My Lords, we understand and respect the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, to achieve the best that he possibly can for people with severe mental disorders and pay tribute to his many achievements in the mental health field over many years. We are indeed, as he said, on the same side. We recognise the special vulnerability of this group, and I listened very carefully to what he said.
The Government’s view is that our proposed definition of aftercare services meets the objective of providing clarity on the duty to ensure such provision. That will give greater certainty to those needing or providing aftercare so that it can be provided when it is needed. The inclusion of a definition of aftercare services followed a recommendation by the Law Commission that aftercare services should be defined in accordance with a two-limbed definition from the Mwanza case. This case law defined the services to mean services necessary to meet a need arising from the person’s mental disorder and aimed at reducing the likelihood of the person’s readmission to hospital for further treatment of the disorder.
The Government’s definition of aftercare services builds on the definition recommended by the Law Commission. That was the starting point for the definition. We accepted the recommendation of the Law Commission as a sensible starting point, but we have gone further. The clause now clarifies that the Section 117 duty requires services to be provided to meet needs arising from or related to the person's mental disorder, as well as reducing the risk that the person’s mental condition could deteriorate, requiring their readmission to hospital.
Following public consultation, the Government expanded the proposed definition to put it in the Bill in what we feel is a much improved form. The noble Lord’s amendment omits the first limb of the Government’s definition while making changes to the second. In particular, his amendment weakens the connection between the services required to be provided under
Section 117—I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, that we are fully committed to continuing those—and the specific needs linked to a mental disorder, meaning that the scope of the definition would be unclear.
The Government are concerned that this amendment may confuse rather than clarify the circumstances in which aftercare services should be provided. That would run counter to the purpose of introducing a new definition. If there are disputes over the aftercare services to be provided, the wait that some people would have to endure before the aftercare services would be in place to enable them to leave hospital could be prolonged, something which the noble Lord wants to avoid. In our view, given that it omits the criterion that services must have the purpose of,
“meeting a need arising from or related to the mental disorder of the person concerned”—
I can assure the noble Lord that the definite article does not simply mean something singular but encompasses the plural as well, something to which he briefly referred—the amendment is likely to give rise to more disputes and administrative uncertainty than would be the case with the clause as it stands. Examples of disputes arising under the current Section 117, with no definition, highlight why a statutory definition will add clarity. As highlighted by the Law Commission, having no definition means that the interpretation is left to case law, which has provided varying interpretations.
Nothing in Clause 68 will change the guidance in chapter 27 of the code of practice. It covers housing, employment counselling, and cultural and spiritual needs. The professionals involved include mental health professionals, GPs, employment experts, independent advocates and others. The proposed definition sets out the essential elements and requirements for services to fall within Section 117. The Government do not wish to be more prescriptive as aftercare services should be agreed by health and social care professionals as guided by the code. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord. This has to be done, of course, in the light of each patient’s particular needs.
Finally, the current clause introduces a purpose for Section 117 services to reduce the risk of deterioration in a person’s mental condition, which the noble Lord’s amendment leaves out. I found myself looking at his examples as he went through them. I could not see that they would be excluded by the definition in the Bill, so we see no compelling reason to alter the definition of aftercare from what has been proposed, which is based on research and consultation by the Law Commission and the Government. Perhaps I should propose to the noble Lord that we meet between now and the Report stage to discuss his concerns and make sure that they are not well founded. I am very happy to take this forward and see whether we can involve my honourable friend Norman Lamb in those discussions. I hope that, on the basis of this response, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.