I am pleased to be speaking in this debate as one of the newer members of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. It is good to hear from my colleagues on the Committee, and I will try not to repeat too much of what they have said, because the Committee has of course taken a view on some of the issues covered by the Bill.
Let me begin by saying to the Home Secretary that it is unequivocally a good thing that the Government have finally brought forward a Bill to update and reform the Official Secrets Act regime, as has been made clear across the House. As many have said, the legislation relating to
the Official Secrets Act regime goes back many—very many—years and is no longer fit for purpose. It is not just the Government who do not think it is fit for purpose. The Committee has said that it is not fit for purpose and the Law Commission has said that it is not fit for purpose. I have not heard anybody suggest that it is fit for purpose, so I think there is consensus across the Chamber that it needs to be replaced.
The idea of replacing the Official Secrets Act regime is to ensure that the intelligence community has the legislative powers and the tools it needs to combat the varied, complex and constantly evolving threat to the UK’s national security posed by hostile state actors. It is therefore good that the Bill as currently drafted, with its aims to modernise the offence of espionage and create a suite of more modern tools and powers for police, security and intelligence agencies to defend the UK against hostile state actors, is now before us. Although the Home Secretary has set out her intentions in legislation, she has not made it clear that she intends a comprehensive reform of the Official Secrets Act regime in total. She is reforming espionage offences, but she is not doing much at the moment about the Official Secrets Act 1989, which relates to the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information. That is an important part of the Official Secrets Act regime, without reform of which she cannot claim that she has modernised the existing suite of powers. I agree with her—I doubt there would be much disagreement—that it is quite a difficult thing to do, but she and her predecessors have been at it for some time, helped by other parts of Parliament and by the Law Commission which have looked at the matter. Perhaps now is the time—with this Bill before us, which is meant to be a comprehensive piece of legislation—actually to make it comprehensive and come up with proper reforms.
The Law Commission has suggested a regime, and the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers) has set out that she certainly believes, as the Committee does more generally, that this reform ought to be part of this legislation. From what I gathered from the Home Secretary’s replies to interventions earlier—and I am glad if she is listening to what is being said—she is not proposing to bring forward reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989 in this legislation, nor has she set out a timetable within which she intends to bring it forward in another piece of legislation, which is a disappointment.
This Parliament will end in 2024, if it does not end sooner—of course, provisions about when Parliaments end have now changed, and it could end sooner than that—so the Home Secretary might be saying to the House that she does not have any plans to make the reform comprehensive in this Parliament. She has certainly not committed that she will. I think that that is a shame—it is an omission. However, in respect of the other missing element—the foreign influence registration scheme—I very much welcome the fact that the Home Secretary has been very precise and said that it will be introduced in Committee. I hope that that is at the beginning of the Committee stage, because the points that have been made by Members across the House about the importance of scrutinising such a provision are important. She will only get into trouble in the other place if she does not enable proper scrutiny in the
Commons. We all want to get the foreign influence registration scheme right, and scrutiny can only help with that.
I hope that the Home Secretary introduces that swiftly, giving plenty time for proper scrutiny. The proposals that have been made for a Committee of the whole House might be a way of doing it, if she can persuade the business managers. I hear that she is very persuasive, so perhaps she can persuade them that that should be done. I do not think that she would find anyone who said that that was a bad idea. The Government have previously made a commitment that reform of the OSA 1989 would represent a key part of the Bill, so it is a bit of a mystery, difficult as it is, that it is missing. One might even say that it is a glaring omission. The Home Secretary could put it right by introducing that sooner.
Comments have been made about clause 23 and the amending of schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007, to disapply the offence of encouraging or assisting offences overseas when the activity in question is deemed necessary for the proper exercise of any function of the intelligence services or armed forces. The explanatory notes say—and I think that I heard the Home Secretary say something similar—that the provision will
“provide better protection to those discharging national security functions on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, to enable more effective joint working and to improve operational agility”.
I think that that is what the Home Secretary said, but this appears to be a wholesale carve-out of the intelligence services and the armed forces from any liability for assisting or encouraging crime overseas in any activities undertaken abroad. It is in effect an extensive granting of impunity against liability for criminal wrongdoing abroad for those discharging national security functions. It is extraordinarily broad in scope, particularly given the defence in legislation for those discharging national security functions abroad, which protects from liability in certain circumstances.
Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 protects those who act “reasonably”, and the agencies and armed forces can use those provisions to protect their staff in appropriate circumstances where their actions are reasonable. There is a further option in some cases to protect staff from liability by obtaining a ministerial authorisation under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.
The question—and it has not really been answered—is why has this wholesale carve-out been included? Why is it needed? What is inadequate about the current defences that has led the Government to do this? If an action does not meet a reasonableness test, I do not think it could possibly be described as necessary for the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service or of the armed forces. Clause 23 at the moment appears to confer impunity without the need to consider whether an action is reasonable. When the Committee considered this matter, it did not think that it was justified, and the case has not been made to justify the inclusion of a blanket carve-out from liability—nor does that carve-out explain what has gone wrong with the existing reasonableness defence and the ministerial authorisation system, and why that is thought to be inadequate. We look forward to a much clearer explanation in Committee of why the Government think the provision is necessary,
because in a worst-case scenario it could lead to less accountability for the agencies. At best, it seems unnecessary, given the existing safeguards.
On the legal aid provisions in part 3, I heard what was said by the Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), who is not in his place at the moment. He cautioned that the Government need to be careful about the terms in which they set out such provisions. My remarks are in view of my membership of that Committee and certainly not a reflection of my membership of the ISC, because such matters are not in its remit.
Civil legal aid has always been made available based on two main criteria: the type of case, including its likelihood of success; and the financial means of the applicant. It has never been dependent on the nature of any previous conviction of the applicant in a blanket ban, and certainly not whether they had been convicted of a particular type of offence in the past. I understand why policymakers and the Government might be concerned about those who have committed terrorist offences getting civil legal aid to sue, but I hope the Government will consider whether introducing this novel way of determining eligibility for civil legal aid is the right way forward.
I notice that provisions in clause 61 and schedule 10 will enable the court to make a freezing order on all or part of any damages that such a person recovers, ensuring that they are paid into the court, and enable an extension of the period for which awarded damages can be frozen. There is also provision in schedule 10 for a forfeiture of any such damages if it looks like they may be used to further some terrorist cause. I have no problem with that, but the novel restriction proposed on eligibility is difficult because it changes the whole way in which administration of civil legal aid is carried forward for a particular class of person. We must be careful about that. One can always think of other types of offenders who perhaps do not “deserve” to get civil legal aid. My concern is that introducing such a way of looking at eligibility may have a much broader implication that is not entirely good. That is despite there being hard cases, and I understand why policymakers are concerned.
When we get to Committee, I hope that those of use fortunate enough to consider the Bill further will be able to go into all its aspects in a lot more detail. I finish as I began by welcoming the Bill’s introduction; it just needs to be more comprehensive.
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