UK Parliament / Open data

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 24, which is in this group. In doing so, I wish also to speak to Amendment 52 and, with the leave of the House, Amendments 56, 57 and 58, which are in a different group but are all consequential on the main amendment.

Clause 2(3) applies only to communications to,

“a Minister of the Crown or permanent secretary”,

second Permanent Secretary or persons serving in government offices as listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1. My amendment seeks to extend the class of persons. As many noble Lords observed at Second Reading, lobbyists will not confine their activities to Ministers or the senior civil servants listed in these provisions. Indeed, their involvement with such people is likely to follow lobbying activity involving civil servants of a lower grade. This is clearly the case when one considers the word “government” in paragraphs (a) to (d) inclusive of Clause 2(3), which has to be construed in accordance with paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 1. That construction extends the definition of consultant lobbying to Ministers or their equivalent, and officials at the highest level in devolved Governments and local authorities in the United Kingdom, and in any institution of the European Union.

When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was initially standing junior to the City of Edinburgh Council then, when I was appointed Silk, I became standing senior to that authority. From that experience, I am aware that local authority officials of a lower grade than senior management prepared policy documents for consideration by senior officials, then elected members. Those junior officials had considerable expertise within their own professional competence and a significant influence on the terms of policy documents that were ultimately submitted to elected members. Any lobbyist worth his salt who wished to influence policy would communicate with these officials at an early stage. I suspect that the same is true in central government and devolved Governments in the United Kingdom. If this provision is to be of any significance, it should be extended to include communications with any civil servant. Equally, there is a perception that political advisers can have a significant influence on government policy. Why should they not be included in the definition of persons to whom communications are made?

Amendment 34 sets out the definition of “political adviser” but, on reflection, the approach taken in the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall of Blaisdon and Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, is more appropriate in referring to “special advisers”. That avoids reinventing the wheel.

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I have suggested the inclusion of Parliamentary Private Secretaries, but I suspect that that might be the most controversial part of the amendment. While I agree that it is essential that Members of Parliament and Members of your Lordships’ House, but not Ministers, should be excluded from this provision,

PPSs are in a special position regarding their Minister. Although unpaid, they may have access to draft policy documents and will attend meetings with the Minister and departmental officials when the formulation of policy is being discussed. I recall that the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, who is not in his place, attended many such meetings when he was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the late Donald Dewar when he was Secretary of State for Scotland. The special relationship that a PPS has with his or her Minister and the access to policy documents and discussions indicate that their inclusion in the affected parts would increase the transparency that the provision seeks to achieve. The other amendments are consequential because the definition of “Permanent Secretary” would be otiose if Amendment 34 were passed.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

749 cc131-3 

Session

2013-14

Chamber / Committee

House of Lords chamber
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