My Lords, like many noble Lords who have spoken, I regard Part 1 of this Bill as being probably well intentioned but very perverse in its effect. Part 2 may or may not be well intentioned but is certainly pernicious in its effect. Part 3 is just pernicious. I have some critical points to make on all parts of this Bill. Many of them have been made already, but that will not prevent me from repeating some of them; there are some things that I wish to underline in all three parts of the Bill.
I also want to say something to Ministers and noble Lords opposite, particularly those of a more liberal disposition in either of the coalition parties. I think that there is a feeling in government that the objections to this Bill of the committees of both Houses, of all the organisations in civic society that have been cited and of noble Lords today is due to oversensitivity, suspicion or even paranoia. But, frankly, the Government have done little to overcome that paranoia. They hope that during consideration of this Bill they will manage to do so, but I doubt it because it is part of a wider problem for this Government.
Looking at the wider issue, when the Westminster Foundation or other human rights bodies promoting democracy in Africa or the former Soviet Union visit these emerging democracies, one of the key elements that they wish to develop is the voice of intermediate democratic representative bodies—local government, trade unions, faith bodies, co-operatives, charities—all the kinds of bodies that will be hit by one or other of the provisions of this Bill.
Let us think about this Government’s record. In the third week of this Government, an instruction went from the Cabinet Office to all quangos and arm’s-length bodies that they were no longer allowed to campaign or to try to influence legislators. Then we had the instruction from DCLG to local government that it had to drop or cut dramatically its campaigning activity. Then we had the various restrictions on access to justice, to tribunals and courts, and the cuts in legal aid. Ministers can defend every single one of these moves individually, but the totality adds up to an attack on or at least an undermining of essential elements of our civic democracy. Democracy is not all Westminster or the big issues; it is what goes on in civic society down the line and how people express themselves collectively and individually through those intermediate organisations. The Government need to reflect on that. I particularly ask the noble Lord, Lord
Wallace of Saltaire, to do so, for I know him to be a liberal person of great democratic credentials. I am not saying anything different about the other Minister sitting on the Front Bench, but I say that today, because it is worrying.
Most of my points on the Bill have been spoken to. On Part 1, we need greater transparency in lobbying, but, as my noble friend Lord Haskel and others said, we are attacking the wrong target at both ends. The only register and requirements are for consultant lobbyists. Consultant lobbyists are a relatively new operation in our democracy. Some of my best friends are now consultant lobbyists, partly because it has been a bit of a job creation scheme for the wannabe, has-been and never-were politicos of various sorts, but, as my noble friend said, they are not the major part of the lobbying industry—far from it. Some organisations see a need to use consultant lobbyists; some do not really need to. The really big, effective lobbyists do not need to. Rupert Murdoch does not need a consultant lobbyist; EDF and the Chinese Government do not need consultant lobbyists; pharmaceutical companies and defence contractors do not need them. Some of them use them occasionally, but they do not need them because they have the power to address Ministers and senior civil servants directly.
I do not know what the solution is to that huge area of lobbying. As the noble Lord, Lord Lang, said, it is very difficult to have a single definition of lobbying. As I remarked the other day, sadly, anybody who wants to talk to a politician is not really there to enjoy their sparkling conversation, their erudition and wisdom, still less their erotic allure; people are there because they want something. In one sense, almost every encounter that a politician has with a member of the public or a representative of an organisation could be defined as lobbying. We have to pin it down—I understand that—but the fact is that Part 1 does not tackle that problem. We are hobbling the minnows while we let the sharks swim free.
It is also about the other end of the process. We all know from being in or anywhere near government that it is very difficult to get the ear of the Secretary of State or the Permanent Secretary, but it is much easier to buy lunch for the person who has their ear—the spad, the private secretary, the assistant secretary or the grade 5 who is actually drafting the legislation or assessing the contracts. They are completely excluded from the Bill, so the Government have got it wrong at both ends of how we are to introduce transparency in the lobbying sector.
On Part 2, a lot of points have been made both in the House and outside, in the literature that we have all received. It is right that there should be restrictions on third parties in electoral situations. It is right that we should be worried about an American-style super-PAC development here. That is why the Labour Government introduced PPERA in the first place 13 years ago, but Part 2 restricts the activities of third parties beyond the degree that is necessary to protect democracy. It reduces the threshold, so that very small organisations have huge burdens placed on them; it widens the definition of what is to be electorally relevant or regulated expenditure; and it cuts significantly the
amount of money that third parties can pay over a period of 12 months before an election, not just the four or five weeks of the election campaign itself.
Obviously, third parties’ campaigning activities can be said to be aligned with one party or another, or with one candidate or another, either locally or nationally. The cutting of expenditure and the widening of the activities that are covered by it will have a drastic effect on many local campaigns—and very soon, if the Bill goes through. We are only 18 months off the general election; we know when it will be these days. Within six months or so, the £5,000 limit on a constituency basis—we need a limit at that basis—will prevent a number of local campaigns against the closure of hospitals, for or against wind farms, for or against particular developments, or campaigns against HS2. All of those local campaigns could fall foul of the constituency limit.
At a national level, several major political events over the past few years could not occur in future in the 12 months before an election, because they were too expensive. In that, it is not just one organisation’s limit that must be taken into account. If several organisations are in coalition for an event, it is the aggregated cost that is controlled, which includes such things as staff costs of the organisation. In those circumstances, for example, at no time in the 12 months before an election could the TUC organise another March for Jobs. It is highly probable that the BMA would find it difficult to organise a campaign about health service reforms. I see my noble friend Lady Mallalieu here. It would be very difficult for the Countryside Alliance to organise a march of previous proportions against a foxhunting ban. God forbid, if we were engaged in some new military intervention, it would be very difficult for a coalition against the war to organise a march against it. All such events would come up against a limit for 12 months. That is a serious limitation on our democracy and something that this House should not allow through without serious objection. That is not a healthy democracy.
Part 3 has trade unionists specifically in its sights. My noble friends Lord Monks and Lady Donaghy have already pointed out the absurdity of that and others have queried why we are doing it at all. Of course, in my paranoid mood, I think that there are two or three potential reasons. One is that it might make strike ballots even more challengeable in the courts than they already are. Another would simply be to impose additional costs on trade unions, limiting their activities. A third is that it is primarily directed at the political funds of trade unions and therefore has an effect on the finances of the major opposition party.
To intervene in this way 18 months before a general election in some emerging democracies would rightly provoke serious condemnation around the democratic world. I will return to Part 3 at later stages. I ask the Government to stop demonising trade unions and to stop the other interventions that this Bill represents, which seriously limit our democracy and the involvement of a whole range of different sorts of organisations in democracy. Ministers may think that our reaction is an exaggeration, but part of the duty of this House is to be vigilant. We must be exceptionally vigilant about this Bill.
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