme provided by a major retailer and goes to work for a two-person employer running a small shop, whose workplace scheme has higher charges, poor governance and a less suitable investment strategy. Would it really be wise to default several thousands of pounds of the worker’s savings into the new employer’s scheme? Regulation could set standards for aggregated schemes above the qualifying standards for automatic enrolment schemes, raising those standards in order to mitigate the risks that can occur on transfer.
Against that, PFM increases the regulatory burden to oversee a myriad schemes into which automatic transfers would be made, rather than focusing on leveraging very high standards in a few aggregated schemes. There is the potential for significant burdens on employers involved in transferring small pots to any number of schemes. Under PFM, every scheme would potentially need to be capable of communicating with every other scheme. Aggregators could pose a lower burden, as there would be—or could be—a much smaller number of such schemes.
Automatic enrolment was intended to carry a lighter regulatory burden for employers, especially SMEs, but this seems to be rowing in the opposite direction. The National Employment Savings Trust, which embraces the most transient low to moderate market, could consequently face higher administrative costs as a result of PFM. What is the consumer detriment to NEST members whose pots are transferred into the schemes of new, small employers, and out of the protection of the high governance standards in NEST?
With pot follows member schemes, the department expects that over the long run average charges would reduce as efficiency savings are made by the industry, but a reading of the impact assessment lacks confidence. Paragraphs 67 to 69 list some of the risks to which I have referred, but paragraph 70 concludes rather sweepingly that,
“the Department would expect the gains and losses from differences between scheme charges and investment performance to cancel out on average”.
When it comes to savers benefitting through lower charges from the administrative savings that providers may make from PFM, paragraph 71 comments that,
“there is a risk that some providers will not experience the resource savings projected”.
Paragraph 72 reminds us of the,
“uncertainty surrounding the assumption over the savings that providers will make”.
This is not the firmest of springboards from which to lock into a solution on the front of a Bill. On the differing views of what benefits the saver, PFM does not currently accommodate people who leave the labour force or become self-employed, as they have no employer scheme into which to transfer their pot. Their ex-employer may nevertheless default them into a poorer personal pension because they do not allow ex-employees in their existing scheme, which I must say is a growing trend. What of women who leave to become carers, move to a new employer, or who work part-time but because of the level of the earnings trigger are not auto-enrolled into the new employer’s scheme?
As has been argued by NAPF and others, pot follows member increases the risk of charges and transaction costs being incurred on the whole pension pot, rather than on the incremental amount saved with the previous employer. If the saver works in an industry characterised by frequent job changes they will be more vulnerable to these risks, which an aggregator could reduce.
Even where individuals choose to transfer to their new employer’s scheme, they face supply-side barriers. Transfers can take weeks if not months, and complexity and lack of standardisation combine to cause delay and increase costs. At decumulation the buying power of a larger pot can be harnessed by the individual, but the buying power is even better if open-market options can be exercised in bulk. Aggregators could facilitate and do this.
I turn to the third element, which is the need to protect dormant pots that have already been accrued. A key weakness in pot follows member is that it excludes existing dormant pots. An aggregator could pool an individual’s dormant and live pots because aggregation would not depend on an active scheme member moving to a new employer. Pot follows member at the point of introduction only consolidates live pots with future live pots. Today’s dormant pots are completely ignored. No start date has been set for pot follows member, as my noble friend Lady Sherlock has indicated, but by 2016 some five years’ worth of dormant pots will have been built up under automatic enrolment, and they will be excluded from the PFM proposition. The summary of the impact assessment points out that those with dormant pots before the start date will,
“remain in their existing scheme”.
That is a key weakness in this solution. Equally, it cannot be right that they should stay with their existing scheme in every instance because some employers will simply default these pots into alternative arrangements anyway if the former employee does not voluntarily transfer. If they are not allowed the option of access to PFM or the aggregator, the employer may well default them anyway into a personal pension.
Finally, the issue of pension pots is not only a future one, it is also one of legacy. Quite a lot of work is being done on standards and reviewing legacy pots by the DWP and the OFT, and there is work to come out of the FCA. I would ask this question: is there to be no synergy on the solution to transferring small pots post-2016 under auto-enrolment, and the solution to the problems that may be revealed in the audit of legacy schemes arising from the OFT investigation? Is it really going to be a set of parallel lines in looking for the solutions to cover the legacy problem, which could also be in auto-enrolment savings pots because of the 2016 dateline and what evolves in the future?
Amendment 62ZC clearly maintains the power of the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the transfer of pension pots, because everyone sees the compelling need to have some way of aggregating or consolidating these small pots. This amendment provides an opportunity to rethink the model to be chosen, but it does not of itself substitute an alternative model. The Government can eventually decide on the alternative
model, and new primary legislation would not be needed—but it would not lock us in. The effect of the amendment would not be to lock us in to the PFM model at this stage. The reason for that is, I would say, because the case is not proved, members’ interests are not truly being defended, and there is no synergy with any dormant savings that may exist prior to the implementation of PFM before 2016. I believe that all these issues need much more consideration.