I had occasion to consider deeply the matter of rights and human rights when I drafted, tabled and had debated in this place a British Bill of Rights—the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill. People said to me that that could not be done, that it could not be drafted and that it was an impossible project. However, with the help and counsel of many hon. and learned Friends—not least my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox), who has just spoken with power, force and vigour—I was able to construct and present a Bill of Rights to this House. That is relevant to this debate because there were three key questions involved. The first
question was: what are the rights? The second was: how do we interpret them? The third was: which court should decide on those rights?
Let us take the first question. What are the rights? Some rights are so basic and self-evidently true that they are not even rights at all. They are values. They go to the heart of our constitution, of our foundations, of what we believe in as a country, of what we are about and of our way of life. They involve basic stuff such as the rule of law, natural justice, the right to a fair hearing and the presumption of innocence. Those are the fundamental values of what we are about as a nation and of what we hold to be self-evident and true. When they are trampled upon, there is uproar in this place and across the country because we know in our hearts that those are the values that we hold dear. They are not rights; they are values.
There are also rights, in the Human Rights Act 1998, that we hold to be self-evident and true. They are called second amendment rights in America, and they include the right to a free press, the right to free speech, the right to determine one’s religion and the right of association. Those are important rights that go to the heart of what we are about and that we call values. Then there are the many rights set out in the European convention on human rights that have been built mainly in our own constitution and our own history. They did not just begin in 1998. They are rights that we have taken to be self-evident and true for many years, and they have found their way into the Human Rights Act, and the human rights code—a document to which it is hard to object.
Then we come to the issue of interpretation, and that is where the problems begin. The European Court of Human Rights adopts an interpretation mechanism that I call objective. It asks: do we have the right to family life, yes or no? If we have that right, we cannot be extradited in certain cases. In our own system, we tend to take what I call a more subjective view. We look at all the facts and circumstances of a case. In interpreting that right, we ask whether someone should be able to stand on that right to family life, given their conduct if, for example, they had committed a crime or run someone over. Having examined all the facts and circumstances of the case, we would say that they should not be able to stand on that right because their conduct means that they should not be allowed, ethically and in equity, to do so. That is where the British people were in so many extradition cases. They thought, “These are European rights and they are all wrong.” They are not necessarily wrong, but their interpretation was not right and did not sit well with our values, our way of life and our understanding of how principles of law should be interpreted.
The third question is: what is the proper court? I made sure that my British Bill of Rights included a clause on interpretation. It stated: first, that all facts and circumstances of a case should be considered, giving judges a wide discretion to make a full decision; and secondly, that the court should be the Supreme Court. For me, it was about making the Supreme Court supreme. I did not see why our rights as a nation should be subject to the European Court of Human Rights, or indeed to the European Court of Justice, when our own Supreme Court can determine those things very effectively. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member
for Torridge and West Devon that it should be this House that constructs rights, that their interpretation should be in line with our own canons of interpretation as a nation, and that the Supreme Court should be supreme.
However, I would not reject the charter of fundamental rights out of hand. Let me explain why. There are rights that make no sense here, such as the right to petition the European Parliament. If we are leaving the European Union, why would we want to petition the European Parliament? On the right to free movement, to seek and have employment anywhere across the continent, that will be a matter for us to determine as a nation state when we leave the European Union. It makes no sense to include those rights in the charter—a point I made to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who agreed with me that we would need to adapt it.
The charter contains rights that draw on the European Court of Human Rights, so there is unnecessary duplication. Then there is an intermediate set of rights, which I think this House should look at. If we are to take back control, we should ask ourselves, “Is it right that some of the rights in the charter should be brought into our own system of law?” That might not be for this Bill, but it is something we should definitely consider.