Amendment 21B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, would require the courts to take into account whether or not to grant applications for arrest warrants in cases where an arrest warrant was not attached to prohibitions in the injunction at the time of its issue but was sought subsequently, when the breach has occurred.
We are not introducing a new and untested power under Clause 9. The courts are used to handling applications for arrest warrants: for anti-social behaviour injunctions on which the IPNA is modelled and gang injunctions, as well as other injunctions. We should therefore bear in mind that the courts are already
experienced in handling applications for arrest warrants and dealing with breach proceedings and they are experienced in doing so without needless delay or copious guidance. So while I agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on the importance of swift action—indeed that is one of the reasons we are reforming the anti-social behaviour powers—I am not persuaded that statutory guidance is needed on this point.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee has also tabled an amendment to the provisions on powers of arrest. The purpose of Amendment 21C is to prevent an arrest warrant being issued against someone who breaches a requirement in their injunction. They would only be able to be brought before the court to answer the breach of a prohibition in the order. With respect to my noble friend, I do not agree with that. Whether a term in an injunction is a prohibition or a requirement, they form part of an order of the court. They must be complied with. The requirement to do something about the cause of your anti-social behaviour is as important as the prohibition to stop it. The courts must have the power to enforce them both. If a person is not forced to do something about their behaviour by complying with a positive requirement, it is likely that they will eventually breach the order and cause further problems. That has been the problem with anti-social behaviour orders.
As my noble friend points out, this is different from the approach we have taken in Clause 3. At the time an injunction is made, a power of arrest can only be attached to a prohibition and not to a positive requirement. The reason for this distinction is that the test under Clause 3 is, rightly, a high one. A power of arrest can only be attached where there is a threat of violence or harm. It is difficult to see how this test could be met by breaching a positive requirement. However, the provisions in Clause 9 for obtaining an arrest warrant do not include such a high test because here the focus is on enforcing the injunction, not on preventing an immediate risk of violence or harm.
On the basis of this explanation, I hope that my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, will be content to withdraw their amendments.