My Lords, one of the themes running through our debates on the Bill has been the need to ensure that the UK has sufficient generating capacity to meet likely demands and to avoid power cuts. It is what is meant by security of supply. This concern has been sharpened by last month’s worrying 2013 report from Ofgem on electricity capacity and the forecast of margins falling perhaps even by the middle of this decade to dangerously low levels. The central purpose of this Bill, through EMR, which is at its heart, is to address this issue, and the capacity market is one of its principal instruments.
I must say at the outset that in the circumstances in which the nation finds itself Ministers have been quite right to identify this as a solution to the capacity problem—or at any rate to try to find a solution. They were right, too, to bring forward the first auction for the capacity market to 2014. But to retain 2018-19 as the earliest date for any payment under the capacity market is a serious mistake. What matters to potential investors is not the date of the auction, but the date on which they can be sure of the first payment if they are successful in the auction.
What I suspect lies behind this four-year gap between the auction and the payment is an idée fixe—an idea somehow firmly held within the corridors of DECC that what it is addressing is really confined to building new plant, for instance to commissioning new generating plant such as a combined cycle gas-fired plant. Yet what we are faced with now is that the problem is on us sooner than anyone had anticipated. The Ofgem report has aroused a great deal of concern, which is not unjustified. The National Grid, supported as one
might expect by Ofgem, has reacted by suggesting what I can only describe as a couple of temporary expedients, aiming to tide the system over until the EMR really begins to bite towards the end of the decade. My impression from the welcome briefings we have had, not least that of yesterday, is that these temporary expedients are what DECC is really basing its hopes on: that we shall not in fact have any power cuts. What is strange is that these temporary expedients had previously been rejected by DECC because of their potential adverse impact.
Ofgem’s electricity capacity assessment concludes that risks to security of supply are likely as early as 2014-15, driven by further reductions in electricity supplies from the withdrawal of installed generation capacity. The report also highlights that future policy and price uncertainty are continuing to limit investment in thermal generation. The assessment bolsters the case for bringing forward a mechanism to deal with the underlying issues contributing to generation inadequacy, which some commentators have described as the “missing money” as in a world of high renewables, thermal plant will run less and less often at suppressed prices. There is also the uncertain economic viability of conventional generation going forward.
Yet against that background, the grid launched what it called an informal consultation last month on two new temporary expedients. I think I need read only the title:
“Demand Side Balancing Reserve and Supplemental Balancing Reserve: Informal Consultation on the Development and Procurement of two new Balancing Services”.
What is needed is new capacity, not temporary sticking plaster. If the required plant is not in the system, it simply is not available for balancing anything. However, it is actually worse than that. The consultation document acknowledges in paragraph 32 on page 9—I have it here if necessary—that,
“security of supply is a function of the market which is underpinned by the energy policies under which the industry operates”.
It also says that it is not National Grid’s role,
“to ensure there is sufficient generation capacity available to meet demand”.
Yet the proposals aim to ask National Grid to do precisely this, by procuring capacity through the supplemental balancing reserve and demand-side balancing reserve.
The SBR is essentially a form of strategic reserve with last-resort despatch. As I intimated earlier, the strategic reserve was rejected by DECC, while acknowledging that such a mechanism does not address the missing money in the energy market but could even make the problem worse, in that investors might fear that the strategic reserve will be deployed before it is envisaged it would be—that is, when other capacity is available, albeit at very high prices. This would dampen the investment signal for players outside the strategic reserve, leading to what one might describe as a slippery-slope effect whereby no new investment is viable without an SBR contract. More and more capacity would then have to be procured within the strategic reserve. The result is that it simply displaces the ever-dwindling part of the market, with no intervention. What is needed is to bring forward not
only the auction date under the capacity market but the date on which payments under the capacity market will be received. That is the purpose of my amendment.
At Second Reading, noble Lords may well remember that I drew attention to the substantial amount of mothballed plant held by some of the larger generators. They were mothballed because it is simply not economic to run them at current prices and in the light of uncertain futures. Some of this capacity could well be brought into production over the next six to 18 months, provided—this is what has to be hoisted on board—that capacity market payments can be made as soon as the plant is available and commissioned. That would happen if this amendment were to be accepted; both Ofgem and the grid recognise that the immediate problem is about capacity, not balancing. If my noble friend is unable to accept the amendment as it stands, perhaps she would agree to reflect on the situation I have described over the recess and consult further with those who are trying to help the Government to avoid the risk of serious interruptions of supply. The mechanism would be there but the implementation dates need to recognise the growing immediacy of the problem we face.
I make just one final point. This is not primarily about improving access to the market—other amendments will address that—but about reducing the risk of blackouts. I repeat what I have said previously; if the country faces interruptions in electricity supply, it is Ministers and the Government who will be held responsible. I, like everyone else, wish to avoid that. I beg to move.