I see that he is nodding. Should he wish to elaborate on that a little more, that would be even more welcome.
1.45 pm
I had better move on, because we are in a time-limited debate and I still have a little way to go. Let me set out the background by saying that the new clause proposed by Lords amendment 122 would update the ISC’s remit to ensure that it has the power effectively to scrutinise intelligence and security activity that takes place across Government under the new national security regime, not just in the seven organisations already listed in our MOU. The MOU sits under the Justice and Security Act 2013, and it outlines our remit and the organisations that we oversee. That encompasses the expenditure, administration, policy and operations of the agencies and four other organisations that currently form part of the UK’s intelligence community.
Given the national security focus of the Bill, the ISC already has the power to oversee much of the intelligence and security activity that will take place under the new regime through its oversight of those seven organisations. However, as we have made clear in our most recent annual reports, which were cited by the shadow Security Minister, intelligence and security activities are increasingly being undertaken by a wider collection of policy Departments, including those that generally do not carry out national security- related activity, such as the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy,
the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and the Department for Transport. Those teams are not currently listed in our MOU, simply because at the time it was drafted, in 2013, they were not responsible for any intelligence and security work. Had they been, Parliament would have included them in the ISC’s remit, as is clearly indicated by the commitments given to the House during the passage of the 2013 Act by the late and much-missed James Brokenshire, the then Security Minister.
All this means that the ISC’s MOU needs urgent updating. In the meantime, effective parliamentary oversight of intelligence and security matters is being eroded. Lords amendment 122 is therefore essential, as it will help to reverse the increasingly large gap that has emerged in Parliament’s ability effectively to oversee intelligence and security activity.
Effective oversight of intelligence and security matters can be undertaken only by the ISC. Select Committees do an excellent job scrutinising their Departments, and we have no wish to duplicate any of their work, but only we have the security infrastructure effectively to scrutinise those aspects where classified material, such as intelligence, underpins decisions on national security. The importance of this difference is obvious. For example, during the passage of this Bill, when the Government were unable to provide publicly the detailed rationale and case studies underpinning clause 31 to Parliament, due to its classified nature, the material was provided instead to those on the ISC, who were then able to scrutinise it on Parliament’s behalf. That enabled us to understand the problem and make recommendations for change, leading to a much improved “defence”, with the necessary safeguards, in place of the previous unsatisfactory “exemption.”
I have almost concluded, so I will just make the following few additional remarks. This could not have been achieved without the ISC, because Select Committees cannot provide effective oversight of classified matters. This is no reflection on the ability of Select Committees, which provide robust oversight on all other matters. The Government provided a clear undertaking to Parliament during the passage of the Justice and Security Act 2013, when the then Security Minister told Parliament that it was
“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of…all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now”—
which was then—
“and in the future”—[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]
which is now.
It was clear that the MOU was designed to be a living document that could be updated to reflect any changes to the security and intelligence activities being undertaken by the Government. Yet the Government have repeatedly failed to meet this commitment, which indicates a worrying lack of appreciation of the importance of comprehensive oversight of intelligence and security matters. As the ISC set out in our annual report, the then National Security Adviser relayed the Government’s position that they did not feel bound by statements made by the then Security Minister in 2013 during the passage of the Justice and Security Act.
To conclude, if the Government will not ensure that the ISC’s memorandum of understanding is kept updated —and they have not been ensuring that—each piece of
new legislation devolving intelligence and security matters away from the bodies already overseen by the ISC must come with a commensurate expansion to that MOU. I know that this is not the Minister’s fault. I speak to Minister after Minister—I am not saying anything about this particular one—but Ministers do not seem to understand why this keeps happening. I just wonder where exactly in the Government machine this necessary change that was always envisaged in the ISC system is being blocked.