I should put on record that I have been doing some academic research on Russian conventional and non-conventional warfare. I lived in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet states between 1990 and 1994, and I have recently made about seven trips to Ukraine and the Baltic republics for research purposes.
I thank the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) for initiating the debate, and for the spirit in which it is taking place. I think the best way I can help is by giving a few definitions, either Russian or my own, and then making some suggestions to the Minister.
In my view, the most important thing we can achieve is to avoid worsening relations with Russia and do what we can to minimise the chances of conflict, which are small but genuine. At the same time, however, we need to call out Russian malign intent, understand what is happening, and take firm action when it is required. It is clear that the Kremlin opposes liberal democracy and sees it as a threat. Its doctrines imply a conflict of values. We see that in the Russian foreign policy concepts, two of which have emerged in the last 20 years, and in the information security doctrine, the recent national security strategy and the three military doctrines that have also appeared in the past two decades.
My hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Julian Knight) talked about the conceptualisation of active measures and about hybrid war. In contemporary Russian doctrine, the first characteristic of military conflict is
the combining of “people power” with military and non-military tools. It has been described as the
“integrated use of force, political, economic, informational and other measures of a non-military character, implemented with the extensive use of protest potential of the population and Special Operations forces”.
That is my slightly rough translation of the original. It refers to cyber and espionage as well as traditional, physical special forces operations.
Contemporary military conflict involves the integrated use of all tools, and vote-rigging is very much part of that. I have come across more than 50 such tools, too many to list here, but they can be divided into six categories. There is information warfare, of which we are seeing a great deal in this country, and in which I would include the substance of cyber. There is soft power: culture, religion, governance and law. That is more applicable to eastern Europe than to us. There are subversive political tactics. They date from the old Soviet active measures of which my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) will be well aware: assassination, blackmail, kompromat—the stuff that the Russians may or may not have on President Trump; we hope not, but who knows? Those tools were developed by the KGB, and have been re-championed by FSB and the GRU. There are also diplomacy and public outreach, economic tools, and conventional and non-conventional military tools.
To those six elements we should add another two: command and control. Journalists often miss that out because they do not think it particularly interesting, but for diplomats, soldiers and, one presumes, spooks—people who are trying to understand them—the command and control structures are important. Finally, there is control through “psychological chess”. The Russians call it “reflective control”, and it is a way of leading opponents to their own demise.
I have been filleting my speech, and I have 45 seconds in which to tell the Minister what I think we need to do. I suggest that he should remember what was happening in the United States in the 1980s. It had a House Intelligence Committee which reported twice a year. It was a standing, powerful Committee which used a great many experts from across the range to publicise its results in order to inoculate society against the lies that were told. We need such a Committee. I shall write about that to various Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston) and the right hon. Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett), in the new year. We need a powerful Committee that can look at matters holistically. Russian warfare is holistic, and ours needs to be as well.
We also need a standing group of experts. In the United States in the 1980s, the Active Measures Working Group was very successful in bringing to light the warfare activities of the Soviets and presenting the evidence to Mr Gorbachev.
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